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BAD POLICY FOR GOOD POLICIES: 
ARTICLE 9’S INSURANCE EXCLUSION 
 
Andrew Verstein* 
 
* * * 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code excludes from 
its scope any transfer of an interest in a life insurance 
policy. Thus, any lender whose security is a life insurance 
policy may not look to the UCC to determine her rights. 
This Article argues that the exclusion should be eliminated 
because it leaves insurance governed by antiquated and 
problematic law.  Three specific problems are considered: 
non-UCC law does not have a satisfactory alternative to 
UCC perfection; non-UCC law is insufficient to prevent 
lenders from abusively taking more than their share of 
value from defaulted policies; and non-UCC law allows 
insurance companies to hinder securitization through the 
“reservation problem.” The result is that Americans 
borrow $121 billion worth of policy loans, almost all of 
which comes without serious competition. Eliminating the 
life insurance exclusion will rationalize the law of lending 
in this area, and improve prospects for a secondary 
market.+# 
 * * * 
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* Associate Research Scholar in Law and John R. Raben/Sullivan & Cromwell 
Executive Director, Yale Law School Center for the Study of Corporate Law, Yale 
Law School. The author would like to thank Eric Brunstad, Matthew Grieder, 
Mitzi Huang, George Mullin and Debbie Cotton for their insightful comments. All 
errors remain the author's own. 
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BAD POLICY FOR GOOD POLICIES: 
ARTICLE 9’S INSURANCE EXCLUSION 
 
$100 billion worth of American life insurance policies are 
“impaired,” meaning that the insured would realize more money by selling 
the policy on the secondary market than by surrendering the policy to the 
insurance company.1 Many consumers benefit from selling or surrendering 
their life insurance policies, but selling one’s life insurance is a serious step 
that many people later regret. Rather than selling her policy, an insured 
could instead borrow against it, with less permanence and worry.  
Borrowing is not without its own risks.2 Nevertheless, for many insureds, 
borrowing is a better choice than selling.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
1 Neil A. Doherty & Hal J. Singer, The Benefits of a Secondary Market for Life 
Insurance Policies, 38 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 449 (2003). See also DELOITTE-
UCONN ACTUARIAL CTR., DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP & THE UNIVERSITY OF 
CONNECTICUT, THE LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE (2005), available at http://www.quatloos.com/ 
uconn_deloitte_life_settlements.pdf.?
2 Recent events in the financial markets have shown that improvident 
borrowing and excessive indebtedness can lead to harms of all their own. 
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Borrowing against life insurance is widespread. Americans 
currently secure about $121 billion dollars worth of loans with their life 
insurance policies.3 The vast majority of these loans were made by their 
issuing insurance company and without any serious competition from other 
lenders. This is in part because of difficulty and uncertainty in the law 
governing the assignments of life insurance policies. Though it is legal to 
sell or pledge a life insurance policy, life insurance policies may not serve 
as security for the purposes of an Article 9 lien.  
Revised Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code is governing 
law for almost all security interest transactions in all states.4 The product of 
extensive scholarly drafting and professional insights, the UCC is lauded 
for its clarity, coherence and logic.5 Despite its potential benefits, Article 9 
excludes from its scope transfers of interests in insurance policies.6 Forty-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Moreover, some insurance borrowing arrangements can be disadvantageous, 
fraudulent, or predatory. See infra Part III.D.  
3 FED. RES., FLOW OF FUNDS ACCOUNTS OF THE UNITED STATES: FLOWS AND 
OUTSTANDING, FOURTH QUARTER 2009 32 (Mar. 11, 2010), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/z1/current/z1r-1.pdf. ?
4 U.C.C. § 9-109(a)(1) (2000) ("[T]his Article applies to a transaction, 
regardless of its form, that creates a security interest in personal property or 
fixtures by contract.”). 
5 See, e.g., Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., A Property-Based 
Theory of Security Interests: Taking Debtors' Choices Seriously, 80 VA. L. REV. 
2021, 2021 (1994) (“In embarking upon the revision of what many consider the 
most successful commercial statute ever . . . .”); Donald J. Rapson, Default and 
Enforcement of Security Interests under Revised Article 9, 74 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
893, 893 (1999) ("Article 9 has been rightfully lauded as the 'jewel' of the Uniform 
Commercial Code . . . ."); Edward L. Rubin, Efficiency, Equity and the Proposed 
Revisions of Articles 3 and 4, 42 ALA. L. REV. 551, 557 (1991) (“[T]he greatest 
conceptual achievement in the field was Article 9 of the U.C.C. Its drafters, 
Gilmore and Dunham, had unified the various forms of security instruments-chattel 
mortgages, trust receipts, field warehouses, pledges and so forth-into a single 
coherent framework with a new, generic terminology.”); Karl N. Llewellyn, Why 
We Need the Uniform Commercial Code, 10 U. FLA. L. REV. 367, 379 (1957) 
("[T]he whole of Article 9 brings into simplified and workable form the law of all 
chattel security."). 
6 U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8) (2000) (“This article does not apply to . . . a transfer of 
an interest in or an assignment of a claim under a policy of insurance, other than an 
assignment by or to a health-care provider of a health-care-insurance receivable 
and any subsequent assignment of the right to payment, but Sections 9-315 and 9-
322 apply with respect to proceeds and priorities in proceeds”). Notice an ad hoc 
exception for health-care insurance receivables. See id.  Moreover the code does 
not exclude the proceeds of insurance policies from its scope. Id.; see also U.C.C. 
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eight of the fifty states follow the UCC in excluding insurance policies 
from the scope of their state’s version of Article 9. 7 A lender who accepts a 
life insurance policy as collateral to secure a debt may not look to Article 9 
to determine her rights and responsibilities. But as states adopted Article 9, 
they repealed their other security statutes. So while the practice of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
§§ 9-315, -322. But this inclusion is meant to allow secured parties whose 
collateral is destroyed to maintain their interest in the subsequent insurance money. 
See Peter Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARV. L. REV. 477, 515 (1973).  
Neither exception is relevant to the discussion at hand.?
7 ALA. CODE § 7-9A-109 (D)(8) (LexisNexis 2006); ALASKA STAT. § 
45.29.109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 47-9109 (West 
2005); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2001); COLO. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 4-9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2010); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 42a-9-109 
(West 2009); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 6, § 9-109 (2005); DC CODE § 28:9-109 
(LexisNexis 2001); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091(4)(h) (West 2003); GA. CODE 
ANN., § 11-9-109(d)(8) (West 2010); HAW. REV. STAT. § 490:9-109(d)(8) (2008); 
IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-9-109(d)(8) (2001); 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-109(d)(8) 
(West 2004); IND. CODE ANN. § 26-1-9.1-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2005); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 554.9109(4)(h) (West 2004); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-9-109(d)(8) 
(1996); KY. REV. STAT. § 355.9-109 (4)(h) (West 2006); LA. REV. STAT. § 10:9-
109(d)(8) (West 2002); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 9-1109(4)(h) (West Supp. 
2010); MD. CODE ANN., COM. LAW, § 9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2002); MICH. 
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 440.9109(h)(4) (LexisNexis 2001); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
336.9-109(d)(8) (West 2002); MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-9-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 
1972); MO. ANN. STAT. § 400.9-109 (d)(8) (West 2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-
9A-109(4)(h) (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 9-109(D)(8) (2006); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
104.9109(4)(h) (LexisNexis 2007); N.H. REV. STAT. § 382-A:9-109(d)(8) 
(LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:9-109(d)(8) (West 2004); N.M. STAT. 
ANN. § 55-9-109 (d)(8) (West 2001); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 25-9-109(d)(8) 
(LexisNexis 2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 41-09-09(4)(h) (LexisNexis 2001); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.109(d)(8) (West 2010); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-9-
109(d)(8) (West 2001); OR. REV. STAT. § 79.0109(4)(h) (2009); 13 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 9109 (d)(8) (West 2002); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6A-9-109(d)(8) 
(LexisNexis 2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 36-9-109(d)(8) (West 2003); S.D. CODIFIED 
LAWS § 57A-9-109(d)(8) (West 2004); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-9-109(d)(8) 
(LexisNexis 2001); TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.109(d)(8) (West 2002); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 70A-9a-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2009); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 
11A, Art. 9 § 9-109(d)(8) (West 2009); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9A, § 9-109(d)(8) 
(LexisNexis 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.9A-109(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2001); WASH. 
REV. CODE ANN. § 62A.9 A-109(d)(8) (West 2003); W. VA. CODE § 46-9-109 
(d)(8) (LexisNexis 2007); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 409.109(4)(h) (West 2003); WYO. 
STAT. ANN. § 34.1-9-109 (d)(vii) (LexisNexis 2009). But see CAL. COM. CODE § 
9109 (West 2002); LA. REV. STAT. § 10:9-109(d)(8) (West 2002).?
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borrowing on insurance policies grows exponentially,8 there is less 
statutory law than ever.  In that absence of statutory law, the common law 
governs from subterranean obscurity. 
Article 9’s Official Comments rationalize the insurance policy 
exclusion by stating, “Such transactions are often quite special, do not fit 
easily under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by 
existing law.”9 However, by the late 1960s, the Drafting Committee was 
criticizing the exclusion and the above-stated rationale:  
 
It is hard to see where loans made by outsiders ‘are 
adequately covered by existing law’ and why they did not 
‘fit easily under a general commercial statute.’ Indeed, it 
would appear that the law needs some rules to cover the 
growing practice of insurance premium financing where 
the loan by an outsider is always secured by a pledge of 
the insurance policy.”10  
 
This Article argues that security interests in life insurance policies can and 
should be within a general commercial statute, the Uniform Commercial 
Code’s Article 9 and its concomitant state enactments.  
 The law as it currently operates is woefully inadequate. This is 
because the exclusion does more than decline UCC-specific legal 
procedures.  It causes interests in life insurance policies to tumble down the 
rabbit hole into the pre-statutory common law. Economic innovation and 
industry practice have far outpaced the law in this area, and that has 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8 The target market for life settlements, a subset of the impaired policies most 
attractive for a policy loan, is anticipated to grow at three times the rate of 
population growth in the coming decades. See SUNEET KAMATH & TIMOTHY 
SLEDGE, BERNSTEIN RESEARCH CALL, LIFE INSURANCE LONG VIEW – LIFE 
SETTLEMENTS NEED NOT BE UNSETTLING 6 (Sanford C. Bernstein & Co.) (2005).?
9 Uniform Commercial Code: 1962 Official Text with Comments (Article 3 to 
End), 621 (1963), reprinted in XXIII Uniform Commercial Code Drafts, 401 
(Comp., Elizabeth Slusser Kelly, 1984). The Comments to the current draft of the 
UCC no longer explain the policy exclusion at all.?
10 Homer Kripke, Associate Reporter of the Review Committee for Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code, Memorandum Re: Problems of Inclusion and 
Exclusion, 4-5 (Feb. 16, 1968). Permanent Editorial Board for the Uniform 
Commercial Code, Document No. 10 in VI Uniform Commercial Code: 
Confidential Drafts, (Comp., Elizabeth Slusser Kelly & Ann Puckett, 1995). 
Kripke’s comments were primarily directed at the exclusion of third party loans to 
the insured. ?
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potentially harsh consequences for the consumers whose finances are 
impacted by the insurance industry.  
Part I explains the basics of insurance financing transactions, 
emphasizing the importance of policy loans and sales to insurance 
customers, and how a vibrant secondary market serves those interests. Part 
I gives the reader a sense of what is at stake. 
 Part II explains the trouble with UCC § 9-109(d)(8) by showing 
three areas where the law is irregular, unfair, or at odds with modern 
business practice. Section A considers the “perfection problem,” which are 
those difficulties a party may experience in trying to perfect her security 
interest in an insurance policy.  The current law grants priority in an 
uncertain and inefficient manner, to the detriment of secured parties, 
insureds, and insurers alike. The perfection problem is well known to those 
who follow these issues,11 though the growing importance of an efficient 
secondary market makes it more important than ever.  
Sections B and C present new problems with the exclusion. No 
previous scholarship has noticed or addressed these issues. Section B, the 
“surplus problem,” explains the law regarding the division of surplus from 
sale, surrender, or maturity of the policy. An important question that 
emerges in any insurance policy financing is “upon default, who gets 
what?” The rise of the secondary market has seen a variety of creditors who 
hope to receive the full maturity or resale value of the policy upon which 
the loan is secured. Because the policy is often worth more than the loan it 
secures, there is often a windfall to the creditors. These creditors are often 
unjustly enriched, and the present legal regime is insufficient to deter them.  
Section C explains how the secondary market is threatened by a 
particularly bedeviling combination of draftsmanship and old law. Nearly 
all existing insurance policies are assigned in a manner that impedes the 
creditor’s ability to resell the policy. The resale is impeded as a result of a 
reservation clause in the policy assignment, and so is referred to as “the 
reservation problem.”  
Each of these problems would be solved if security interests in life 
insurance policies were included within the scope of Article 9 of the UCC. 
Because interests in insurance policies are choses in action or things in 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
11 Gerald T. McLaughlin, “Seek but You May Not Find”: Non-UCC Recorded, 
Unrecorded and Hidden Security Interests under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 953, 959 (1985); Stephen Knippenberg, 
Insurance Policies as Collateral Under Article 9: Withdrawal of the Section 9-
104(g) Exclusion, in APPENDICES TO REPORT OF THE ARTICLE 9 STUDY 
COMMITTEE OF THE PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 219 (1992). 
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action,12 Article 9 would treat insurance policies as general intangibles.13 
Security interests in general intangibles are perfected by filing with the 
Secretary of State.14 They are subject to a well-understood foreclosure and 
disposition regime.15 Contractual restrictions on assignment of interests in 
general intangibles are invalid.16 These features of Article 9, in addition to 
its general coherence and uniform treatment of other security interests, 
promise substantial improvements to this area of financing.  
Part III goes on to consider and reject objections to this proposal. 
Five such objections are considered. Historical analysis shows that there 
was never a compelling reason for the exclusion, and policy analysis shows 
that exclusion is an inappropriate mechanism for protecting consumers or 
the insurance industry. Part IV concludes by taking stock of the problem 
and imagining the significance of this proposed solution for the broader 
financial market.  
 
I. WHY PEOPLE BORROW AGAINST THEIR INSURANCE 
POLICIES, AND WHY IT SHOULD BE EASIER.  
 
Judge Crippin in St. John v. American Mutual Life Insurance Co., 
noted that “[W]ithout the right to assign, insurances on lives lose half their 
usefulness.”17 An insured’s right to assign an insurance policy to a third 
party is not seriously contested. The right was clearly recognized by the 
Supreme Court of the United States in 1911.18 But the law may make it 
difficult,19 and as a result compromise half the usefulness of an insurance 
policy. 
Many different rationales might motivate an individual to borrow 
against her life insurance policy.20 Most simply, an insured may desire to 
keep her insurance policy but be unable or unwilling to continue paying 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
12 See infra note 94.?
13 U.C.C. § 9-102(1)(42) (2000). ?
14 U.C.C. § 9-310 (2000). ?
15 U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2000).?
16 U.C.C. § 9-408 (2000).?
17 St. John v. Am. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 N.Y. 31, 39 (1855). In that case, 
perhaps not by coincidence, the surrender value of the policy was approximately 
half of the death benefit. ?
18 Grigsby v. Russel, 222 U.S. 149 (1911). ?
19 See infra Part II. ?
20 Sachin Kohli, Pricing Death: Analyzing the Secondary Market for Life 
Insurance Policies and its Regulatory Environment, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 279, 293-95 
(2006) (listing manifold reasons policy owner may wish to part with it).?
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premiums. Perhaps needs have changed, as would be the case if dependants 
have grown up or passed away. Perhaps her current policy is under-funded 
and she desires capital with which to invest in a better-suited life insurance 
product.21 Perhaps she needs an emergency fund to finance current 
expenses in the event of economic hardship.22 More than ever, our law 
respects such transactions and understands life insurance policies as 
instruments for planning for the aftermath of rapid declines in health other 
than death,23 and as a financial asset more generally. 
Recently, great attention has been directed towards so-called “life 
settlements” or “viatical settlements.”24 In these transactions, insureds sell 
their policies to investors who then pay the premiums and stand to collect 
the death or “maturity” benefit. It is clear that some consumers benefit from 
this novel way of liquidating their insurance assets, but the irreparable 
quality of a sale increases the risk of fraudulent or unfair transactions.25 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21 Perhaps 40% of life insurance policy sales result in the purchase of a 
another financial product. Heather D. Mitchell, The Producer’s Role in a Life 
Settlement, LIFE INS. SELLING, Feb. 1, 2004, (magazine), at 3 (statement of Scott 
Butterworth).?
22 Andre P. Liebenberg, James M. Carson & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand for 
Life Insurance Policy Loans, 77 J. RISK AND INSURANCE 651 (SEPT. 2010), 
available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1653049.?
23 Wayne M. Gazur, Death and Taxes: The Taxation of Accelerated Death 
Benefits for the Terminally Ill, 11 VA. TAX REV. 263, 266 (1991) (“Arguably, an 
income tax exclusion for accelerated death benefits . . . blur[s] the present 
distinction between the income taxation of life insurance, which traditionally 
emphasizes survivor protection, and the taxation of retirement, health, and long-
term care requirements.”).?
24 See Ffiona M. Jones, Note, The Viatical Settlement Industry: The 
Regulatory Scheme and Its Implications for the Future of the Industry, 6 CONN. 
INS. L.J. 477, 480 (2000). ?
25 According to one study, the price paid by third parties for life insurance 
policies tended to exceed surrender value, but amounted to only a small fraction of 
the present value of the policy’s maturity payment.  On average, insureds were 
paid 20% of the face value of the policy, but the policies purchased were worth 
64% of the face value to the purchaser who holds them to maturity. More 
worryingly, it is not clear that insureds realize that this difference is so large since 
many industry estimates downplay relevant expenses the insured will bear in a 
policy sale. DELOITTE-UCONN ACTUARIAL CTR., DELOITTE CONSULTING & THE 
UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT, THE LIFE SETTLEMENTS MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL 
PERSPECTIVE ON CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE 8 (2005); see also Joy D. 
Kosiewicz, Comment, Death for Sale: A Call to Regulate the Viatical Settlement 
Industry, 48 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 701 (1998) (describing potential abuses).?
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Another way for a cash strapped consumer to deal with premium 
payments is to borrow against the insurance policy for those same amounts. 
Loans secured by life insurance mark a palatable halfway point between the 
extremes of outright sale of the policy on the one hand and continued 
premium payment (which may no longer be possible for some insureds) on 
the other. Policy-secured loans allow an insured to monetize her valuable 
asset without permanently losing her residual interest in her policy. If she 
later regrets borrowing against her policy, she may be able to repay her 
creditor and again own the proceeds in full.26 If the insured dies before 
having borrowed much of her line of credit, the surplus value above the 
debt belongs to her or her estate.27  
Today many consumers borrow from their life insurance 
companies. However, because the current legal regime discourages third-
party creditors from making favorable bids, insureds must often borrow 
from their insurance company without being able to consider competing 
offers from other lenders.28  The bargaining power of the insured and the 
lending insurance company is grossly unequal, and one may reasonably 
deduce that this inequality harms consumers and generally discourages 
consumers from borrowing against their insurance. Insurance statutes and 
market competition only partially mitigate these harms. 
 If we improve the law, with the result being a freer market, what is 
the benefit? This section addresses that question, explaining how the power 
to liberally sell or borrow against a policy will tend to benefit consumers by 
obtaining greater value for them than the transactions in which they 
currently engage. A liberal secondary market involving securitization of 
life insurance policies will also benefit investors, insurance companies, and 
the market as a whole.   
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26 See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 563 (2007). 
27 See 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 562 (2007). 
28 Insurance companies take steps to discourage insureds access to third-party 
financing. See Lori Widmer, Life Settlement Regulation Makes It Harder to  Avoid 
the Market, AGENT SALES J., Feb. 2010 (“Many have gone so far as to ban the 
mere mention of life settlements to policyholders, and a number of insurers include 
contract stipulations that expressly prohibit agents from entering into such 
discussions.”).  Some insurance companies have restricted agents from informing 
customers about third party assignability rights, while one insurance company has 
added a “right of first refusal.”  James C. Magner, What is Life Insurance?  The 
Evolution of Financial Products, 35 EST. PLAN 24, 30 (2008).  Accumulator 
Universal Life III offered by Phoenix Home Life Variable Insurance Company, a 
Connecticut-domiciled affiliate of Phoenix Life Insurance. Id. at 30 n.55.0z.?
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A. HOW CONSUMERS BENEFIT FROM A LIBERAL AND EFFICIENT 
ASSIGNMENT REGIME 
 
Insurance companies provide loans pursuant to the terms of the 
particular insurance policy and applicable state laws. Insurance companies 
will often lend up to the surrender value of an insurance policy, which is 
the amount of cash the insurance company would pay to an insured who 
chooses to discontinue the policy. For a term-life policy, the surrender 
value is generally zero. For whole-life policies, which have an internal 
savings component, the surrender value, or the maximum borrowing 
amount, is generally no greater than the reserve set aside to fund the 
anticipated payment upon maturity.29  
It is, in any event, set by statute or by the contract at the time the 
policy is originated.30 The surrender value at any given moment can be 
called the ex ante value of the policy, because it represents the current 
value as determined under a contract that does not account for intervening 
changes in facts.   
If third party lenders were unimpeded by difficult and confusing 
laws, they would have incentives to provide better terms to some insureds 
than insurance companies. This is because they have an incentive to lend 
against the ex post value of the securing insurance policy, which accounts 
for subsequent changes in circumstances, while insurance companies do 
not have such an incentive.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
29 Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 451 (explaining that “[i]n the case of the 
lapse of a term-life policy, a policyholder who could no longer afford premium 
payments simply lost his insurance coverage and received nothing. In the case of a 
surrender of a universal, or whole-life policy, the predetermined schedule of 
surrender values offered by the insurance company—representing at most the 
reserve set aside to fund future insurance costs at standard rates—did not 
compensate a policyholder for the full actuarial value of the impaired policy.”).?
30 See ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.080(a) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1209(A) (2010); Del. Code Ann. tit. 18, § 2911(a) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-
25-3(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(1) (2000); MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ch. 175, § 132 (1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.03(g) (West 2005); MONT. 
CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.110(1) 
(LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-8 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 
743.186(1) (2009); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 510(h)(2) (West 1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
38-63-220(l) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3731(7)(A) (2009); WASH. REV. 
CODE. ANN. § 48.23.080(1)(b) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-8(a) 
(LexisNexis 2006). 
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History may illuminate the present: insurance companies used to 
act as abusive monopolists when their customers wished to discontinue 
premium payments. Professor Gazur recounts a story of the early abuses of 
insurance company monopoly on the loan and surrender markets: 
 
In London, [Elizur Wright] visited the insurance auctions 
at the Royal Exchange.  There he saw old men standing on 
the life insurance auction block, their policies being 
offered to the highest bidder at a fraction of their actual 
worth.  In one case a man had paid premiums for forty-four 
years and could meet the payments no longer.  "This was 
done, I was told, because the companies made it a rule 
never to buy their own policies," wrote Mr. Wright.31     
 
Although the worst abuses have been long curtailed, insurance companies 
still profit when their customers have fewer options in monetizing their 
policies. In particular, there is a direct relationship between lapse rate and 
profitability, and an inverse relationship between lapse rate and credit 
availability. 
Insurance companies will ordinarily lend up to the surrender value 
of the policy, but no further. They may choose not to lend at all if the state 
statute does not require it.32 An insured that is unable to get a policy loan 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
31 Wayne M. Gazur, Death and Taxes: The Taxation of Accelerated Death 
Benefits for the Terminally Ill, 11 VA. TAX REV. 263, 273 (1991), citing ALBERT 
W. ATWOOD, THE GREAT STEWARDSHIP 75 (1945).?
32 5 PLITT ET AL., COUCH ON INSURANCE § 80:4 (3d. ed. 2005) (insureds right 
to loan may be conditioned on having paid premiums on time for a prescribed 
period of months or years); see also MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 175, § 142(2) (1998) 
(stating that “[a]fter premiums have been paid for at least three full years on any 
policy of life insurance issued or delivered in the commonwealth by any life 
company, the holder thereof, upon written application therefore to the company at 
its home office and upon an assignment of the policy to the company, in a form 
satisfactory to it, shall be entitled to a loan from the company of a sum not 
exceeding its loan value, on the sole security of the policy.”); N.Y. INSURANCE 
LAW § 3203(8)(A) (McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.05(G) 
(LexisNexis 2010); Del Rio v. Prudential Ins. Co., 199 N.E. 32, 34 (1935) (insurer 
was compelled to comply with a statute requiring the making of a loan after three 
full years of premiums had been paid by insured); Umstattd v. Metropolitan Life 
Ins. Co., 110 S.W.2d 342, 350 (1937); Gray v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 178 Tenn. 88, 
156 S.W.2d 391, 393 (1941) (insured required to have paid a certain amount before 
being eligible for policy loan); 44 C.J.S. Insurance § 354 (2007).?
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sufficient to cover her premiums may surrender her policy or allow it to 
lapse.  
Insurance companies build a rate of lapse into their business 
models.33 They assume that some insureds will stop paying the premiums 
rather than wait to collect the full maturity sum, even when the maturity 
amount is substantially greater than the premiums probably required to 
service the policy. If insureds could borrow up to the true value of their 
policy at a competitive rate, they could pay their premiums on credit and 
avoid lapse, or borrow against their policies rather than use the surrender 
option.  
Primary markets for insurance products are largely competitive,34 
so initial surrender prices should be actuarially fair at the time a consumer 
begins coverage. Even without laws forbidding the abusive practices Gazur 
reported, insurance companies have an incentive to offer ex ante reasonable 
surrender options because it is one feature consumers may compare as they 
decide which policy to select. Customers will pay less for an insurance 
policy if they think that it will be subject to unfair borrowing or surrender 
terms. 
However insurers have no ex post incentive to update the surrender 
value to become actuarially fair.35 The contract has been signed, and the 
competitive pressure is gone. In particular an insurance company is 
unlikely to improve the surrender or borrowing terms if an individual learns 
that her health prospects have worsened.  
Poor health means that the insurance contract is likely to pay 
sooner than initially expected. Consequently, the insurance policy becomes 
more valuable. The insured, now having a shorter life span than was 
predicted by the insurer’s initial models, will pay fewer premiums and wait 
a shorter time before her estate can collect. But this is true only if she holds 
the policy until maturity. No extra value is realized if she surrenders the 
policy or allows the policy to lapse.   
If the surrender value represents the amount of money needed to 
pay the maturity sum in the future, and the maturity date has moved sooner, 
the surrender value should increase. But the insurance contract generally do 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
33 DOMINIQUE LEBEL, TOWERS PERRIN TILLINGHAST, PRESENTATION AT 
SOCIETY OF ACTUARIES ANNUAL MEETING: PRICING LAPSE-SUPPORTED 
PRODUCTS/LAPSE-SENSITIVE PRODUCTS (Oct. 16, 2006) (A lapse-supported 
product is “a product where there would be a material decrease in profitability if, in 
the pricing calculation, the ultimate lapse rates were set to zero (assuming all other 
pricing parameters remain the same).”).?
34 Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 468.?
35 Id. at 462.?
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not require such an increase, and insurance companies do not gratuitously 
do so. Surrender values are generally not updated for new health 
information, so they will remain low.  
In the same way, if the insured wishes to borrow against the value 
of the policy, the insurance company will lend an amount, and at an interest 
rate, that reflects the initial contracting conditions. There will be no effort 
to compensate for the changed health conditions of the insured. Policy 
provisions36 and state statutes37 typically recognize no surrender value for 
term life insurance against which to borrow, even if the insured is likely to 
die within a year or two, and receive far more than the concomitant 
premiums could ever equal. Insurance companies exploit these individuals 
by offering loans with unnecessarily low credit limits and comparatively 
unattractive terms, and so encourage lapse.  
Third parties may be willing to lend greater amounts and at lower 
rates, reflecting the updated longevity risk upon yield. In the short run, 
competition from third-party lenders will give better options to insureds. In 
the long run, competition will cause issuer insurance companies to issue 
policies that more closely track the updated longevity of consumers, 
granting greater and better ex post surrender values and borrowing terms to 
consumers.38 In particular, consumers with the worst adverse health 
conditions and least ability to service their premiums will be most helped 
by increased competition in this market.  
The outstanding value of life insurance policy loans in the US in 
2009 exceeded $121 billion.39 The vast majority of these loans had no 
serious competition, and it is reasonable to believe that more competition 
among lenders would improve the secondary market. There are perhaps 
$100 billion worth of impaired policies.40 Almost $12 billion of policy face 
values were sold to investors in 2008, a number which could easily grow to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
36 Francis v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 223 So. 2d 188, 192 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 
1969), application denied, 254 La. 781, 226 So. 2d 771 (1969).?
37 See ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.080(b) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-
1209(B) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18, § 2911(c) (2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-
25-3(12)(b) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(2) (2000); MONT. 
CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(2) (2009); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 688A.110(1) 
(LexisNexis 2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-8 (West 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 
743.186(4) (2009); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220(l) (2002); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 
3731(7)(J) (2009); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-8(b) (LexisNexis 2006).?
38 Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 472.?
39 FED. RES., supra note 3, at 32.?
40 Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 452-53.?
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$90-140 billion by 2016.41 Every one of these policies has a resale value 
larger than its surrender value and so is eligible for a larger policy loan or a 
lower rate than the insurance company would offer.42 The target market for 
life settlements, the sale of an insurance policy, is anticipated to grow at 
three times the total population in the coming decades.43  
There are clearly an enormous number of people who may be 
interested in, or well served by, loans secured by their life insurance policy. 
Competition from third party lenders will improve their prospects, as will a 
robust secondary market with securitized insurance-linked assets.   
The insurance business has a set of terms and practices all its own, 
so it is fruitful to address some terminology. A collateral assignment44 is an 
assignment of the policy as collateral. The creditor has no rights in the 
policy until the borrower defaults, at which time the creditor’s interest in 
the pledged collateral may be used to satisfy the debt. A transfer of the 
entire interest in the insurance policy to a third party will be effected 
through an absolute assignment.45An absolute assignment of a life 
insurance policy is the irrevocable transfer of all of the owner’s rights in 
the policy, typically made in order to give the policy away or to sell it.46 An 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
41 Conning Research and Consulting, Inc., Life Settlements: A Buyers’ Market 
for Now, Oct. 8, 2009.?
42 For example, a policy with a face value of $5 million may have a surrender 
value of $1 million, reflecting the statutory or contractual conditions at the time the 
policy was signed. If the insured discovers that she has two years to live, she may 
find that the policy has a value on the secondary market of, say, $3 million. 
Someone may be willing to pay her $3 million for the right to collect $5 million 
when she dies. That purchaser will pay the premiums until she dies, too. Similar 
math applies to borrowing. If the insured wishes to borrow, and absent new 
competition, the insurance company will lend to her as though she has $1 million 
collateral – the surrender value of the policy. A third party will be willing to lend 
against $3 million, recognizing a greater resale value upon which to foreclose in 
case of default. The third party may be willing to lend a larger amount, or at a more 
attractive rate for a loan which is recognized as oversecured.  
43 KAMATH & SLEDGE, supra note 8, at 1-2; see also Matthew Goldstein, Why 
Death Bonds Look so Frail, Bus. Wk., Feb. 25, 2008 (putting the market for life 
settlements at about $15 billion).?
44 See, e.g., Example Assignment of Life Policy to Secure and Future Debts, 
10 AM. JUR. Legal Forms 2D § 149:183 (2010).?
45 See, e.g., 9 CHRISTOPHER GADSEN, Estate Planning, in WEST’S 
PENNSYLVANIA FORMS § 14:7 (1995).?
46 MURIEL L. CRAWFORD & WILLIAM T. BEADLES, LAW AND THE LIFE 
INSURANCE CONTRACT 356 (6th ed. 1989).?
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absolute assignment can also be used to secure a loan.47 A party may sign 
an absolute assignment in favor of a lender, but the lender does not 
presently gain the rights and privileges of ownership, nor will the lender 
simply come to own the policy upon default by the borrower. A court will 
treat the absolute assignment in form as a collateral assignment.  
 
B. TOWARDS A THRIVING SECONDARY MARKET  
 
Creditors will more readily lend against insurance policies if they 
are able to efficiently dispose of policies upon default.48 If a dependable 
legal framework is provided, the secondary market for insurance policies 
should thrive and dramatically improve borrowing opportunities for 
insureds.49 Arguments for robust secondary markets may seem naïve given 
the unfolding of the financial crisis,50 nonetheless, it is generally accepted 
that secondary markets in assets tend to raise the value of those assets.   
Generally, a vibrant secondary market increases demand for 
qualifying policies, conferring greater surplus to the seller or borrower 
consumers. This is for three reasons. First, secondary markets allow 
investors to sell their investments prior to maturity. Increased liquidity 
attracts a much greater pool of investors with shorter time horizons, or who 
anticipate that their portfolio needs may change. Without a liquid 
secondary market, fewer lenders will value insurance as collateral. Those 
who accept it will demand a proportionally higher return to compensate 
them for risks and opportunity costs associated with a long-term 
investment.  
Second, a vibrant secondary market gives rise to greater 
specialization of actors. It takes specialized skills to evaluate the risks and 
return associated with a given policy. Where parties find it difficult to resell 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
47 Id. at 360. ?
48 Even those opposed to Article 9 inclusion seem to accept this statement. See 
Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., How Successful Was the Revision of 
UCC Article 9?: Reflections of the Reporters, 74 CHI.-KENT. L. REV. 1357, 1375 
n.75 (1999). Consumer groups agreed with the Drafting Committee that non-
Article 9 law had the practical effect of making credit secured by insurance 
policies much less available, but they did not see this as a good thing. ?
49 See, e.g., Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 459; see also 35 Est. Plan. 24, 
24 (“The most significant innovation the life insurance industry has experienced in 
recent memory has been the development of the so-called secondary market”).?
50  Doherty & Singer, supra note 1, at 459 (arguing that life insurance policy 
securitization and marketing will have a similarly beneficial effect in reducing risk 
as does mortgage securitization in its own market). ?
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a policy, they must research policies for their own long-term holdings. But 
where resale is possible, a savvy investor may dedicate resources to 
evaluating policies.  She may invest in far more policies than she would be 
comfortable holding to maturity because she anticipates selling them to 
investors lacking the specialized evaluating skills.51 More policies will be 
funded and better investment research skills will be developed in a 
specialized market with liquid secondary sales. Lenders may lend more on 
insurance than they otherwise would, knowing that they will not have to 
hold collateral to maturity.  
Third, vibrant markets lead to price discovery, which allows non-
speculators to be comfortable investing in a given asset class. Fourth, 
where policies are liberally sold and resold, they can be combined, 
bundled, and securitized in a way that reduces risk. The benefits of 
investing in pools, rather than in their individual underlying assets, are well 
known. 52  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
51 It is also true that some investors may dedicate less resources to evaluating 
assets when they know that they will be passed onto to less specialized secondary 
purchasers. That is one key cause of the present financial crisis. Too many 
investors or lenders allowed their internal controls to lapse because they knew that 
they would not bear the costs of their errors, and too many secondary purchasers 
trusted ratings agencies or bond insurers. However, the above point about the raise 
of specialized investment evaluation skills remains valid. If it costs $10 to develop 
a method for determining whether investment X is $1 more profitable than 
investment Y, or vice versa, then few companies will develop that method. But if a 
company can the sell their interest in X or Y to a third party, and then use the 
proceeds to buy either X2 or Y2, that company can use the method again. The 
more iterations, the greater the return on the knowledge investment. Capital is 
better allocated when companies profitably invest in vetting and evaluation 
methods. Doubtless, many companies failed to adequately evaluate the viability of 
many subprime, exotic, or complex assets. But the few that did evaluate, and the 
many more that could have, did so because of technology that only made sense in a 
securitized market where primary investors didn’t have to buy and hold.  
52 See LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, STAFF REPORT TO THE UNITED STATES 
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION 6 (2010) (“the majority of investors in 
today’s life settlements market are large institutional investors looking to acquire 
pools of policies”). The benefits of pooled investments accrue only if the risks of 
individual assets are not highly positively correlated. Pooled life insurance policies 
will generally meet this condition. Mortality rates generally do not rise and fall in 
tandem for geographically spread policy holders. The possibility for pooling is one 
of the major enablers of an insurance industry. If one individual’s death was 
strongly positively correlated with many other individuals, insurance companies 
would not be able to reduce risk by holding a large portfolio.?
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There is a growing interest in assets that have no correlation with 
market forces,53 so secondary markets would serve a legitimate economic 
need of investors who seek to hedge. Investors seeking a strong yield 
without strong market exposure should find life insurance policies a 
potentially attractive asset class. Major institutional investors like UBS, 
Merrill Lynch, Citibank54 and Berkshire Hathaway55 have already entered 
this market. Investors have always been able to gain partial exposure to this 
asset by investing in insurance companies. But such investments are not 
ideal for hedging because the risk is affected by the management of, and 
investment portfolio held by, a particular insurance company. Moreover, 
since beneficiary payments under life insurance policies constitute a 
liability to insurance companies, the corresponding bet is actually to short 
the insurance company. 
There are risks to these assets. Investors in insurance policies 
through intermediaries must trust that the company is truly investing their 
money in assignments of life insurance policies. Not all such companies are 
scrupulous agents for their investors. Some hide behind the opacity of their 
investment to squirrel away funds.56 If investors are not to be disappointed 
here as they were with housing securities, these securities must be 
appropriately marketed and regulated. And securitized life insurance assets 
are not immune to whatever forces precipitated the current financial 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
53 Id. (“Institutional investors reportedly view life settlements as an alternative 
asset class that is not correlated to traditional asset classes because returns 
principally are based on the death rates of the insured individuals rather than the 
performance of financial instruments or the overall economy. Diversification to 
uncorrelated assets is especially attractive to investors during periods of 
unfavorable economic conditions”); see also Matthew Goldstein, Profiting from 
Mortality, BUS. WK., July 30, 2007, at 44; Sam Rosenfeld, Life Settlements: 
Signposts to a Principal Asset Class (Wharton Fin. Inst. Ctr., Working Paper No. 
09-20, 2009), available at http://fic.wharton.upenn.edu/fic/papers/09/0920.pdf.?
54 See Harold G. Ingraham, Jr. & Sergio S. Salani, Life Settlements as a Viable 
Option, J. FIN. SERV. PROFS. 72, 75 (2004). But see Matthew Goldstein,  Goldman 
Retreats from Life Settlements, REUTERS.COM, Dec. 18, 2009 2:27 PM EST,  
http://www.reuters.com/article/idUSN1823436220091218 (“life settlement 
derivatives appears [sic] to be a casualty of the worst financial crisis since the 
Great Depression”). ?
55 John Hoogesteger, Berkshire Unit Lends $400M to Startup, 
MINNEAPOLIS/ST. PAUL BUS. J. (Feb. 3, 2002, 11 PM CST), available at 
http://twincities.bizjournals.com/twincities/stories/2002/02/04/story1.html. ?
56 PCO, Inc. v. Christensen, 58 Cal. Rptr. 3d 516, 516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) 
(PCO executives converted all $89 million intended for viatical investment).?
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crisis.57 But risks are no greater here than in any other area, and whichever 
financial reforms are attempted will succeed or fail for securitization here 
as elsewhere.58 Moreover, some of the most potentially worrying products 
have been cancelled due to market forces.59  
It should be clear that secondary markets in insurance increase the 
demand for third-party creditors to lend to customer borrowers. It should 
also be clear that this increased demand is to the benefit of borrowers. 
What follows is an explanation of the current law of insurance-secured 
financing. It will be shown that the law is confused and antiquated, and the 
most logical reform proposal will virtuously liberalize the market for loans 
as well. 
  
II. WHERE EXCLUSION LEAVES INSURANCE 
 
Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code governs almost all 
security interests transactions in all US jurisdictions. Although it is 
preempted by any inconsistent state laws,60 most states have redacted any 
prior inconsistent laws. The Code’s merits are well-recited and have only 
grown as more states and more transactions have come under its scope. 
Article 9, in particular, rationalized and reformed a truly confusing area of 
the law.  
As mentioned before, Article 9 excludes interests in and 
assignments of insurance policies from its scope.61 Nearly every state 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
57 See, e.g., Rep. Collin C. Peterson Holds a Hearing on the Over-the-Counter 
Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Agriculture, 111th Cong. 
(2009) (Rep. Boswell asking, “does this securitization of life settlements not only 
add another element of possible risk to an industry that is already in need of more 
transparency and consumer safeguard, but is it something you -- we should even 
allow?”).?
58 The author acknowledges the intuitive worry that derivatives in the 
insurance space have a worrying resonance to the fact that AIG’s non-insurance 
activities threatened their core insurance business, and indeed, the entire economy. 
However, the analogy should be resisted, owing to the difference between 
securitization of insurance products, and securitization of non-insurance products 
by insurance companies. ?
59 Goldstein, supra note 53 (“The Wall Street company once had big plans to 
sell derivatives pegged to the index [which tracks the life expectancy of a group of 
people who have sold their life insurance policies to an investment pool] to 
investors seeking exposure to the estimated $15 billion life settlements market.”). ?
60 U.C.C. § 9-109(c)(1)-(3) (2011).?
61 U.C.C. § 9-109(d)(8) (2011). But see CAL. COM. CODE § 9109 (Deering 
2010); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-109(d)(8) (2011). Of course, there is an ad hoc 
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follows the UCC in excluding insurance policies from their secured 
transactions statute.62 Where a lien or assignment is not covered by the 
UCC, the court must decide which other body of law to apply.  
It would be natural to look to whichever statute governed security 
interests before the UCC, but this is generally incorrect. Having adopted 
the Uniform Commercial Code, many states repealed the statutes governing 
chattel mortgages and pledges that had previously also governed interests 
in, and assignments of, insurance policies. This repeal leaves something of 
a statutory void for assignments of life insurance policies.63 
For example, pre-code chattel security in Illinois came in through 
six devices: the pledge, the chattel mortgage, the conditional sale, the trust 
receipt, accounts receivable financing, and the factor’s lien in favor of 
wholesalers.64 By 1962, all but one had been eliminated. The conditional 
sale was a creature of the Uniform Sales Act,65 which was repealed 
following the adoption of the UCC.66 The Uniform Trust Receipt Act was 
repealed following the adoption of the UCC,67 as was the validating statute 
for accounts receivable financing,68 chattel mortgages,69 and the factor’s 
lien in favor of wholesalers.70 Only the common law pledge remained. 
Similar stories can be told of every other state.71  
The little statutory law that remains is not particularly appropriate 
to insurance policy liens. For example, some states have reserved a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
exception for health-care insurance receivables, see id., but this hardly relevant.  
Moreover the code does not exclude the proceeds of insurance policies from its 
scope. Id. at §§ 10:9-109, -315, -322. But this inclusion is meant to allow secured 
parties whose collateral is destroyed to maintain their interest in the subsequent 
insurance money. See Coogan, supra note 6, at 515.?
62 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.1091(4)(g) (LexisNexis 2011).  ?
63 See, e.g., ME. PUB. L. of 1963, c. 362 (1963).?
64 2B Daniel R. Murray et al., UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE WITH ILLINOIS 
CODE COMMENTS 9  (2010 ed., 2010). ?
65 Id.?
66 810 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/10-102 (2011) (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 121 
1/2,  ¶ 1 et seq.).?
67 Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 121 1/2, ¶ 166 et seq.).?
68 Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 121 1/2, ¶ 220 et seq.).?
69 Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 95, ¶¶ 26-27).?
70 Id. (repealing ILL. REV. STAT. 82, ¶ 102 et seq.).?
71 See, e.g., 12A PA. STAT. ANN. § 10-102 (1953) (repealing Uniform 
Conditional Sales Act, 69 PA. STAT. ANN. § 361 et seq. (1931); Uniform Trust 
Receipts Act; 68 PA. STAT. ANN. § 551 et seq. (1953); a general chattel mortgage 
statute, 21 PA. STAT. ANN. § 940.1 et seq. (1953); and a factor’s lien act, 6 PA. 
STAT. ANN. § 221 et seq. (1953)).?
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banker’s lien that gives bank loans a general lien on all assets.72 There are 
cases in which this might accomplish the desired effect of allowing an 
individual to borrow against her insurance policy, but it is a cumbersome 
way to organize a loan. It may be better to say that there remains no 
statutory law that directly governs insurance liens and assignments. Thus, 
to a great degree, the governing pre-Code law is not just pre-Code statutory 
law, but pre-statutory common law.73  
Not only does this deny the insurance policy transactions the 
benefits afforded by the UCC, it also forces insurance-based lending to rely 
on law that has languished in isolation from growing case law and 
reforming trends. Article 9 explains itself with nearly syllogistic clarity.74 
Where clarification is required, the centralization of uniform law has 
encouraged a comprehensive scholarly treatment that explores, reconciles, 
and renews the law.75 No such commentary fixes similar attention to niche 
subject of state-by-state case law on insurance-linked finance transactions.  
The possibility of this problem was not lost on the Commenters for 
the 1972 Article 9. Professor Peter Coogan, Consultant to the Review 
Committee for Article 9, discussing the effect of the exclusion of bank 
deposit accounts from Article 9 explained how “[t]his illustrates one of the 
problems with respect to the exclusions generally, of section 9-104.”76 He 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
72 CAL. CIV. CODE § 3054 (Deering 2010); DuBrutz v. Bank of Visalia, 87 P. 
467, 468 (Cal. Ct. App. 1906) (bank surrenders life insurance policy). Note, 
however, that California transactions do not need to resort to these sorts of statutes, 
since California’s Article 9 does not exclude life insurance loans. This example is 
provided only illustratively.?
73 Law Research Serv., Inc. v. Martin Lutz App. Printers, Inc., 498 F.2d 836, 
840 (2d Cir. 1974).?
74 See Timothy R. Zinnecker, Socrates, Syllogisms, and Sadistic Transactions: 
Challenges to Mastering U.C.C. Article 9 Through Deductive Reasoning, 13 CHAP. 
L. REV. 97, 136 (2009).  
75 See, e.g., Bender UCC REPORTER-DIGEST; THE ABCS OF THE UCC 
(American Bar Association); LARY LAWRENCE, ANDERSON ON THE UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE (WEST); HAWKLAND ET AL., HAWKLAND’S UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE SERIES (West); THOMAS M. QUINN, QUINN'S UNIFORM 
COMMERCIAL CODE COMMENTARY AND LAW DIGEST (West); BRADFORD STONE & 
KRISTEN DAVID ADAMS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE IN A NUTSHELL (West); 
JAMES J. WHITE & ROBERT S. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 
(HORNBOOK SERIES) (West); UCC L.J.; Margit Livingston, Survey of Cases 
Decided Under Revised Article 9: There's Not Much New Under the Sun., 2 
DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 47 (2003) (surveying case law developments). 
76 Program, Impact of 1972 Revisions On Secured Financing Transactions 
Under UCC Article 9, 33 BUS. LAW. 2491, 2532 (1978).?
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goes on to say “we have the awful problem that part of this was statutory 
and those statutes have all been repealed, like the chattel mortgage, the 
assignment of contracts, all that stuff, has been repealed, so that you go to 
the pre-pre-statutes, and sometimes you cannot find it.”77 
The insurance policy exception never enjoyed enthusiastic support 
from the drafters of the UCC. The written reflections of the Reporters 
indicate neither serious policy commitments to this exclusion, or even a 
concerted industry opposition to its inclusion. Relatively mild opposition 
from the insurance industry was persuasive in light of the Reporters’ sense 
that this exclusion simplified the drafting process. Even taking that 
conclusion for granted, the Reporters expressed reservations about 
extending the insurance exclusion to third party interests as well as issuer 
policy loans.  
The problems with all exclusions are the same: the most recent 
statutes were repealed in conjunction with the adoption of a new uniform 
code. Article 9 does not apply to the excluded items, so they are orphans 
left in the care of truly ancient law.  
Professor Coogan asked Bill Davenport, General Counsel for First 
Bank of Chicago, about the law applicable to bank deposit accounts, and 
Davenport’s reply centered on case law so old that Coogan interrupted, 
“We are now including a generation-some people may be of a generation 
that does not remember [the case]. Would you just explain it.”78 An 
exclusion from Article 9 does not just freeze the applicable law as that of 
the early 1960’s. Exclusion kicks life insurance policies back a hundred 
years to the common law operative before any legislative reforms at all.79  
There was some hope among the drafters of Article 9 that the 
common law on insurance pledges would come to resemble the Article 9 
law and thus “the exclusion would be more formal than real.”80 Like so 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
77 Id. at 2533.?
78 Id. at 2532 (discussing Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925) and prior, 
related Illinois case law).?
79 Despite the obvious problems with reverting to the law of substantially 
different times, this is only one of many examples of the general phenomenon. See, 
e.g., Teemu Ruskola, Colonialism without Colonies: On the Extraterritorial 
Jurisprudence of the U.S. Court for China, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 217, 223 
(2008) (the U.S. Court for China, from 1906 to 1943, “was called on to ‘ascertain 
the common or unwritten law in force in the colonies prior to the Declaration of 
Independence and then to attempt to apply it to modern conditions in China’. . . .”) 
(quoting a Shanghai lawyer). 
80 1 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 315 
(photo. reprint 1999) (1965).?
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many theories of legal convergence, that hope has not materialized.81 As a 
result, the applicable common law remains splintered, inconsistent, 
irregular, and generally ill-suited to the demands of modern finance.82  It 
has failed to improve because all the other pledges and assignments were 
plucked away to develop case law under the UCC. 
The distance between growing UCC law and languishing non-UCC 
laws leads to the distressing possibility that cross-jurisdiction transactions 
might implicate different security rules. The Reporters acknowledged this 
ambiguity under currently law: 
 
It would be odd if a designation of applicable law by a 
debtor and secured party were to control some of these 
matters. Consider an example that may arise under current 
law. Former 9-318(4) makes ineffective terms in certain 
contracts that restrict assignments of the right to payment 
under the contracts. Under California’s nonuniform 
version of Article 9, security interests in most insurance 
policies are within the scope of the article. Under New 
York’s (and most states’) version, security interests in 
insurance policies are excluded. If an insurance policy 
provides that it is governed by the law of New York, it 
would seems [sic] appropriate for New York’s law to 
determine whether a term restricting assignment of the 
policy is effective. Since New York’s Article 9 does not 
cover an assignment of the policy, New York’s 9-318 
would not appear to render ineffective the restriction on 
assignment. Now assume that the owner of the policy, a 
California resident, assigns it as security to a California 
bank, and the security agreement provides that it is 
governed by the law of California. Does California’s 9-
318(4) then render the restriction in the policy ineffective? 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
81 One of federalism’s early indulgences was the notion that federal common 
law would come to influence and unify the various state common laws. But see 
Erie R.R Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).?
82 Karl Llewellyn, Problems of Codifying Security Law, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 687, 688 (1948) (the Chief Reporter for the Uniform Commercial Code 
noting the inefficiencies created by the hodgepodge of older commercial laws: 
"What is not minor is the price in complexity, inconvenience, and often in 
unfairness which must be paid when legal patterns of happenstance origin are 
taken in all their history-ridden detail as the basis for the doing of remodeling jobs 
which are themselves piece-work”).   
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We are inclined to think it should not, but the answer is 
uncertain.83  
 
 Unheard of in other areas, conflicting security rules from state to state are 
a reality for lawyers practicing law in this area. These issues would 
evaporate if all policies were governed by the UCC,84 but because they are 
not, life insurance policies remain tangled in the interstate conflicts of law 
problems of a bygone era.  The confusion and antiquation of that era gives 
rise to three problems, each of which serves to frustrate those third party 
lending, and secondary market trading, that would benefit consumers.   
 
A. THE PERFECTION PROBLEM 
 
The perfection problem refers to the difficulty in finding a rational, 
coherent, and clear perfection equivalent in non-UCC law.85 Strictly 
speaking, it is impossible for any party to perfect an interest in a life 
insurance policy. This is because perfection is a concept introduced by the 
UCC, but the UCC excludes life insurance policies from coverage. One 
wishes that under the non-UCC regime, similar procedures could achieve 
perfection’s goal: allowing parties to discover prior liens, and then establish 
their own priority in a durable and just manner.  However, conflicts 
amongst assignees are common and messy under the non-Article 9 regimes. 
This is because the law governing priority is not as firmly established as 
might be inferred from industry practice. Subparts (1)-(3) show the places 
where industry consensus lacks doctrinal support.  
Moreover, even if accepted that non-UCC law speaks coherently 
and with adequate approval of industry practice, industry practice remains 
unjust and inefficient. Subpart (4) explains the public policy problems with 
the status quo practice. The perfection problem thus indicates the gulf 
between non-UCC reality and the clear and efficient perfection parties have 
come to expect through Article 9.  Under the UCC, notification would 
follow the method of any general intangible: attachment plus notification. 
With attachment plus notification, the problems of secret liens, private 
notification, and doctrinal uncertainty would be much reduced. The status 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
83 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE art. 9, pt. 4: RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES 
(Proposed Official Draft, Oct. 1996).?
84 U.C.C. § 9-301 (1999). ?
85 Other commentators have noticed the perfection problem in the past, though 
none have used that title. See, e.g., McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 959; 
Knippenberg, supra note 11. 
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quo exacerbates problems in a context of uncertainty by over-valuing 
notification to insurers and under-valuing public notification.  
 
1. Notice to Insurance Company 
 
Industry practice is to assume that priority of security goes to the 
assignee that first provides notice to the insurance company. Although 
there is some doctrinal support for this state of affairs,86 the importance of 
insurer notification is not always dispositive at common law.  
Requirements of notice are for the benefit of insurance 
companies.87 Courts often emphasize that the notice requirement is part of 
the contract between the insured and the insurer, and cannot affect the 
rights of third parties, such as the assignee.88 Thus, courts adjudicating 
between non-insurer assignees often ignore notice to insurance companies, 
deciding the case on other factors.89  
A substantial minority rule allows priority to the first assignee, 
regardless of notice to the insurer.90 This minority rule was recently 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
86 Patten v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 6 S.E.2d 26 (S.C. 1939); Richards v. 
Griggs, 16 Mo. 416 (1852); Murdoch & Dickson v. Finney, 21 Mo. 138 (1855); 
Houser v. Richardson, 90 Mo. App. 134 (1901); Klebba v. Struempf, 23 S.W.2d 
205 (Mo. App. 1930).?
87 See Equitable Life Ins. Co. of Iowa v. Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 401, 404 (Ill. 
App. Ct. 1927) (“It has been repeatedly held that provisions of a life insurance 
policy requiring notice of an assignment to be given to the company are for the 
benefit of the company and it alone may complain or object because of a failure to 
comply with the terms of the policy.”). Note that this demonstrates an important 
difference between UCC and non-UCC treatment of insurance companies. Notice 
under the UCC is for the benefit of all creditors and potential creditors, not for the 
benefit of one creditor or the notified party. ?
88 See, e.g., Allhusen v. Caristo Const. Corp., 103 N.E.2d 891, 892 (N.Y. 
1952); Herman v. Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co., 105 N.E. 450, 451 (Mass. 1914).?
89 See Fidelity Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. City Nat’l. Bank, 95 F. Supp. 276, 282 
(N.D. W. Va. 1950) (first-in-time assignee has priority). See also Fidelity & 
Deposit Co. v. Moore, 14 S.E.2d 307, 310 (Va. Ct. App. 1941) (case determined 
on intent of the assignor). ?
90 Fidelity Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. City Nat’l Bank, 95 F. Supp. 276, 282 (N.D. 
W. Va. 1950); see also In re Leterman, Becher & Co., 260 F. 543, 547 (2d Cir. 
1919); Superior Brassiere Co. v. Zimetbaum, 212 N.Y.S. 473, 475 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1925) (“By the first assignment, the rights of the assignor pass to the assignee . . . . 
Notice of the assignment to the debtor adds nothing to the right or title 
transferred.”). The insurance company should correspond to the “debtor” in each of 
2011 BAD POLICY FOR GOOD POLICIES 311 
?
affirmed by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Rose v. 
AmSouth Bank of Florida.91 There, the court overruled the district court’s 
ruling that New York law required insurer notification in order for an 
assignment to be valid against a subsequent assignee. Thus, the newest and 
clearest ruling on priority gives the interest in an insurance policy to the 
earliest assignee, rather than earliest notifying assignee, in contradiction of 
industry practice.  
 
2. Possession 
 
The legal significance of possession of the original life insurance 
policy is treated inconsistently. As a matter of commercial practice, life 
insurance companies do not attribute legal significance to possession of a 
sole “original” policy.92  Additionally, the requirement of possession is not 
practical for interests in group life insurance policies.93  
Nevertheless, insurance policies are choses in action at common 
law,94 and the common law pledge provides a mechanism for perfecting an 
interest in an insurance policy by possession.95 Until the early nineteenth 
century, the only way to create a valid security interest in personal property 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
those cases. An assignee was due proceeds and assigned them twice, similar to an 
insured who assigned the policy twice.?
91 Rose v. AmSouth Bank, 391 F.3d 63, 66 (2d Cir. 2004) (citing Salem Trust 
Co. v. Manufacturers’ Finance Co., 264 U.S. 182, 198 (1924)) (noting that the 
Salem court—which ruled on the basis of then-extant federal common law, and on 
which the district court relied—specifically commented that under New York Law 
the earlier assignee would have prevailed, notwithstanding its failure to take 
possession or provide notice).?
92  Louisiana Official Revision Comments to R.S. – 2001, § 10:9-107.1(b), 
revised, 2004 (c) 2008.?
93 James Stuckey, Lousiana’s Non-Uniform Variations in U.C.C. Chapter 9, 
62 LA. L. REV. 793, 813 (2002). ?
94 Missouri State Life Ins. Co. v. Langreder, 87 F.2d 586, 592 (7th Cir. 1937); 
U.S. Life Ins. Co. v. Ludwig, 103 Ill. 305, 312 (Ill. 1882); Considine v. Considine, 
7 N.Y.S.2d 834 (1938); Coleman v. Anderson, 82 S.W. 1057 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1904), aff’d, 86 S.W. 730 (Tex. 1905).?
95 RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF SECURITY § 1 cmt. a (1941) (“Where a chose in 
action is represented by an indispensable instrument, whether negotiable or non-
negotiable, the chose in action may be pledged.”); RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF 
SECURITY § 1 cmt. e (1941) (“Indispensable instruments include . . . insurance 
policies.”).?
312 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 17.2 
?
was through physical possession by the pledgee.96 Non-possessory security 
interests were presumptively fraudulent.97 Non-possessory security 
interests found greater expression and acceptance in later years, but 
development was neither linear nor logical. Rather, the “the law of personal 
property security transactions [had come] to resemble the obscure wood in 
which Dante once discovered the gates of hell.”98  
 There is substantial authority that assignments of insurance policies 
may be perfected by physical delivery of the policy.99 In a case concerning 
unearned premiums on a life insurance policy, the bankruptcy court 
determined that Maine common law requires possession of the collateral as 
prerequisite to the enforceability against third parties of pledge of 
intangibles, and that “[A] pledge of insurance policies requires that the 
pledgee maintain physical possession of the policies.”100 This result is by 
no means unique.101 Some decisions have even specified that no written 
assignment is necessary where the policy is delivered.102  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
96 Peter F. Coogan, Article 9 – An Agenda for  the Next Decade, 87 YALE L.J. 
1012 (1978). See, e.g., Silverman v. McGrath, 10 Ill. App. 413 (1882) (possession 
essential to a valid pledge); W.W. Kimball Co. v. Polakow, 190 Ill. App. 174 
(1914) (At common law, all pledges of personal property void unless title and 
possession went to pledgee.). ?
97 See Griffen v. Henry, 99 Ill. App. 284 (1901) (At common law, transaction 
was fraudulent per se and incapable of explanation where pledgor retained 
possession.). See also Coogan, supra note 96, at 1012; JAMES ANGELL 
MACLACHLAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF BANKRUPTCY 255-70 (West 
Publishing 1956). ?
98 GILMORE, supra note 80, at 27.  See generally id. at 288-90. ?
99 See McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 959.?
100 See In re Maplewood Poultry Co., 2 B.R. 550, 554 & n. 5 (Bankr. Me. 
1980) (internal citations omitted). ?
101 In re Mile Hi Restaurants, Inc., 233 F. Supp. 936 (D. Colo. 1964); Taylor 
v. S. Bank & Trust Co., 151 So. 357 (Ala. 1933) (life insurance policy); Puckhaber 
v. Henry, 93 P. 114 (Cal. 1907) (assignment and delivery of life policy); Collins v. 
Dawley, 4 Colo. 138 (1878) (life insurance policy); Helms v. First Nat. Bank, 28 
So.2d 262 (Fla. 1946) (by implication; life insurance); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. 
Mitchell, 248 Ill. App. 401 (1927) (life insurance policy); Embry's Adm’r v. 
Harris, 52 S.W. 958 (Ky. 1899) (life policy); Arrowood v. Duff, 152 S.W.2d 291 
(Ky. 1941) (life insurance policy); Lake v. New York Life Ins. Co., 45 So. 959 
(La. 1908) (life insurance; dictum); Foote v. Sun Life Assur. Co., 173 So. 477 (La. 
Ct. App. 1937) (dictum; life insurance policy); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. 
Allen, 235 Mass. 187 (1920) (life insurance policy); Detroit Life Ins. Co. v. 
Linsenmier, 217 N.W. 919 (Mich. 1928) (life policy); Palmer v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
130 N.W. 250 (Minn. 1911)  (life policy); Prudential Ins. Co. v. Sheehan, 133 
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This raises the troublesome possibility that security interest in life 
insurance policies might be perfected by possession without notification.103 
The common law pledge existed in every state prior to the Uniform 
Commercial Code.104 While Article 9 controls formerly-pledged 
transactions of other kinds, the life insurance carve-out puts these policies 
squarely within the case law that has always governed pledges. As a result, 
this case law has given great importance to physical possession of policies.  
It should provide no comfort to note that not all jurisdictions follow 
this rule, with some vindicating the industry practice of disregarding 
physical possession.105 Opportunities for confusion and conflict abound. 
Physical possession may matter in one state, but not in another, such that 
the perfection regime is ruefully diverse.   
Not only do jurisdictions differ from one another, intra-
jurisdictional variation is also substantial. It is often difficult to disentangle 
judicial decisions interpreting the common law of pledges rather than the 
statutory pledge act of a given state – only the latter being repealed in many 
of the states that have adopted the Uniform Commercial Code. The 
portions of those decisions that interpret the common law, and the cases so 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
S.W.2d 1060 (Mo. Ct. App. 1939) (life insurance policy; no formal or written 
assignment necessary); Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Phillips, 68 A.2d 574, (N.J. 
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1949) (by implication; life policy); MacQueen v. Dollar Sav. 
Bank Co., 15 N.E.2d 529 (Ohio 1938) (life insurance, pledged by deposit without 
written assignment); Woofter v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 78 P.2d 683 (Okla. 1938) 
(insurance policy and benefit certificate); Page v. Detroit Life Ins. Co., 11 Tenn. 
App. 417 (1929) (life insurance policy); Sun Life Assur. Co. v.Weyen, 136 F. 
Supp. 592 (D.C. Wash. 1955); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Bank of 
California, 60 P.2d 675 (Wa. 1936) (life policy).  See 5 RUSS ET AL, COUCH ON 
INSURANCE  § 37:47 (3d ed. 2008).?
102 See In re Bickford's Estate, 38 N.Y.S.2d 785 (1942) (no written assignment 
necessary where policy is delivered); Woofter v. Fourth Nat’l Bank, 78 P.2d 683 
(Okla. 1938) (pledge did not require written assignment).?
103 Shanklin v. Madison County, 21 Ohio St. 575 (1871) (A chose in action 
may be equitably assigned without any written transfer). See also RESTATEMENT 
(FIRST) OF SECURITY § 1, cmt. (e) (1941) (defining an insurance policy as an 
“indispensable instrument,” an interest in which may secured by possession).?
104 See 1 GILMORE, supra note 80, § 14.1.?
105 See Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Haack, 50 F. Supp. 55, 63-64 (W.D. La. 1943) 
(stating that an insurance policy cannot be pledged by possession); Commercial 
Nat’l. Bank v. Chapman, 206 F.2d 349, 349-51 (5th Cir. 1953) (holding that a 
statute authorizing pledge by delivery without assignment was ineffective, so 
creditor took no rights against beneficiaries of the policy).?
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distant in time as to predate those repealed statutes, make an uneven sample 
from which to rediscover the common law of choses.  
 
3. Notification to Third Parties 
 
Industry practice has it that insurers have no general duty of 
notification to any actual or potential creditor, and the common law agrees 
to some extent. As a result, important information may not be shared, to the 
frustration of many parties.  
It is clear that subsequent assignees have no right to the 
information they need to determine whether their interest is 
subordinated.106 The insurer has no general duty to notify assignees that the 
insured has discontinued premium payments.107 Thus, an assignee may 
become an unsecured creditor when she finds that the insurance policy has 
lapsed for want of payment.  
For this reason, it is generally incumbent upon assignees to 
diligently request information from policy issuers and, when necessary, pay 
premiums for the policies. But some statutes differ, reducing inter-
jurisdictional uniformity and putting a burden on the issuing insurer.108  
Moreover, actions or representations by the insurer may give rise to 
estoppel,109 and the insurer’s knowledge of the terms of the assignment has 
given rise to liability.110 Thus, “[t]he outcome in the lapse cases is by no 
means a certitude either for the assignee or the insurer.”111 It becomes a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
106 See discussion infra Part A.4.?
107 See Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. United States, 407 F.2d 1295, 1300-01 (5th 
Cir. 1969); Sorenson v. Nat’l. Life Ins. Co., 201 N.W.2d 510, 512 (Wis. 1972); 
Lewis State Bank v. Travelers Ins. Co., 356 So. 2d 1344, 1346-48 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1978); Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. First Nat’l Bank, 74 S.W. 1066, 1070 
(Ky. 1903).?
108 See CAL. INS. CODE § 10173.2 (West 2005) (stating that notice is required); 
215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/234 (West 2000) (stating that notice is required); 
N.Y. INS. LAW § 3211 (McKinney 2006) (stating that assignment may call for 
notice that premiums are due).?
109 Missouri Cattle Loan Co. v. Great S. Life Ins. Co., 52 S.W.2d 1, 10-11 
(Mo. 1932) (holding that assignee relied on insurer’s promise to provide notice if 
premiums were due).?
110 Bank of Poplar Bluff v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 723 S.W.2d 514, 517-23 (Mo. 
Ct. App. 1986) (the court looked to the contract of assignment and the policy 
assigned to determine whether the insurer was obliged to provide notice to 
assignee).?
111 Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 7.?
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complicated matter to determine which right of notice a secured party may 
expect.  
 
4. Public Policy  
 
As described above, in subsection 1, industry practice assumes 
priority is determined through a race-notification regime. Moreover, it is a 
race to notify the insurance company, not the Secretary of State, as it would 
be under the UCC. Even if this were as well-founded in law as it is in 
practice, it is doubtful that this expresses defensible policy.112 Insurance 
company notification constitutes a non-public system of filing, and it is 
plagued by those problems endemic to non-public systems of security 
interests.  
Where insurers have received a notice of assignment, there is no 
assurance that other creditors will be similarly notified. Insurance company 
records are proprietary, private records. Even where insurers are required to 
give notice to assignees of premium non-payment, insurers are under no 
obligation to notify subsequent assignees of prior policy assignments, nor 
even to respond to information requests by creditors.113  
There is no reliable mechanism for creditors to determine whether 
their claims are likely to be subordinated. A creditor who wishes to learn 
about the encumbrances on a policy has no central public filing system to 
consult. Indeed, an investigation with the Secretary of State of the debtor 
may deceive some creditors into overestimating their security vis-à-vis a 
borrower.114 Interests in life insurance policies will not be recorded there.  
This multiplies the possibilities for secret liens and mischief, as 
parties are induced to lend on terms implying higher degrees of security 
than they may eventually receive. This leads to litigation, into which even 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
112 Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 N.E.2d 114, 117 (Ill. 1940) (“It is essential 
to the prompt payment of losses that life insurance contracts be denied 
negotiability, and prompt payment of losses has come to be one of the most 
desirable of the attributes of such contracts. Life insurance is depended on for the 
payment of estate taxes, for the education of children, for all forms of immediate 
cash demands and for the very living of the family of the deceased policy-holder 
pending administration . . . . [T]he companies, in good faith, may safely pay 
promptly to those shown by their records to be entitled to payment.”).?
113 See, e.g., Wells v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 149 Cal. Rptr. 171, 
174 (Cal. Ct. App. 1978).?
114 McLaughlin, supra note 11, at 959.?
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the insurance company may be drawn.115 And it ends in a reduction in 
value offered to the insured. With secured lenders sliding into unsecured 
status, life insurance policy interests will be traded in a market for 
lemons.116 Increasingly, lenders will offer terms and interest rates 
consistent with unsecured loans, rather than the preferable rate befitting 
properly secured collateral.117  
All of these problems multiply in the context of a securitized 
secondary market for policies. Securitization requires policies that can be 
combined without hindering the pool. Policies that carry litigation risks, or 
the details of which are unclear because of an uncooperative issuer, will not 
find an easy home. Rating agencies list legal risks and a dearth of 
acceptable policies as two of the major impediments to the ratings needed 
to create marketable securities out of life insurance policies.118 And the 
difficulty of investigating policies creates a cost that will be paid with each 
investigation – a cost that will be paid more often in a liquid secondary 
market.119 
Finally, it is distasteful for a private record to be maintained on the 
terms of the most likely creditor. The issuer insurance company stands as a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
115 See, e.g., Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Bunt, 754 P.2d 993, 994-95 (Wash. 1988); 
Am. W. Life Ins. Co. v. Hooker, 622 P.2d 775, 776-77 (Utah 1980); King v. 
Vineyard, 477 P.2d 700, 701-03 (Okla. Civ. App. 1970); Stanfill v. Defenbach, 
239 F.2d 685, 686 (9th Cir. 1957).?
116 See generally George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”: Quality 
Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. ECON. 488, 489-94 (1970).?
117 See generally James J. White, Efficiency Justifications for Personal 
Property Security, 37 VAND. L. REV. 473, 480-81 (1984); Alan Schwartz, The 
Continuing Puzzle of Secured Debt, 37 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1060-62 (1984); 
Homer Kripke, Law and Economics: Measuring the Economic Efficiency of 
Commercial Law in a Vacuum of Fact, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 929, 951-55 (1985). 
118 See, e.g., WINSTON CHANG & GARY MARTUCCI, STANDARD & POOR’S, 
CREDIT FAQ: UNCOVERING THE CHALLENGES IN RATING LIFE SETTLEMENT 
SECURITIZATIONS, (2009); DBRS INC., METHODOLOGY – RATING U.S. LIFE 
SETTLEMENT SECURITIZATIONS, (2008), available at 
http://www.dbrs.com/research/218570 (follow “Rating U.S. Life Settlement 
Securitizations” hyperlink under “Related Research”).  See also LIFE 
SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 52, at 16-17 (stating that market 
participants agree that ratings will be required to make viable securities); 5 RUSS & 
SEGALLA, supra note 101, § 77:45.?
119 LIFE SETTLEMENTS TASK FORCE, supra note 52, at 16 (stating that market 
participants agree that the cost of investigating and warranting policies in the pool 
against legal risks are impractical burdens).?
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potential lender under the policy as a matter of state law.120 Further, the 
issuer stands to profit from the lapse of a policy when the insured is unable 
to obtain adequate financing. Insurance companies may face temptations to 
err in favor of their role as creditor and business, rather than in their role as 
a filing place for other lenders.  
Even if insurance companies faithfully discharge all of their duties, 
there will be an appearance of impropriety to a creditor who finds that the 
private registration has not worked in his favor. Consider Rose again,121 
where an assignee-plaintiff claimed to have sent written notification to the 
insurer, but the insurer claimed to have no record of it. The Court of 
Appeals found that plaintiff had notified the insurance company.122 And 
yet, the district court had ruled for the defendant, crediting an estoppel 
claim that plaintiff had not done enough to confirm that the insurance 
company recorded their assignment and informed subsequent assignees.123 
In another jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals could have affirmed the 
district court on the matters of law and the Roses would have lost their 
priority because of the insurance company’s error.  
Moreover, even as the case was resolved, the subsequent assignee 
may be legitimately aggrieved. They requested information from the 
insurer as to prior liens and were told that there were none.124 They were 
deceived as to their priority by insurance company error. Either way, the 
insurance company’s error determined the rights between rival claimants.  
Disappointing as this error may be, it would be scandalous if one of 
the litigant creditors were the insurance company itself. As it stands, 
insurance companies profit from increased lapse, and lapse increases if 
creditors, aware of their precarious position with respect to non-public 
filing, are discouraged from providing alternative financing. It would be far 
better if the parties were to register their liens with the Secretary of State.125 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
120 5 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 101, § 77:45.?
121 Rose v. AmSouth Bank, 296 F. Supp. 2d 383 (E.D.N.Y. 2003), rev’d, Rose 
v. AmSouth Bank of Florida, 391 F.3d 63, 66-67 (2d Cir. 2004). Though reversed, 
the lower court is still instructive here because jurisdictions differ, and some follow 
the priority rules of the district court.  In this instance, the Court of Appeals 
reversed as a matter of law because it applied New York Law.  ?
122 Rose, 391 F.3d at 66-67.?
123 Rose, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 395.?
124 Rose, 296 F. Supp. 2d at 388.?
125 Another advantage of Article 9 is that is includes provisions for many types 
of errors arising from filing with the appropriate filling agency. ?
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5. UCC Solution 
 
As described above, industry practice has it that interests in 
insurance policies are perfected by notification to the insurance company, 
with physical possession of the policy having no legal effect. However, as 
also described above, the non-UCC law provides ample examples where 
the law contradicts insurance industry practice. Regardless of whether Rose 
can be distinguished in one jurisdiction or another,126 the law here is a field 
of brambles, much underestimated in its propensity to entangle otherwise 
benign transactions. Professor Knippenberg summarizes the non-UCC law 
in this way: 
 
The long and short of it is, there are risks and costs both to 
lenders seeking to secure a debt through an assignment of 
life insurance, and to insurers who are driven to 
interpleader actions or, not infrequently, forced to justify as 
defendants the payment of proceeds to one or another of 
multiple claimants. These risks and costs are of the sort 
that are predictably generated where, for lack of thorough 
statutory treatment, there is room left by uncertainty for 
argument.127 
 
He concludes that “the law governing assignment, then, is sufficiently 
flaccid, incomplete and non-uniform to suggest insurers and assignees alike 
would benefit from . . . Article 9.”128 A fundamental policy of Article 9 of 
the Uniform Commercial Code is to discourage secret liens,129 and it could 
be applied here to give parties greater comfort in their security. 
 The UCC should be amended to remove the life insurance 
exclusion and treat life insurance policy interests as general intangibles, 
while still acknowledging the realities of the insurer’s special role. Issuer 
loans against policies should be treated as purchase money security 
interests under § 9-107. Such loans should be automatically perfected for a 
period of time, and then achieve super priority if perfected through notice. 
Short term financing for an insured who is late in an insurance premium 
payment may never need to be filed. Nor would an insurance company be 
forced to file at a moment of great inconvenience, merely because of the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
126 Rose v. AmSouth Bank of Florida, 391 F.3d 63, 65 (2d Cir. 2004). ?
127 Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 8.?
128 Id. at 9. ?
129 See In re Cushman Baking, 526 F.2d 23, 28-29 (1st Cir. 1975).?
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time that the insured requires a loan. But in a timely manner, all liens on a 
policy must soon be disclosed. Setting a time limit for filing of liens will 
ensure that potential lenders know how long they must wait in order to 
discover all potential claimants.  
Purchase Money Security Interest status is appropriate for two 
reasons.   First, it is recognition that such loans often finance premiums that 
permit the continued life of the policy.130 Second, such status acknowledges 
the insurers’ other statutory responsibilities. Issuing insurance companies 
are required to offer policy loans by insurance statutes in most states.131 
Without purchase money secured status, even a perfected security interest 
could take second priority on a loan whose value had long been promised 
as security to others. No party should be required by statute to lend, as a 
second lien, on an over-promised asset.  Of course, the power of the 
insurance company to “jump the queue” with purchase money security 
interest priority will upset some other creditors. But they can be expected to 
protect themselves with indentures in the agreement with the borrower.  
 
B. SURPLUS PROBLEM 
 
The surplus problem refers to distribution of value of a defaulted 
security-policy above the value of the debt. When an insured defaults on 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
130 See Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 232-33.  See generally Kripke, supra 
note 117, at 951-57 (describing how PMSI creditors enable the insured to obtain 
new collateral, so they are not really disadvantaging prior creditors.); Lucian Arye 
Bebchuk & Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for the Priority of Secured Claims in 
Bankruptcy, 105 YALE L.J. 857, 880-902 (1996) (generally discussing efficiency 
and incentives for priority); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Unsecured Creditor's 
Bargain, 80 VA. L. REV. 1887, 1947-63 (1994) (discussing "three theories and one 
not so bad" in support of subordination).?
131 See ALASKA STAT. § 21.45.080(a) (2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-
1208(A), 20-1209(A) (2010); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2911(a) (1999); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 33-25-3(5) (West 2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(1) 
(2000); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 175, § 132 (West 1998); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
61A.03(g) (West 2005); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (2009);  NEB. REV. 
STAT. § 44-502(8) (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.110(1) (LexisNexis 
2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17B:25-8 (West 2006); N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 
3203(8)(A) (McKinney 2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.05(G) (LexisNexis 
2010); OR. REV. STAT. § 743.186(1) (2009); 40 PA. STAT. ANN. § 510(h) (West 
1999); S.C. CODE ANN. § 38-63-220(l) (2000); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-
15 (2004); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 8, § 3731(7) (2009); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 
48.23.080(1) (West 2010); W. VA. CODE § 33-13-8(a) (2006).  See also Metro. 
Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 729 (1985).?
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his debt obligations to a collateral assignee, a number of questions emerge: 
(1) may the creditor exercise the surrender option of the policy to satisfy 
the debt; (2) may the creditor wait until the policy matures and collect the 
proceeds; (3) may the creditor sell the policy to a third party, and under 
what conditions; and (3) may that third party surrender, wait to collect, or 
resell? At some stage, one of these options may produce cash in excess of 
the debt as of yet unsatisfied, provoking the most important question of all: 
who can keep this surplus of cash above the borrower’s remaining debt?  
There is a gulf between what the law permits and what is industry 
practice. Generally, lenders expect to keep the surplus from the policy, or 
else to sell the policy to a buyer who will someday get to keep the surplus. 
The borrower often loses more than the initial bargain contemplated, and 
the law generally regards surplus as the property of the borrower. Statutory 
treatment is desperately required to curtail the most abusive practices 
currently extant, as well as to clarify creditors’ and third parties’ rights to 
the benefits of their bargains.  
As with the previous section considering the perfection problem, it 
makes sense to look at what third-party lenders believe and what they do.  
In many cases, lenders’ actions are based on wrong assumptions, and 
increase their own risks needlessly. Lenders will generally lend an amount 
that falls somewhere between the policy’s surrender value and the maturity 
proceeds. Lenders reason that if the insured defaults, they can surrender the 
policy with no risk and satisfy the remaining debt. Or, if they have the 
appetite and sufficient patience, they can pay the premiums until the policy 
matures and then collect the death benefit. Or they may sell the policy on 
the secondary market.  
These various actions by lenders are based on their understandings  
(sometimes misunderstanding) of their rights.  Creditors believe they have 
the right to surrender the insurance policy. Most lenders believe that they 
can foreclose on their security with minimal process or protection for the 
debtor and sell the policy to a third party, who takes the policy free and 
clear and may receive the full proceeds.  
Some lenders believe that they may keep the full balance paid by 
the purchasing third party, or paid upon maturity by the insurance 
company, even if it exceeds the value of the defaulted debt, with no need to 
return the surplus to the debtor or beneficiaries.132 Other lenders believe it 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
132 This belief is perpetuated in part by the widespread practice of executing 
security assignments using absolute assignment forms. Thus, the paperwork 
already looks like the creditor has been given the whole policy, without regard to 
specific obligations. ?
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is necessary for the debtor to consent to signing over his remaining rights in 
the policy, or designate the creditor as the beneficiary, and they make a 
practice of obtaining this consent from the insured in satisfaction of the 
debt.  
Notwithstanding creditor optimism, there is substantial authority 
for all of the following contrary propositions: (a) the lender may not 
exercise the surrender option;133 (b) the lender may not resell the policy to a 
third party;134  (c) the lender may keep the amount of the debt owed, plus 
interest and premiums paid, but the borrower’s estate or beneficiaries are 
due any surplus.135 Each of these precedents implies potential litigation and 
impediments to insurance financing transactions.  
Most crucially, (c) is well-supported and contrasts with widespread 
industry practice. Industry practice has galloped ahead of the law in this 
area.136 There is little legal support for the widespread practice of creditor 
windfall, wherein a creditor is able to keep the surplus above the 
indebtedness amount, and it smacks of exploitation.  
While curtailing exploitation, some provision must be made to 
allow creditors a reasonable return on their investment. The law should 
make creditors’ rights clearer, and allow creditors to then charge a rate of 
interest that adequately compensates them for their risk, or else clarify that 
they intend to purchase the policy, surplus and all, rather than merely lend 
against it.   
 
1. Windfall From Sale 
 
Notwithstanding industry practice, numerous courts have adopted 
the view that a creditor who retains more than the amount of the 
indebtedness will have been unjustly enriched.137 The clear majority 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
133 See, e.g., Brown v. New York Life Ins. Co., 22 F. Supp. 82, 88-89 
(W.D.S.C. 1938).?
134 See, e.g., Salvidge v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of New York, 191 N.W. 862, 863 
(Iowa 1923); 5 RUSS & SEGALLA, supra note 101, § 37:68.?
135 See, e.g., Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 653 (8th Cir. 2003); 
Westchester Enters., Inc. v. Swartwout (In re Swartwout), 123 B.R. 794, 799-800 
(Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1991); Succession of Goudeau, 480 So. 2d 806, 808 (La. Ct. 
App. 1985).?
136 Cf. Kenneth Kettering, Securitization and Its Discontents, 29 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 1553, 1632 (2008) (stating that securitization has grown immensely over the 
past twenty years despite shaky doctrinal foundations). 
137 Albrent v. Spencer, 88 N.W.2d 333, 335-36 (Wis. 1958) (“If the amount 
received is greater than the debt, there is an ‘unjust enrichment’ with liability for 
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position is that a creditor-assignee may only take the remaining 
indebtedness, plus expenses such as payments made to keep the policy 
alive.138 Many states have statutes to this effect, patterned off of the 
Uniform Consumer Credit Code.139 In the vast majority of cases, courts 
construe the assignment so as to reserve to the non-creditor beneficiaries 
any excess of proceeds over indebtedness.140 The burden is on the creditor 
to establish what he is due under the indebtedness.141  
Arguments in favor of a creditor’s right of windfall are usually 
limited in their scope. For example, the assignee of a policy of insurance, 
assigned by way of security, is sometimes said to occupy the same status as 
the insured with respect to the rights and liabilities under that particular 
policy that the insured occupied.142 In allowing a creditor to foreclose upon 
and sell an insurance policy, the Florida Supreme Court’s Moon v. Williams 
seems to advocate for this view:  
 
The assignee of a policy of insurance, such as life 
insurance, assigned by way of security, in general, 
occupies the same status with respect to the rights and 
liabilities under the policy that the insured occupied, to the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the amount exceeding the amount of the debt plus interest.”); Rattray v. Banks, 121 
S.E. 516 (Ga. Ct. App. 1924); First Nat’l Bank v. Sec. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 222 S.W. 
832 (Mo. 1920); Minn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Manthei, 189 S.W.2d 144 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1945). ?
138 William H. Danne, Jr., Annotation, Right of Creditor Beneficiary or 
Assignee of Insurance Policy on Life of Debtor to Excess Proceeds Over Amount 
Owed on Debt, 6 A.L.R.6th 391 § 5  (2005).?
139 UNIF. CONSUMER CREDIT CODE (1974) § 4.105(2) (1974) (creditor must 
pay to the consumer or his or her estate all proceeds received by the creditor in 
excess of the amount to which the creditor is entitled within 10 days after receipt of 
the proceeds).?
140 Danne, supra note 138. See, e.g., Luxton v. United States, 340 F.3d 659, 
662 (8th Cir. 2003). (“[A] collateral assignment transfers only those rights 
necessary to secure the assignor’s debt and extinguishes the named beneficiary’s 
interest only to the extent of the assignor’s debt to the assignee.”).?
141 See, e.g., Floyd v. Victory Sav. Bank, 189 S.E. 462, 467 (S.C. 1937).?
142 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 757 (2007) (note, however that this passage reads in 
full “The assignee of a policy of insurance, such as life insurance, assigned by way 
of security, in general, occupies the same status with respect to the rights and 
liabilities under the policy which the insured occupied, to the extent of the 
indebtedness for which the policy was assigned as collateral.”). ?
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extent of the indebtedness for which the policy was 
assigned as collateral.143 
 
The court goes on to say that the assignee may sell the policy by order of 
court and that the purchaser 
 
would stand in the position of the insured as to the right to 
exercise options under the policy, and therefore would 
thereby acquire the right to surrender the policy for its cash 
surrender value, or make such other settlement with the 
company in regard to the policy as could have been made 
by the insured, had the policy not been assigned.144  
 
Although Moon does authorize some creditor activity, the Moon court is 
careful to include the limiting phrase “to the extent of the indebtedness.”145 
The court does not explain what would happen if the court-ordered sale 
price exceeded the indebtedness, and it cites to Metropolitan Life Insurance 
Co. v. O’Brien, a case in which the creditor’s recovery is limited by the 
debtor’s indebtedness.146  
A similar argument emerges from the fact that most courts have 
held that a creditor, holding a policy as collateral, may surrender the policy 
to the insurance company upon the insured’s default.147 An assignee-
creditor has the power to terminate the contract for insurance and end any 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
143 Moon v. Williams, 135 So. 555, 557 (Fla. 1931).?
144 Id.?
145 Id. at 556. 
146 52 N.W. 1012, 1013-14 (Mich. 1892) (“Creditors, however, hold only what 
is necessary for their indemnity for the debt, and the representatives of the insured 
will be entitled to the balance.”) . ?
147 Bush v. Block, 187 S.W. 153, 156 (Mo. Ct. App. 1916) (Assignee of life 
policy taken as security loan, which then comes into default, may convert the 
policy into a paid-up policy upon notice to the insured); Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. 
v. First Nat’l Bank, 169 S.W. 1028, 1034 (Ky. 1914) (creditor to whom life policy 
assigned may surrender the policy); Higgins v. Helmbold, 48 App. D.C. 50 (1918); 
Bank of Idana v. Ill. Life Ins. Co., 9 P.2d 629 (Kan. 1932); McGimpsey v. Sec. 
BIdg. & Loan Ass'n,  157 A. 441 (N.J. 1931); Wilson v. Prudential Ins. Co., 187 A. 
251 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1936); See Gen. Am. Life Ins. Co. v. Fraventhal & Schwarz, 
101 S. W.2d 953, 954 (Ark. 1937).?
324 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 17.2 
?
future growth in the policy principal. Some creditors may reason a fortiori 
that power of surrender entails the existence of equal or lesser rights.148  
In Citizens’ Bank v. Pan-American Life Ins. Co., a bank purchased 
a life insurance policy sold in foreclosure by a collateral assignee.149 The 
bank sought to have itself listed as a beneficiary under the policy.150 The 
court ruled for the bank, analogizing the power of appointment to the right 
of surrender: “Rights with respect to loans and surrender clauses in a policy 
are rights of the same nature and character as the one to change beneficiary, 
and we can think of no reason why the purchaser of the policy in this case 
should not enjoy the same right . . . .”151  
Similarly, if the power to destroy the policy is theirs, then any 
value in surplus of the surrender value persists due solely to their benign 
neglect of that power. And any premiums paid from that point forward goes 
to grow the principal and increase the chance that the principal will be 
realized rather than the surrender value.  
There is a sense in which the surplus is created through the 
creditors’ actions alone and so they are entitled to it. But it proves difficult 
to find a case where the surplus-taker did not acquire the policy after the 
appropriate judicial sale. No such case validates the right of the creditor to 
hold a maturity or resale balance in excess of the debt and costs. The most 
this reasoning proves is that if a party takes the policy after court-ordered 
sale, they may be able to keep whatever proceeds are later liberated – but it 
says nothing about the proceeds of the judicial sale itself, which surplus 
may be properly allocated to the insured.   
Perhaps sensitive to unfavorable law, industry practice has it that a 
creditor who is owed less than the maturity payment will persuade a 
defaulted debtor to list the creditor as beneficiary on the policy and sign 
away his residual rights in the insurance in satisfaction of the debt.  In this 
way, the creditor obtains an amount of money greater than the nominal 
value of the debt and the debtor retains no rights to any residual.  
The transaction then acquires the character of a wager contract, 
with all the worrisome policy implications of the creditor hoping for the 
early demise of the insured.152 These surplus allocations are more 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????Accord, FRANK HERBERT, DUNE 462 (2005) (“The power to destroy a thing 
is the absolute control over it”). 
149 141 So. 481 (La. Ct. App. 1932). 
150 Id.  
151 Id. at 482. ?
152 See Anthony Alt, Note, SPIN-Life Insurance Policies: A Dizzying Effect on 
Human Dignity and the Death of Life Insurance, 7 AVE MARIA L. REV. 605 (2009). 
See also infra III.D.  
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distasteful than a simple policy purchase. This seems like an unjust 
windfall for the creditor who loaned money on security and now gets to 
keep the full value of the collateral. This could not have been part of the 
initial agreement since the insured has a right to decline such an 
assignment. Most likely, creditors are squeezing a debtor for an intangible 
asset during a time of difficulty.  
In addition to being distasteful, these conclusions to the lending 
relationship are legally problematic. Industry practice is to structure the 
transaction so that it does involve consideration, perhaps by varying the 
terms of the agreement. But it remains true that if the insured has a right to 
satisfy the debt from sale of the security, the insured loses economic value 
for nothing in return when the insured signs away the security in total.  
Moreover, courts look to the relationship between the insured and the 
creditor-beneficiary in determining the controlling intention of the policy 
assignment.  
Where courts allow the creditor to take an amount greater than the 
debt, they emphasize that the assignment was not as security for a loan,153 
that the creditor was a friend154 or relative.155The only cases where creditors 
seem to be able to take the entirety of the proceeds are where the creditor 
procured the policy.156  
For all of the forgoing issues, authority can be found for nearly any 
position, few rules are clear, and jurisdictions tend to differ. Doubtless, 
some creditors may have found comfort in their ability to take surplus on a 
given set of facts, with a given contract, and under a certain reading of the 
case law. But even such a creditor will may have to anticipate ample 
litigation and difficulty in securitizing her acquired policies. As Professor 
Knippenberg put it, “These risks and costs are of the sort that are 
predictably generated where, for lack of statutory treatment, there is room 
left by uncertainty for argument.”157 Even if reform might limit creditors’ 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
153 Am. Cas. Co. v. Rose, 340 F.2d 469, 471 (10th Cir. 1964); Zolintakis v. 
Orfanos, 119 F.2d 571 574-75 (10th Cir. 1941) (probably a loan, but doubtful that 
that creditor-beneficiary could have collected the sums advanced). ?
154 Am. Cas. Co., 340 F.2d at 471 n.4; Forster v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 311 
P.2d 700, 702 (Colo. 1957).?
155 Wages v. Wages, 42 S.E.2d 481, 482 (Ga. 1947).?
156 Central Nat’l Bank v. Hume, 128 U.S. 195 (1888); Fitzgerald v. Rawlings 
Implement Co., 79 A. 915 (Md. 1911); Haberfeld v. Mayer, 100 A. 587 (Pa. 1917); 
Watson v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 140 F.2d 673 (D.C. Cir. 1943) cert. denied 
322 U.S. 746 (1944); WILLIAN R. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF INSURANCE, 
739-40 (Buist M. Anderson ed., 3rd ed. 1951). ?
157 Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 226-27. ?
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ability to take the surplus from the insured, creditors will benefit from 
greater legal certainty and reduced litigation. 
 
2. UCC Solution  
 
The surplus problem involves confusion as to the treatment of 
surplus proceeds and facilitates predatory behavior by creditors.  Inclusion 
in Article 9 is the appropriate remedy. It is not enough to simply clarify in 
statute that the creditor may not keep surplus unless clearly specified.158 
This clarification is appropriate, and a truthful depiction of the law as best 
as can be construed, but it creates bad incentives if adopted alone.  
Imagine a creditor in possession of a policy with a maturity value 
of $1,000,000, a surrender value of $100,000 and a resale value, reflecting 
the expected value of the policy given premium and maturity date, of 
$200,000. Imagine, further, that the creditor is owed $100,000. Under 
current industry practice, the creditor is likely to resell the policy for 
$200,000 to a purchaser willing to wait for maturity. The creditor will keep 
all $200,000, representing $100,000 of debt and a $100,000 surplus. The 
better result is that the creditor keeps $100,000 and returns $100,000 to the 
debtor insured. 
 But if the law were amended to clarify that the $100,000 belonged 
to the debtor, this better result will not obtain. Stripped of any potential 
surplus, the creditor would simply surrender the policy for $100,000. Why? 
Surrender is always easier than more complex commercial transactions, 
which are risky in terms of their value, and which require the seller to pay 
the insurance premiums until disposition.  
Surrender also reduces litigation risks. If the debtor has an interest 
in the surplus, the debtor may litigate if he feels the creditor made unwise 
choices in selling. He may claim that the creditor made a hasty sale, or a 
sale to a friend on unfair terms, resulting in a cognizable harm to the 
debtor’s interest. There is no incentive for the creditor to bear those risks. 
As long as resale has risk but no benefit, and as long as surrender remains a 
legal option, value will be lost to the debtor-insured.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
158 There is nothing wrong, per se, in allowing an assignee to take the whole 
surplus. But such transaction is really a sale of the policy, in consideration for a 
loan, with the seller’s right to repurchase for the loan principal plus interest.  
Presumably the loan offered is at a below market interest rate, as the lender expects 
to make their real gain on the surplus. But such a transaction should be clearly 
labeled as such, and not sprung upon a borrower. 
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Inclusion of interests in insurance policies within the UCC would 
subject the decision to resell or surrender to Article 9’s standard foreclosure 
provisions. Upon default by the debtor, a secured creditor has a right to 
dispose of the collateral.159 The creditor may come to own the collateral, 
should she wish, by purchasing it in a judicially administered sale.160 But 
the disposition need not be judicially administered, nor need it even be a 
sale,161 so long as it is commercially reasonable.162 Dispositions in 
conformity with reasonable commercial practices are deemed to be 
commercially reasonable.163  
 Creditors have hitherto had undue freedom with regard to liberal 
surrender. Surrender should properly be regarded as one of the many 
options potentially available to the foreclosing creditor. Sometimes 
surrender would be regarded as a commercially reasonable option, such as 
where the surrender amount is likely to equal the resale amount. But under 
the UCC, creditors would no longer be allowed a general safe harbor for 
surrenders where surplus-creating resales may be possible. So the creditor 
from the example above would be required to sell the policy for greater 
value, and share the surplus, less expenses, with the debtor.  
Conversely, some creditors have failed to surrender to the 
detriment of the borrower. In one case, a pledgee held policies with a 
surrender value sufficient to satisfy its claims, but instead allowed the 
policies to decrease in value for years until they could no longer satisfy the 
claims. The court found for the pledgee, allowing it to recover the 
unsatisfied debt from the pledgor. The court reasoned that the Article 9 
statutory obligation of "reasonable care in the custody and preservation of 
collateral" is inapplicable to interests in life insurance policies.164 This is an 
appalling and inefficient result. Inclusion in Article 9 would mean that 
surrender would sometimes be required as part of the reasonable 
preservation and disposition of collateral. The legal duties imposed by 
Article 9 are crucial components to the correction of the surplus problem.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
159 U.C.C. § 9-610(a) (2000).?
160 Id. at § 9-610(f). ?
161 Id. at § 9-610(a) (“a secured party may sell, lease, license, or otherwise 
dispose of any or all of the collateral. . . .”).?
162 Id. at § 9-610(b). ?
163 Id. at § 9-627(b)(3). There is no recognized market for life insurance 
policies, though there may someday be a market for the securitized bundles of 
them. Thus the other methods of reasonable disposition will not work. § 9-
627(b)(1)-(2).?
164 Poultry Processing, Inc. v. Mendelson, 584 A.2d 659, 662 (Me. 1991).?
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Where creditors lend a substantial proportion of the value, this 
change will not be burdensome. Only where creditors have loaned a small 
fraction of the value, and yet still expect the whole maturity payment, will 
this reform decrease the gain to creditors. These transactions are not 
sympathetic or efficient.  
Eliminating the option to simply surrender the policy upon 
foreclosure will decrease some of the flexibility and security associated 
with lending on insurance policies. But there are two reasons to think that 
this change will not substantially harm the availability of credit to 
borrowers. First, insofar as creditors have expected to keep the windfall 
surplus, their practice has been to sell, not surrender, the most valuable 
policies. Under current lending practices, only the least valuable policies 
are rapidly surrendered – a practice which Article 9 would still respect as a 
commercial reasonable disposition.   
Moreover, since Article 9 invalidates limits on assignment, parties 
will be free to draft complex hybrid credit/purchase agreements.165 
Consumers may be given an amount near the secondary market value of a 
policy in exchange for an absolute assignment, with some kind of right of 
redemption if the insured wishes to restore her interest at a later time. Such 
transactions would track the windfall benefit currently enjoyed by 
creditors, but it would make the transaction clear to consumers, as well as 
ensure them a fair price for losing their investment. It is also reasonable to 
assume that more transparency and fair prices would encourage consumers 
to borrow more, thus enlarging the market and opportunities for lenders. 
 
C. THE RESERVATION PROBLEM 
 
The “reservation problem” refers to a subtle problem emerging 
from drafting practices and non-UCC law, which disrupts the growth of a 
secondary market around foreclosed collateral assignments. The vast 
majority of collateral assignments have been executed in a manner that 
reserves to the assignor certain rights that the assignee needs for flexible 
resale.  
  Collateral assignments are performed using standard forms 
drafted by insurance companies. The considerable uniformity of forms was 
in part a deliberate effort of the insurance industry.166 Insurance companies 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
165 U.C.C. § 9-408 (2000). 
166 See John F. Handy, Assistant Counsel, Why Uniformity in Collateral 
Assignment Blanks?, 5 PROCEEDINGS OF THE ASSOCIATION OF LIFE INSURANCE 
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have for years standardized contracts for the benefit of the insured.167 
Collaboration between bankers and insurance companies resulted in a 
standardized assignment form in 1938.168 These uniform forms were used 
almost universally in the following years.169    
By controlling the means of assignment, and limiting them to 
finite, boilerplate clauses, insurance companies can prevent creditors from 
taking advantage of their clients.  On the other hand, those same standard 
contracts can also discourage creditors from accepting insurance policies as 
collateral for loans.170  
Standard assignment forms reserve to the assignor the right to 
designate or change beneficiaries, often called the power of appointment.171 
That is, even once the insured individual gives her policy as collateral for a 
debt, she still has the sole right to decide who is to be paid when she dies. 
This reservation exists to prevent the beneficiary from limiting the 
insured’s power to assign the policy.172 But this reservation casts a cloud 
over the salability of the policy. It is difficult for a creditor to effectively 
sell his interest in a policy missing this incident of ownership.  
Parties cannot draft around this problem because assignments are 
only valid on the terms of the insurance policy,173 which will invariably 
require the use of standard assignment forms.  Many states have codified 
the requirement that policies are assignable or not assignable on the terms 
of the insurance contract.174 Insurance companies will not be expected to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
COUNSEL 307 (1932) (suggesting collaboration with the American Bankers 
Association). ?
167 Comment, The Assignment of Life Insurance as Collateral Security for 
Bank Loans, 58 YALE L.J. 743, 754 (1949). ?
168 See id. at 755.?
169 Id. at 756 nn.81-82.?
170 See, e.g., Neil A. Doherty and Hal J. Singer, Regulating the Secondary 
Market for Life Insurance Policies, 21 J. INS. REG. 63 (2003). See also supra note 
30.?
171 See 10 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2D § 149:184 (2010) (“The following 
specific rights, so long as the policy has not been surrendered, do not pass by virtue 
of this assignment: . . .(b) The right to designate and change the beneficiary.”).?
172 See infra II.C.1. 
173 See, e.g., Immel v. Travelers Ins. Co., 26 N.E.2d 114, 116 (Ill. 
1940) (citing 31 CORPUS JURIS, 430; 2 ROGER W. COOLEY, BRIEFS ON THE 
LAW OF INSURANCE 1829 (1905)). ?
174 See ALA. CODE § 27-14-21(a) (2011); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.42.270 
(West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1122 (2011) (West); ARK. CODE ANN. § 
23-79-124(a) (West 2011); CAL. INS. CODE § 10130 (West 2011); DEL. CODE ANN. 
tit. 18, § 2720 (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-17 (West 2011); HAW. REV. 
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alleviative this problem, in part because they tend to benefit when third 
party interests are impaired.  
 
1. Origin in the Vested Beneficiary Problem. 
 
Beginning in the mid-nineteenth century, courts began to restrict 
the ability of insureds to assign their policies.175 They did so on the theory 
that the beneficiary under the policy had a vested interest in the proceeds 
that could not be divested without his permission. It seemed unjust and 
problematic that a breadwinner could procure a policy to give peace of 
mind to her dependants and then secretly assign the policy to a bank. The 
beneficiary may have come to rely on the benefit. It was also argued that 
the insured had given the beneficiary a beneficial interest at the time of 
taking out the policy and was not at liberty to unilaterally divest the 
beneficiary.  
The protection of the vested interest of a beneficiary became the 
law in all states but Wisconsin,176 and life insurance policies became de 
facto unassignable. Such restrictions reduced the value of insurance 
policies to insureds, who were forced to accept whatever price the 
insurance company saw fit to offer for a policy loan or surrender.  
Insurance contracts were soon drafted to reserve the insured’s right 
to change beneficiaries.177 This reservation clause limited the beneficiary’s 
interest to a mere expectancy and freed the insured’s hand to make 
assignments. A policy that was assigned absolutely would carry with it the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
STAT. § 431:10-228(a) (West 2010); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 41-1826 (West 2011); 
KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 304.14-250(1) (West 2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-
A, § 2420(1) (2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-15-414(1) (2010); N.D. CENT. CODE 
ANN. § 26.1-33-33 (West 2011); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 36, § 3624 (West 2011); 
PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 512 (West 2011); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-10-6.1 
(2011); VA. CODE ANN. § 38.2-3111 (West 2011); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 
48.18.360 (West 2011). 
175 See Lewis D. Asper, Ownership and Transfer of Interests in Life Insurance 
Policies, 20 HASTINGS L.J. 1175, 1177. For more on the origin of this theory, see 
William Reynolds Vance, The Beneficiary's Interest In A Life Insurance Policy, 31 
YALE L.J. 343, 347-48 (1922).?
176 See 4 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 27:56 (2d ed. 
1960). See also Ellison v. Straw, 92 N.W. 1094 (1902); Clark v. Durand, 12 Wis. 
223 (1860).?
177 See e.g., Asper, supra note 175, at 1179; Grimm v. Grimm, 157 P.2d 841, 
842 (Cal. 1945); Morrison v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 103 P.2d 963, 965 (Cal. 1940); 
Davis v. Modern Indus. Bank, 18 N.E.2d 639, 643 (N.Y. 1939).?
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power to select beneficiaries. Thus, be it assignor or assignee, someone 
always had the power to change beneficiaries, and so beneficiary rights 
would not vest. Thus, reservation clauses were originally drafted to 
empower insureds vis-à-vis their beneficiaries.  
 
2. Reservation of Selection of Beneficiary Amounts to the 
Reservation of a Substantial Incident of Ownership.  
 
The power of appointment of beneficiaries is a significant incident 
of ownership and a crucially important one for the creditor who hopes to 
sell the policy to a third party purchaser. Incidents of ownership are the 
economic benefits of owning a policy178 and are constituent elements of 
ownership. Regardless of what labels the parties may apply, a transaction 
that fails to give enough incidents of ownership to the assignee may be 
contested as less than a transfer of ownership.  If an insured purports to 
assign a policy, but a court finds that the insured has retained for herself too 
much of the power associated with the policy, the insured will still be 
deemed the owner. Questions of whether the insured has “really” assigned 
the policy can become important if, for example, other creditors of the 
insured seek to foreclose on the policy.  
Lists of the incidents of ownership of life policies are inconsistent 
and contradictory, shifting somewhat from court to court.179 But it may be 
helpful to look to an area of the law that, though convoluted, at least speaks 
with one voice: federal taxation. If an assignee lacks all the incidents of 
ownership, a life insurance policy may remain in the gross estate of the 
assignor.180 The federal estate tax sets rules to determine whether an 
insurance policy is includable in an individual’s gross estate. It lists the 
following incidents of ownership: 
 
the power to change the beneficiary, to surrender or cancel 
the policy, to assign the policy, to revoke an assignment, to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
178 26. C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (2010). 
179 Asper, supra note 175, at 1183 (“This is due in part to the nature of the 
interests and in part to the fact that few transfers of interest in property are 
conducted at a higher level of ignorance and inattentiveness.”).?
180 4 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 63:41 (3d. ed. 
2010) (“An insured's reservation of the right to change beneficiaries under a life 
insurance policy is an ‘incident of ownership’ sufficient to cause inclusion of the 
policy proceeds in the insured/decedent's gross estate….”). 
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pledge the policy for a loan, or to obtain from the insurer a 
loan against the surrender value of the policy, etc.181 
 
Reservation of the power to change beneficiaries is by itself sufficient 
“incident of ownership” to cause inclusion of the policy proceeds in the 
insured’s gross estate.182 Conversely, an assignor who has exercised the 
surrender option of a policy can still have effectively removed the policy 
from his gross estate.183 
In a standard collateral assignment, an insured does not grant the 
insurer access to the power of appointment, or otherwise put that power at 
risk. It is difficult for a foreclosing creditor to persuade an insurance 
company to list him as the owner when such a large portion of the 
ownership has been reserved.  
It is also difficult for a creditor to persuade a subsequent purchaser 
that he owns the policy if he is not listed as the owner. As a matter of 
industry practice, investors in life insurance policies expect to purchase 
policies with all the relevant rights attached. They designate themselves as 
beneficiary so that they can take the full proceeds, and they expect to be 
able to sell the policy on the secondary market, allowing the next purchaser 
to designate herself as the new beneficiary. Purchasers may wish to 
securitize policies for resale, requiring them to all be complete and 
possessing the full incidents of ownership.  
Thus, the current drafting regime creates a difference between 
policies obtained by absolute assignment and collateral assignment. The 
former policies, assigned as consideration in sale, will come without strings 
attached. The latter, assigned as collateral, will lack important features that 
investors expect and desire.  
 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
181 26. C.F.R. § 20.2042-1(c)(2) (2010). ?
182 See Comm’r v. Estate of Noel, 380 U.S. 678, 682 (1965) (flight insurance 
policy where insured possessed right to change beneficiary and right to assign 
policy). See also Am. Nat’l Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 832 F.2d 1032 (7th 
Cir. 1987) (despite apparent assigning of policy to spouse); Terriberry v. United 
States, 517 F.2d 286, 289 (5th Cir. 1975); Brown v. Comm’r, 95 F.2d 184 (6th Cir. 
1938) (as to policy assigned to decedent, who then reserved right to change 
beneficiary); COUCH, supra note 180. ?
183 Insurance Excluded Despite Withdrawal of Cash Value, 52 Prac. Tax. 
Strategies 182, 182 (Mar. 1994) (citing Estate of O'Daniel v. United States, F.3d 
321 (5th Cir. 1993)).  
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3. Harms of the Reservation Problem 
 
As just discussed, investors in life insurance policies demand all 
the rights provided for in the policy. However, when life insurance is used 
as collateral, the only valid documentation of assignment will not assign all 
of the rights. This makes the policies less useful to the first investor, 
probably a foreclosing creditor, and unsuitable for securitization. The 
failure of law and practice to match the realities of a robust secondary 
market acts as a friction, or worse – a time bomb.  
At the same time as the fact of these reserved rights could result in 
judgments against insurance policy creditors status as policy owner, they 
are footnotes and asterisks that impair securitization and resale. Legal 
uncertainty is particularly damning in the life insurance secondary market.  
Unlike, say, real estate investors, life insurance investors take the 
ultimate value of the investment as known.184 That is, investors demand 
certainty about the ultimate value of life insurance policies and will be 
unlikely to accept securitized assets which have risk litigation or difficulty 
in receiving maturity benefits.  In the history of the United States, no 
insurance policy has ever failed to pay upon maturity. And there have been 
only three instances of the downgrading of an insurance company 
security.185 Every online lecture listed by ILIAM lecture emphasizes 
certainty as one of the core distinguishing values of insurance linked 
assets.186  
A robust secondary market must come to rely on securitization, 
since institutional investors will not wish to purchase individual policies. 187 
But securitized policies must be clean of legal nettles. Investors will pass 
over policies that may be subject to litigation, or are comprised of irregular 
bundles of incidents of ownership. The secondary market will be stunted if 
it carries only purchased, rather than foreclosed, insurance policies. And 
the market for loans on life insurance policies may segregate from the 
greater market for insurance policies, stunting the value proposition for 
investors in, and borrowers against, life insurance policies.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
184 Greg Schmitt, Trends in Insurance Linked Assets – Part 1, LIFE SOLUTIONS 
INT’L (Feb. 10, 2009), http://www.lifesolutionsint.com/news-resources.aspx 
(follow “Feb. 10 ILIAM – Trends in Insurance-Linked Assets – Part 1”).?
185 Id.?
186 See ILIAM, LIFE SOLUTIONS INT’L (2011) 
http://www.lifesolutionsint.com/iliam.aspx. ILIAM is the Insurance-Linked 
Investment Awareness Month, an annual lecture series and conference sponsored 
by Life Solutions International, one of the leading companies in this industry. Id.  ?
187 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 6. ?
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4. Solving the Reservation Problem 
 
Inclusion of life insurance policies under Article 9 will empower 
parties to solve the reservation problem. Consider first why the problem 
cannot be drafted away under the current legal regime. A beneficiary’s 
interest does not vest if the insured always retains the power of 
appointment, and so collateral assignment invariably reserves that right to 
the insured.188 But there are other ways to keep the beneficiaries’ interest 
from vesting.  
Absolute assignments keep the expectancy from vesting by 
granting to the assignee the power of appointment. 189 Similarly, the insured 
could grant the collateral assignee the right to select beneficiaries. This 
would keep the beneficiary’s interest contingent while conveying to the 
creditor an important right he will want upon foreclosure. But the insured 
probably doesn’t want a mere creditor to have the right to select the 
beneficiary, at least not until a default occurs. And even if a default occurs, 
the insured will want the excess of the proceeds to go to her own choice of 
beneficiaries, rather than granting a windfall to the creditor.  
Where the parties intend for the creditor to have access to the full 
proceeds in the event of default, or to be able to resell with all the incidents 
of ownership, the vesting problem could be solved through drafting a 
springing appointment clause. The assignor could grant the assignee a 
contingent right of appointment that vests only in the event of default. But 
these clauses are unheard of. Insurance companies have not seen fit to add 
them to the set of available options, perhaps because of the ease with which 
securitization might then follow.190   
The industry practice discussed in Section III is for insureds and 
their assignees to give notice of assignment to the insurance company on 
forms issued by the insurance company. Insurance companies do not 
include springing beneficiary clauses in those forms, so springing 
beneficiary clauses are not used in collateral assignments and the power of 
appointing beneficiaries remains reserved in the insured. In this case, the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
188 Janesville State Bank v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 274 N.W. 232, 233 (1937).?
189 See, e.g., 9 WEST’S PA FORMS § 14:7 (1995) (“I . . .  assign . . . all 
incidents of ownership with respect to, life insurance policy number ________ 
issued on my life by [name of life insurance company]. The incidents of ownership 
hereby assigned include, but are not limited to, the right to designate the 
beneficiary or beneficiaries of the policy….”). ?
190 See infra Part III.E, explaining why some insurance companies have 
discouraged securization.  
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standard form potentially endangers a secondary market because such a 
market is intolerant of archaic title disputes.  
By contrast, Article 9 invalidates any clause that restricts the 
assignment of security interests in general intangibles.191 If life insurance 
policies were included in Article 9, parties would be enabled to draft 
springing appointment clauses rather than picking assignment forms from 
the insurance company’s limited menu. Insurance contract provisions 
limiting assignment except where conducted through designated 
documentation would be invalid. This would render the reservation 
problem moot.  
 
III. OBJECTIONS 
 
A. CONSUMER PROTECTION 
 
It may be argued that the exclusion of life insurance policies from 
UCC Article 9 is necessary to protect consumers from unwisely using their 
policies as collateral.192 Consumer protection is a worthy goal, and there are 
serious risks to consumers from insurance policy credit transactions. For 
example, an impaired life insurance policy could “cut off any interest of the 
debtor's beneficiaries under the policy if at the debtor's death an 
outstanding debt existed.”193 Moreover, insureds that lose their policy in 
default may find themselves unable to obtain a new policy, either because 
they are now too old or otherwise unattractive to insurers, or because 
insurers will not issue policies to individuals on whom an active policy 
exists, though now in the hands of the creditor. 
Such arguments should not impede inclusion of life insurance. 
First, consumers tend to benefit when they can liberally monetize their 
assets.194 Second, whatever risks are posed by policy lending, they are less 
than outright sales. An efficient borrowing and resale regime will give 
consumers another alternative to life settlements.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
191 U.C.C. § 9-408(a) (2010).?
192 Ettinger v. Central Penn Nat’l Bank, 2 B.R. 385 (E.D. Pa. 1979), rev’d on 
other grounds, 634 F.2d 120 (3d Cir. 1980) (“This was obviously done to prevent 
debtors from foolishly or capriciously utilizing their life insurance policies as 
collateral”) (citing I.G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY 
315 (1965); Ray D. Henson, Insurance Proceeds as “Proceeds” Under Article 9, 
18 CATH. U. L. REV. 453, 456 (1969)).  ?
193 Id. ?
194 See infra Part I. ?
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Third, UCC exclusion amounts to the least efficient point of 
regulation for consumer protection. The law currently allows consumers to 
borrow against their policies, wisely or not, from anyone they please. True, 
UCC inclusion would likely increase insurance policy borrowing; non-
UCC law has the side effect of discouraging would-be creditors from 
becoming competitors to the presumptive monopoly of the insurer. But it is 
rare that the best way to help consumer is to frustrate and raise costs on an 
otherwise legal transaction. If third-party lending posed a threat to 
consumers, regulations can be promulgated to address those threats 
directly, rather than by increasing legal uncertainty and cost. Insureds and 
creditors should not have their rights frustrated in transactions that have 
long been allowed.  
More interesting consumer protections arguments address 
compromises in medical privacy.195 Some life insurance financing 
agreements require the insured to open her health files to the creditor, or 
submit to periodic medical examinations. Creditors and investors are 
interested in the longevity risk associated with their interest in the policy. 
When financial commitments and health become intermingled, policy 
tradeoffs must be made between consumer privacy, transparency, and other 
values.  
For example, without deciding the issue, a Florida Court 
questioned whether a right to medical privacy exists where a medical 
condition has become an essential condition of a commercial transaction.196 
Such arguments bear consideration. They should be evaluated against the 
benefits accrued to consumers from ready alienability of their policies. 
Statutes like HIPAA still apply197 and will no doubt require more careful 
attention in the coming years. But the best consumer protections will be 
targeted to help insureds both keep their privacy and avoid exploitation. 
The worst solution is to protect consumers by using outdated, unclear law 
to discourage fair competition between creditors.   
A similar response is appropriate to the problem of frauds against 
consumers, and other exploitative practices. It can be difficult for an 
individual to procure a new life insurance policy after selling hers or losing 
it through foreclosure. Individuals may be persuaded to part with an asset 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
195 See Andrew Spurrier, Note, The Death of Death Futures?: The Effects of 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 on the Insurance 
and Viatical Settlement Industries, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 807, 836 (1998).?
196 State v. Viatical Servs., Inc., 741 So. 2d 560, 564 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1999). See also Life Partners v. Morrison, 484 F.3d 284, 295-96 (4th Cir. 2007). ?
197 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act  of 1996, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
201 et seq.?
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that they would prefer to keep, or may later regret giving up.198 And the tax 
implications of such a transfer can sometimes be surprising.199 These 
legitimate concerns may require disclosure and regulatory oversight.200 Yet 
our approval of assignments indicates a confidence that these problems can 
be addressed. It is of independent value that the law be orderly and that 
consumers get the best possible price for their policies.   
 
B. STATUS QUO AND THE ORIGIN OF THE CODE 
 
 This section treats the general conservative objection that the 
Drafters of the Code knew what they were doing, and we should not amend 
their work without knowing why they set things up the way they did. 
Indeed, since most of the problems explained in the preceding sections are 
not new, it would be strange, if not hubristic, to amend the Code without 
wondering what the drafters thought of these problems. 201  
 It will be shown in this section that this general objection is not 
persuasive here. The origin of the exclusion lies not in the drafters’ 
thoughtful understanding of subtle economic and legal realities so much as 
bowing to the pressure of an industry that feared change.  As ambitious as 
Article 9 may have been, the drafters made compromises in order to ease 
its passage.202  
 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
198 J. Alan Jensen and Stephan R. Leimberg, Stranger-Owned Life Insurance: 
A Point/Counterpoint Discussion, 33 ACTEC J. 110, 113 (2009) (“therefore, it will 
reduce the ability of the insured to buy additional coverage throughout his life. . . 
.”).?
199 Rev. Rul. 2009-13, 2009-21 I.R.B. 1029 (explaining that individuals who 
sell their insurance policies may owe taxes on the amount received, less premiums 
paid. Thus, settlement income does not receive the same tax advantage for the 
insured as maturity proceeds. Note, however, that tax implications of a policy loan 
are unlikely to be as surprising and adverse.). ?
200 See generally Miriam R. Albert, The Howey Test Turns 64: Are the Courts 
Grading this Test on A Curve? 2 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 39-50 (2011) 
(statutes and regulations regulating viatical settlements).  
201 Notwithstanding the growing importance of secondary markets. See infra 
Part I.B.?
202 Homer Kripke, The Principles Underlying the Drafting of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 1962 U. ILL. L. R. 321, 327 (1962) (“The draftsmen and the 
members of the sponsor organizations knew that to draft a dead-letter bill would 
accomplish nothing. The Code had to be enacted.”). 
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1. Early Exclusion in Article 9 
 
The first draft of the Uniform Commercial Code, promulgated in 
1952, did not exclude insurance policies from the scope of Article 9.203 
Article 9 was first adopted in Pennsylvania without any exclusion,204 but 
the integrity of the Code was soon threatened by a seeming drafting error.  
The confusion arose from an apparent conflict between the text of 
the Code and its comments. Comment 4 to Section 9-105 of the 1952 UCC 
stated: 
 
‘Instrument’ (subsection (1)(g)): the term as defined 
includes not only negotiable instruments and investment 
securities but also other intangibles which are evidenced by 
writings which are in ordinary course of business 
transferred by delivery, for example, insurance policies.205 
 
This Comment clearly indicates the desire of the drafters to classify 
insurance policies as instruments.  
However, the statutory text of the definition does not mention 
insurance as an instrument, and indeed, implies the contrary: “‘Instrument’ 
means . . . [a writing] which evidences a right to payment of money and is 
of a type which is the ordinary course of business transferred by 
delivery.”206 To be an instrument, insurance policies must have been 
transferred by delivery in the ordinary course of business, but the extant 
commercial practice required more than mere delivery to transfer insurance 
policies.207 Life insurance policies were ordinarily transferred by delivery 
and by a written agreement of transfer, not mere delivery. If not an 
instrument, life insurance policies would seem to have been left out of the 
Code notwithstanding the drafters’ intentions. 
There were a number of ways to potentially square the drafters’ 
intentions with the text, but none proved satisfactory. For example, if the 
commercial practice of delivery was a necessary condition, but not 
sufficient, then life insurance policies might still fit the definition as 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
203 See U.C.C. § 9-104 (1952). ?
204 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 1-101 et seq. (Purdon Supp. 1953).?
205 U.C.C. § 9-105, Comment 4 (1952).?
206 Id. § 9-105.?
207 Carl W. Funk, Problems of Classification Under Article 9 of the Uniform 
Commercial Code, 102 U. PA. L. REV. 703, 709 (1954).?
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instruments. But many lawyers were unwilling to make this interpretive 
leap without guidance.208  
An alternative interpretation might have fitted insurance policies 
into another category of collateral. It could have been argued that insurance 
policies qualified as chattel paper, the definition of which read “of a type 
which is in ordinary course of business transferred by delivery with 
appropriate endorsement or assignment.”209 But a consensus did not form 
around this interpretation either. The Comments clearly placed insurance in 
the mutually exclusive “instruments” group. It was impossible to square the 
text of the statute with the commercial reality of insurance policy transfer, 
regardless of what the Comments did to keep policies out of other 
categories. It became necessary to draft an amendment.  
In resolving this confusion, the Drafting Committee bowed to 
industry pressure, and simply excluded life insurance policies. Even the 
revered Drafting Committee had to consider the political realities of getting 
legislatures to accept their proposal, as drafter Fairfax Leary explains: 
 
All along there were other indirect pressures on the 
draftsmen from special interests. These pressures were felt 
through various and sundry people who got the 
information from their contacts and passed it on. There was 
great pressure to produce an adoptable Code, and, 
therefore, certain interests who might oppose the Code had 
to be pacified . . . . [One]  was the insurance industry and 
sure enough you'll find their exemption in 9-104.210 
 
Other drafters have made similar remarks and calls for reform.211 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
208 Id. at 709-10. 
209 U.C.C. § 9-105(b) (1954).?
210 Fairfax Leary, Reflections of a Drafter: Fairfax Leary, 43 OHIO ST. L.J. 
557, 558 (1982). See also Kathleen Patchel, Interest Group Politics, Federalism, 
and the Uniform Laws Process: Some Lessons from the Uniform Commercial 
Code, 78 MINN. L. REV. 83, 101 (1993) (“[C]ar-trusts and insurance were 
exempted from Article 9 coverage to pacify, respectively, the railroad interests and 
the insurance industry.”); Soia Mentschikoff, The Uniform Commercial Code: An 
Experiment in Democracy in Drafting, 36 A.B.A. J. 419 (1950) (describing 
extensive interaction with interest groups); WILLIAM TWINNING, KARL 
LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST MOVEMENT 330 (1973) (describing Llewellyn’s 
commitment to a draft which would be adopted, even if it meant excluding areas 
that should logically be included, like insurance).?
211 Coogan, supra note 96, at 1054. ?
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At first, the insurance industry suggested several solutions, 
including simply expanding the definition of instruments to more clearly 
cover life insurance policies.212 Later insurance industry lawyers demanded 
exclusion from the Code rather than disambiguation.213  
Resistance came from resistance to relatively small concessions. 
For example, there was a difference in commercial practice between 
insurance companies and third party creditors, and insurers did not wish for 
a Code that would require them to change their practice. Third party 
creditors were in the habit of taking possession of collaterally assigned 
policies, while insurance companies tended not to take possession of the 
collaterally assigned policy. Insurance companies were afraid that they 
might have had to change their lending practices slightly to be on par with 
third party lenders.214 Although this would have increased uniformity and 
certainty, insurance companies preferred to maintain the status quo. They 
would have found a policy possession requirement an “inconvenience.” 215 
According to one account, insurance companies had no opposition 
to Article 9 more substantial than that the status quo was adequate enough, 
and so change should be resisted simply because it constituted change. This 
is the opinion of Professor Grant Gilmore, Co-Reporter for Article 9: “If 
[my] personal recollection may be relied on, the attitude of counsel [for the 
insurance companies] was not that any provision of the Article was 
incorrect, harmful, or disadvantageous to their client, but was rather that 
they were disinclined to flee the evils that they knew not of.”216 Professor 
Coognan, Dean of Commenters on the 1972 revision of Article 9, shared 
Gilmore’s perspective:  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
212 Funk, supra note 207, at 711 (citing Willis H. Satterthwaite, Assignments 
of Life Insurance Policies Under the Uniform Commercial Code (May 2, 1953) 
(unpublished manuscript) (suggesting that Section 9-105(g) be amended to read: 
“(g) ‘Instrument’ means ... or any other writing ... which evidences a right to the 
payment of money and is of a type which is in ordinary course of business 
transferred by delivery or by delivery with appropriate indorsement [sic] or 
assignment”)).?
213Robert Dechert, The Uniform Commercial Code and its Impact Upon the 
Life Insurance Business, in 47 PROCEEDINGS OF THE LEGAL SECTION OF THE 
AMERICAN LIFE CONVENTION 48, 60 (1954). ?
214 J.C. Vance, Annotation, Right of Life Insurance Beneficiary Against Estate 
of Insured Who Used Policy as Collateral, 91 A.L.R. 2d 496 (1963); Funk, supra 
note 207, at 710-11.?
215 Dechert, supra note 213, at 60.?
214 2 GRANT GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 10.7, at 
315 (1965).   ?
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Then there are other exemptions or exclusions which were 
based solely upon the fact that some group had a big club, 
and would say that if you were going to leave those in, 
then we will have to learn a new set of laws and we are just 
not going to do it. We do not know whether it is good or 
bad, but we do not want to take the time to learn. The 
insurance people were one group who got such a 
consideration.217 
 
As Article 9 has proved reliable and stable, other groups that had lobbied 
for exclusion, like the railroads, voluntarily gave up them up.218 The 
insurance industry has grown to enjoy its exclusion and has not expressed 
any desire to give it up.  
The Pennsylvania legislature thus added an insurance exclusion 
only three months after adopting Article 9.219 The Drafters of the Code 
added the exclusion as well. Their decision to resolve the ambiguity in this 
way was a direct result of insurance company pressure. 220?
 
2. Exclusion in Revised Article 9 
 
The exclusion was almost eliminated in Revised Article 9.221 
California has a non-uniform version of the Code with respect to interests 
in insurance, and the Committee was interested in California’s choice to 
remain non-uniform.222 California first adopted a uniform version of Article 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
217 Comm. On. Unif. Commercial Code, Program, Impact of 1972 Revisions 
on  Secured Financing Transactions Under UCC Article 9, 33 BUS. LAW. 2491, 
2533 (1978). ?
218 Id. (“When we asked the railroads, in 1972, whether they really wanted to 
continue to exclude the equipment trusts from the operation of Article 9, nobody 
could remember why they did it. So the exclusion of equipment trusts from Article 
9 has now been eliminated. Thank God.”).?
219 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12A, § 9-104(g) (Purdon Supp. 1954); see also Funk, 
supra note 207, at 711.?
220 Gilmore, supra note 80, at 315. (“This exclusion, like that of railroad 
equipment trust under subsection (e), was politically inspired.”). ?
221 See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF. STATE LAWS. AM. 
LAW INST. DRAFT UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVISED ARTICLE 9. SECURED 
TRANSACTIONS; SALES OF ACCOUNTS AND CHATTEL PAPER (1995).?
222 Louisiana also chose to exclude policies of insurance from their U.C.C., but 
it is not clear that the Committee took account of their practices. Article 9 of the 
Uniform Commercial Code first took effect in Louisiana on January 1, 1990, 9 
years before The American Law Institute’s promulgation of Revised Article 9. For 
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9 with respect to insurance, and later narrowed the exclusion of life 
insurance policies. The revision treated insurance policy loans differently 
from other loans largely because of insurance company lobbying.223 
California also accepted that loans from an issuing insurance company 
“essentially involve a set-off,” and are not really loans.224 Thus, 
California’s Section 9 now excludes “[a]ny loan made by an insurance 
company pursuant to the provisions of a policy or contract issued by it and 
upon the sole security of the policy or contract.”225 Loans by third parties 
are not excluded from the UCC.  
The drafters preferred the California approach. Professor Homer 
Kripke, Associate Reporter for the Review Committee, concurred with 
Gilmore’s reflection that the exclusion existed less for good public policy 
reasons than because of the insurance industry’s sense that it was perfectly 
happy with the status quo: 
 
We have thus had a clear-cut issue as to the approach of 
this Committee. The California position seems (at least to 
the writer) to be more sound theoretically than the existing 
Code. On the other hand, we seem not to have had any real 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
a discussion of Louisiana’s non-uniform treatment of Article 9, see James A. 
Stuckley, Louisiana’s Non-Uniform Variations in U.C.C. Chapter 9, 62 LA. L. 
REV. 793 (2002). There is only one glaring problem with the Louisiana approach 
for the present purposes. Chapter 9 of the Louisiana Code does not adequately 
protect the rights of those with interests in insurance policies to assign them. By 
excluding insurance policies from the definition of “general intangible,” Louisiana 
was able to conveniently draft separate provisions specific to insurance, such as the 
perfection by control provision. Id. at 842.  But life insurance policies were thereby 
removed from the scope of U.C.C. § 9-408 which rendered ineffective restrictions 
on alienability of general intangibles. With no clause protecting the alienability of 
life insurance policies, the reservation problem still plagues Louisiana.  ?
223 See, e.g., Further Comments on Chapter 9: Comments on Memoranda of 
Subcommittees of State Bar Committee an California Bankers Committee, Further 
Comments of State Bar. (“Therefore, we think that the amendment proposed by the 
California Bankers Committee is a sound modification of the rule of the Official 
Draft and will avoid unnecessary opposition from life insurance companies. . . .”).?
224 The Uniform Commercial Code, A Special Report by the California State 
Bar Committee on the Commercial Code, 37 J. ST. B. CAL. 119, 200 (1962).  But 
see infra.?
225 CAL. COM. CODE § 9109(d)(8) (West 2009).?
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trouble with the existing Code and a change would 
certainly create some opposition.226 
 
The superiority of the California approach was thus weighed against 
resistance from industry groups.  
 The Drafting Committee met with insurance industry 
representatives to vet their opposition to ending the life insurance 
exclusion. Nearly all of their expressed concerns focused on the difficulties 
incumbent on the obligor of an account that is subject to transfer. The 
Drafting Committee deemed some of these concerns unwarranted.227 
Others, if warranted, could be solved through some kind of in-Code 
accommodation.228 At the end of a June 1996 meeting, the Drafting 
Committee voted, three to five, in favor of ending the exclusion.  
Notwithstanding the arguments and votes against the exclusion, the 
Drafting Committee ultimately retained it.229 They opted for the low-
hanging fruit of eliminating the exclusion of health-care-insurance 
receivables. To the degree that the insurance exclusion is supported by 
simple incumbency, it should be clear that the status quo was not the result 
desired by those most thoughtfully involved in the drafting. The exclusion 
has serious negative effects for consumers and makes life insurance 
products less attractive, very likely harming the insurance industry in 
general. Acquiescence to change-averse industry lobbyists can no longer 
justify the life insurance exclusion.     
 
 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
226 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: CONFIDENTIAL DRAFTS, supra note 10, at 4-
5.?
227 Harris & Mooney, supra note 48, at 1374-75 (“e.g., the concern that an 
insurer would need to consult  the UCC filings before deciding whom to pay”). 
This concern is not warranted because the code allows such an obligor to pay the 
presumed obligee unless notice has been given of assignment.?
228 Id. at 1375 (“e.g., the concern that the insurer would be obligated to pay the 
secured party upon receipt of a notification of assignment”).?
229 NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’R ON UNIF. STATE LAWS, REVISION OF 
UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 (1997) (“The Drafting Committee 
recognizes that insurance policies can be important items of collateral in many 
other business contexts and that the “cash” or “loan” value of life insurance 
policies also can be a useful source of collateral for borrowing by individuals. 
Nevertheless, it decided that other law should continue to govern security interests 
in insurance policies.”).?
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C. “SPECIAL” TRANSFERS OF INTEREST 
  
Although an insurance exception was created in light of political 
pressures, the avowed purpose of the exclusion was given in the Official 
Comments. “Such transactions are often quite special, do not fit easily 
under a general commercial statute and are adequately covered by existing 
law.”230  
In what ways these transactions are special, and why they do not 
fit, is not explained by the Commenters.231 Subsequent treatises have 
accepted the Comment without elaboration.232  Although every transaction 
is no doubt quite special, in the same sense as every child is above 
average,233 there is no good reason to credit this comment.  
 Some resistance to creating parity between insurance-backed loans 
and other loans is based on the once popular theory that issuer-policy loans 
from the insurer were not loans at all, merely advances on the proceeds.234  
This view holds that a policy loan carries no obligation on the part of the 
insured to repay the amount borrowed, but the insurer can cancel the policy 
if the loan value ever exceeds the cash value of the policy.235   
 Two textual considerations show why this idea of “advances 
against life insurance policy proceeds” cannot justify the policy exclusion. 
First, party-specific explications cannot defend a transaction-specific 
exclusion.   As the Comments make clear, “transfer[s] of interests in . . . a 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
230 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE: 1962 OFFICIAL TEXT WITH COMMENTS, 
reprinted in XXIII UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE DRAFTS 401 (Elizabeth Slusser 
Kelly ed., 1984). The Comments to the current draft of the U.C.C. do not explain 
the life insurance policy exclusion. ?
231 Indeed, it is clear they had no idea either. See infra Part II.B.. ?
232 See, e.g., 11 Lary Lawrence, Lawrence’s Anderson on the Uniform 
Commercial Code § 9-109:29 (3d. ed. 2010).  
233 See GARRISON KEILLOR, LAKE WOBEGON DAYS (1985).?
234 See, e.g., Ford v. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 13 So.2d 45 (Miss. 1943); COUCH, 
supra note 32, § 80:1; VANCE, supra note 156, at 645.?
235 VANCE, supra note 156, at 652.  Yet this view warrants skepticism. It 
would imply that insurers violate no lending statutes when offering misleading 
terms and usurious interest rates, or loan money in a racially discriminating 
manner. Second, if a policy loan creates no obligation in the insured, then loan 
repayments constitute payments without obligation. As a result, the insurance 
company ought to pay taxes on income that did not constitute obligated loan 
repayments. Third, if policy loans constituted an advance on proceeds, the loan 
principal ought to be out of the reach of ordinary creditors, receiving the same 
immunity as the proceeds would. But insureds cannot draw down their insurance 
policies to live at a high standard while remaining judgment proof.?
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policy of insurance” are excluded because “such transactions” are special, 
not because the transactions’ participants are quite special. Nor does the 
exclusion mention or emphasize the relationship between the transferor and 
the transferee.  
Neither the text of the UCC nor the Comments intimate that the 
specialness is any greater or lesser when the creditor is the policy issuer. 
No explanation that defends the exclusion in terms of the relationship 
between the insured and the insurer, as opposed to a third party, can make 
sense of the text or its application in decades of transactions. Even if it 
could, it would only justify an exclusion of transfers from insured to 
insurer, partially validating the reform proposal advocated in this article.236  
Second, the question of whether a loan from an issuer is really a 
loan, as opposed to some other transaction, takes away focus from the real 
problem – bad, non-uniform law – and cannot justify keeping the exclusion 
as it currently exists. The Article 9 exclusion does not distinguish between 
loans and “advances” or “setoffs.” Instead, it applies to any “transfer of an 
interest in” of a policy of insurance. A given transfer may be a setoff and 
not a loan, but simply being a setoff does not make the transaction 
“special” and unable to fit within the general security statute.  Article 9 
makes adequate provisions for setoffs in deposit accounts.237 
If insurance companies deserve special treatment by virtue their 
identity or the nature of the transaction, there is room to acknowledge these 
differences in the Code without exclusion. Consider the creditor-bank that 
doubles as the holder of a deposit account. Like an insurance company, it is 
in a privileged position to monitor the customer. Also like the insurance 
company, it has a dual role as creditor and debtor, mirroring the insurance 
company’s role as policy loan-creditor and “debtor” of the ultimate 
proceeds.  
The Code allows the bank to perfect interests in the deposit 
accounts by control.238 Banks are afforded special treatment in virtue of 
their special role, but they still join the general structure of the Code. The 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
236 Even if the insurer’s relationship is different enough to warrant an 
alternative perfection and assignment scheme, third parties would still deserve an 
efficient system vis-à-vis one another. The Code is so wholly superior to existing 
law that third parties must be allowed to avail themselves even if the text were 
somehow construed to allow a coherent account of insurance companies’ 
specialness. 
237 U.C.C. §§ 9-109(d)(10)(A), 9-340 (2000) (including set-off rights in scope 
of Article 9).  ?
238  Id. at § 9-314. See generally Willa E. Gibson, Banks Reign Supreme Under 
Revised Article 9 Deposit Account Rules, 30 DEL J. CORP. L. 819 (2005).?
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Code acknowledges the dual role of the creditor-bank well enough without 
an exclusion, and it could do the same for insurance policies.  
California has enshrined insurer’s privilege, but done so within the 
ambit of the UCC.239 There are flaws with the California approach that are 
severe enough to make the California approach inferior to full inclusion. 
California excludes only issuer loans, and third party interests in loans 
perfect only upon written notification to the insurer. Notwithstanding such 
problems, both California’s approach and the UCC’s treatment of deposit 
accounts show that UCC-inclusion can be accomplished a number of ways, 
not all of which should seem a radical departure. Either would be a marked 
improvement upon the status quo since either solution would eliminate the 
uncertainty about how security interests are granted and perfected.  
 
D. STOLI 
 
It may be mistakenly thought that this proposal will facilitate 
stranger-originated life insurance (STOLI, as it is often called). In a typical 
STOLI transaction, a speculator persuades a consumer to obtain a policy of 
insurance. The speculator will typically offer to pay the premiums for a 
period of time. In some STOLI transactions, the premium payments 
constitute a loan that will be secured by the policy, and the speculator 
becomes the owner of the policy after a period of time.240 The consumer 
will either be promised some payment for their participation, or else be 
enticed by the offer of “free insurance,” enjoyed in the years prior to 
transferring the policy to the speculator.    
STOLI transactions are thought to be worrisome for a variety of 
reasons.241 First, by enabling speculators to treat insurance as a mere 
investment, STOLI transactions misuse public subsidy of insurance. 
Incentives to hold insurance are intended to promote the core survivor-
protection function of insurance, because society benefits when insurance 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
239 CAL. COM. CODE § 9312(b)(4) (West 2009) (“[S]ecurity interest in, or 
claim in or under, any policy of insurance, including unearned premiums, may be 
perfected only by giving written notice of the security interest or claim to the 
insurer.”);  id. 9310(b)(11).  ?
240 Absent other concerns, the period will usually be the contestability period. 
After that period, the insurance company must generally honor the policy.  
241 Eryn Mathews, Note, STOLI on the Rocks: Why States Should Eliminate 
the Abusive Practice of Stranger-Owned Life Insurance, 14 CONN. INS. L.J. 521  
(2008). See also Anita Huslin, Wealthy Engage in Controversial Re-Selling of Life 
Insurance Policies, WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2007, at D1. (Larry King victimized in 
a STOLI arrangement).  
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products replace lost incomes and relieve the government of burdens.242 
STOLI speculators enjoy these subsidies without any party contemplating 
income replacement.  
Second, STOLI transactions are often marketed without adequate 
disclosure of their downsides to insureds, including taxes, fees, reduced 
eligibility for Medicaid and other programs, and difficulty obtaining new 
insurance policies after the transaction.243 Third, they are intended to 
circumvent insurable interest law.244 The law has found it worrisome what 
strangers might do with a financial interest in the insured’s passing; even 
family members murder one another enough for insurance proceeds.245  
Perhaps more important was the general distastefulness of gambling on 
another person’s life.246  As a result, many legislatures passed statutes 
recognizing the common law requirement that only those with appropriate 
interests in the insured living could own insurance against her dying.247  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
242  Tax Treatment of Single-Premium Life Ins. Before the Subcomm. on Tax'n 
and Debt Mgmt. of the Senate Comm. on Fin., 100th Cong. 118 (1988) (statement 
of Dennis E. Ross, Deputy Assistant Secretary (Tax Policy), Department of the 
Treasury) (“In certain cases, life insurance may enable the surviving spouse and 
minor children to avoid becoming dependent on governmental assistance, thereby 
relieving the government of an obligation it otherwise would have to assume.”). 
243 Bob Lotane, STOLI – It’s Not Dead Yet, FLORIDA UNDERWRITERS 
MAGAZINE, Feb. 2010.  
244 See generally, 28 JOHN ALAN APPLEMAN, APPLEMAN ON INSURANCE § 
174.02 (2d ed. 2009) (“The requirement that a person purchasing a life policy must 
have some interest, pecuniary or otherwise, in the continued life of the insured. . . 
.”).  
245 Prudential Ins. Co. of America v. Athmer, 178 F.3d 473 (7th Cir. 1999) 
(wife murders husband).?
246 GEORGE J. COUCH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 24:117 (2d ed. 
1984) (“The reason given for such rule is that a contract made [devoid of an 
insurable interest] is against public policy on the theory that the beneficiary would 
be more interested in the early death of the insured than in the prolongation of his 
life. The purpose . . . is to prevent wagering contracts on the life of another by one 
having no insurable interest therein”); see also Grigsby v. Russell, 222 U.S. 149, 
156 (1911) (“[T]he ground of the objection to life insurance without interest in the 
earlier English cases was not the temptation to murder but the fact that such wagers 
came to be regarded as a mischievous kind of gaming.”).?
247 See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-79-103(c)(1) to (2) (West 2009) ("In the 
case of individuals related closely by blood or by law, a substantial interest 
engendered by love and affection [and i]n the case of other persons, . . . a lawful 
and substantial economic interest in having the life . . . of the individual insured 
continue . . . ."). ?
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STOLI policies contemplate circumventing these statutes to whatever 
degree possible.  
This article should not be taken to endorse or ease the creation of 
STOLI transactions. Article 9’s freedom of assignment will not invalidate 
efforts to prevent STOLI transactions. True, Article 9 will not abide policy 
provisions limiting transfers of the policy to third parties.248  However, 
insurance policies may be rescinded for fraud, and almost all policy 
applications ask questions about intentions to transfer the policy to a third 
party. Insurers will be free to rescind policies that appear to have been 
fraudulently obtained, particularly during the contestability period.249 And 
Article 9 is explicit that its assignment facilitation clause250 will control 
only for the creation of security interests.251 STOLI transactions involve 
absolute assignments of the entire policy; hence other statutes252 and 
contract provisions can constrain these transfers. It is possible to 
distinguish STOLI from reform of life insurance securitization.253 Many 
states have already taken action to bar STOLI254 without taking a stand 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
248 Franklin L. Best, Jr., Securitization Of Life Insurance Policies, 44 TORT 
TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 911, 929-30 (2009) (discussing drafting of policies to 
allow rescission). ?
249 See 29 APPLEMAN, supra note 244, at § 178.03 (insurance statutes set a 
period of years after which insurance companies may generally not contest a 
policy’s validity for reasons of fraud in acquisition).?
250 U.C.C. § 9-408 (2010). ?
251 Id. comment 3. ?
252 Section 9 of the NAIC Viatical Settlements Model Act provides that 
"[p]rior to the initiation of a plan, transaction or series of transactions, a viatical 
settlement broker or viatical settlement provider shall fully disclose to an insurer a 
plan, transaction or series of transactions, to which the viatical settlement broker or 
viatical settlement provider is a party, to originate, renew, continue or finance a life 
insurance policy with the insurer for the purpose of engaging in the business of 
viatical settlements at any time prior to, or during the first five (5) years after, 
issuance of the policy." NAIC VIATICAL SETTLEMENTS MODEL ACT § 9. 
253 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 12. See also Life Settlements and the 
Need for Regulatory Transparency Before the S. Special Comm. On Aging, 111th 
Cong. 1 (2009) (statement of Mary Beth Senkewicz, Deputy Ins. Comm’r, Florida 
Office of Ins. Reg.); Cory Chmelka, Premium Financing: The Time Is Now, CPA J. 
(Sept. 2009); Christina Pellett, Life Settlements Poised for ‘Natural Growth,’: But 
Producers Still Lacking in Education, AGENT’S SALES J. (Feb. 2010) (“While the 
two are often tied together in media coverage, life settlements are not the same 
as STOLI - though some STOLI arrangements do involve life settlements.”).?
254 Best, supra note 248, at 917-27.?
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against life insurance related financial products, and even the life 
settlement industry generally opposes STOLI.255 
 
E. INSURANCE INDUSTRY VITALITY  
 
Any reform proposal must take into account the vitality of the 
insurance industry as a whole. As described above, increasing credit to 
insureds will reduce lapse.256  The reduction in lapse will tend to be among 
the impaired policies, resulting in adverse selection (from the insurance 
company’s perspective).257  One may speculate that a general reduction in 
lapses by policyholders could lead to more payouts to insurance 
beneficiaries, and consequently increased costs for insurance companies. 
Insurance companies might pass on costs to other consumers,258 or face a 
risk of insolvency.259  Such results would decrease the utility of a 
competitive credit regime.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
255 Life Settlement Industry Opposes Stranger-Originated Annuities, 
MARKETWIRE (May 5, 2010), http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Life-
Settlement-Industry-Opposes-Stranger-Originated-Annuities-1160433.htm. ?
256 See LeBel & Tillinghast, supra note 33. See also Jim Connolly, New 
Persistency Study Shows Lapse Rates Have Generally Declined, NAT’L 
UNDERWRITER LIFE & HEALTH (May 4, 2008). ?
257 Best, supra note 245, at 915.  ?
258 Hanming Fang & Edward Kung, How Does Life Settlement Affect the 
Primary Life Insurance Market? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working 
Paper No. 15761, 2010), available at http://econ-www.mit.edu/files/5329 (“[L]ife 
insurance companies, as represented by the Deloitte Report (2005), claim that the 
life settlement market, by denying them the return on lapsing or surrendered 
policies, increases the costs of providing policies in the primary market. They 
allege that these costs will have to be passed on to consumers, which would 
ultimately make the consumers worse off.”).?
259 Perhaps this is why most life insurance companies oppose securitization of 
policies. Press Release, Am. Council of Life Insurers, Statement of the ACLI 
Regarding Securitization of Life Settlements (Feb. 3, 2010), available at 
http://www.secondaryinsurancemarketblog.com/files/aclipolicy.pdf.  Statement of 
the ACLI Regarding Securitization of Life Settlements (Feb. 3, 2010) (“ACLI 
Statement”), available at http://www.acli.com/NR/rdonlyres/972B2B38-89F0-
4683-B236-A01360544A9F/23344/STOLI_SecuritizationPolicyFinal_020310.pdf  
(The American Council of Life Insurers are a trade group for life insurance 
companies. They mainly oppose securitization out of fear that it will increase 
demand for fraudulent STOLI policies); But see Press Release, Institutional Life 
Markets Ass’n, ACLI Mixes “Apples and Oranges” to Mislead Customers (Feb. 4, 
2010), available at  http://www.lifemarketsassociation.org/documents/PR-
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However, the SEC Life Settlements Task Force was not persuaded 
that lapse-reduction threatens the industry.260 The Task Force noted that 
prudent pricing models involve conservative lapse rate assumptions.261 At 
worst, certain insurance companies will suffer, but the industry as a whole 
will remain healthy.262 
Moreover, reforms to the law of assignment are likely to be to the 
benefit of the insurance industry, for at least four reasons. First, these 
proposals are efficiency increasing, and insurance companies should be 
able to obtain some compensating share of the surplus. For example, legal 
reform will reduce costly litigation and confusion that currently is a cost for 
insurers too.263  
Second, whatever wealth is transferred from insurance companies 
to creditors and investors is likely to find its way back to insurance 
companies anyway. Insurance companies are the ones with the best 
actuarial information and they are, theoretically and actually, the most 
likely third-party creditors against other insurance company’s policies. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
%20ACLI%20misleads.pdf; Press Release, Life Insurance Settlement Association, 
Life Insurance Settlement Association Responds to Misleading ACLI Position on 
Life Settlements, MARKETWIRE (Feb. 5, 2010), available at 
http://www.marketwire.com/press-release/Life-Insurance-Settlement-Association-
Responds-Misleading-ACLI-Position-on-Life-Settlements-1113175.htm.?
260 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 20 (“the Task Force was told that the 
extent of this impact is likely to be small.”) (citing Telephone Interview with Scott 
Hawkins, Conning Research & Consulting (Mar. 30, 2010); Michael Shumrak, Life 
Settlements—A Window Of Opportunity For The Life Insurance Industry?, REINS. 
NEWS, Feb. 2010, at 14 (only about 1% of life policies have been settled)). ?
261 SEC, STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 20 (citing Christian Kendrick, 
Special Report: Return of Premium Products, TRANSAMERICA REINS. (Jul. 13, 
2007), available at http://www.transamericareinsurance.com/Media/media_ 
associateArticle.aspx?id=295); see also DELOITTE CONSULTING LLP & THE UNIV. 
OF CONN., THE LIFE SETTLEMENT MARKET: AN ACTUARIAL PERSPECTIVE ON 
CONSUMER ECONOMIC VALUE 12 (2005), available at 
http://www.quatloos.com/uconn_deloitte_life_settlements.pdf (a life settlements 
transaction “generally has minimal or no impact on the anticipated profitability of 
a life insurance contract because the persistency of an unhealthy policyholder is 
precisely what is assumed at the time of original pricing.”). ?
262 SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 20. ?
263 See Knippenberg, supra note 11, at 226 (“The long and the short of it is, 
there are risk and costs. . . to insurers who are driven to interpleader actions or, not 
infrequently, forced to justify as defendants the payment of proceeds to one or 
another of multiple claimants.”) (citing Lincoln Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Brown 
Schools, 757 S.W.2d. 411, 414 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988)). ?
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Much of what insurers lose in lapse-reduction will really represent a 
transfer from one insurance company to another, with the consumer as the 
incidental beneficiary.  
Third, insurers may sometimes be pleased that their customers turn 
to third parties for credit. Policy loans disrupt insurer cash flow, and so 
their dynamics are of vital interest to insurers.264  Since insurers may be 
required by law to offer policy loans265 and may be limited by law in their 
ability to charge market interest rates, there may be times where insurers 
would prefer not to serve their customers’ financing needs.  
This result may be exacerbated by the inverse relationship between 
an insurer’s ability to lend to their customers, and their customers’ need for 
loans: policy borrowing is largely driven by emergencies,266 so catastrophic 
events both induce borrowing and also accelerate maturity payments. 
Insureds resort to policy loans more often when other forms of credit are 
difficult to obtain, regardless of the market interest rate.267 Rendering 
alternative financing more accessible may induce some insureds to borrow 
elsewhere. This will reduce unanticipated draws on the insurance 
company’s balance sheet, even when statutory interest rate compares 
favorably with the market interest rate.    
Fourth, a liberal secondary market allows insurance companies 
new ways to hedge risk. Actuarial technology gives insurers great power to 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
264 Andre P. Liebenberg, James M. Carson, & Robert E. Hoyt, The Demand 
for Life Insurance Policy Loans, 77 J. RISK & INS. 651, 651 (2010). ?
265 See ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 21.45.080(a) (West 2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 20-1208(A) (2011); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1209(A) (2011); DEL. 
CODE ANN. tit. 18 § 2911(a) (West 2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 33-25-3(5) (West 
2011); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2510(1.) (2010); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 
ch. 175, § 132(7) (West 2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 61A.03(g) (West 
2011); MONT. CODE. ANN. § 33-20-131(1) (2010); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44-
502(8) (2010); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. 688A.110(1) (West 2011); N.J. STAT. ANN. 
§ 17B:25-8 (West 2011); N.Y. INS. LAW § 3203(8)(A) (McKinney 2011); OHIO 
REV. CODE ANN. § 3915.05(G) (West 2011); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 743.186(1) 
(West 2011); 40 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 510(h) (West 2011); S.C. CODE ANN. § 
38-63-220(k)(1) (2010); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 58-15-15 (2011); VT. STAT. ANN. 
tit. 8, § 3731(7) (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 48.23.080(1) (West 
2011); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 33-13-8(a) (West 2011). See also Metro. Life Ins. Co. 
v. Mass. Travelers Ins. Co., 471 U.S. 724, 728, (1985).?
266 Liebenberg, Carson & Hoyt supra note 264.?
267 A. Edward Day & Patric H. Hendershott, Household Demand for Policy, 
44 J. RISK & INS. 441 (1977). But see J. David Cummins, An Econometric Model 
of the Life Insurance Sector of the U.S. Economy, 40 J. RISK & INS. 533 (1973) 
(arguing for both market interest rate and alternative funds hypotheses).?
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predict the time and extent of their liabilities, but insurers currently can do 
nothing to meet expected and liabilities except altering their asset mix. An 
insurance company that recruited heavily in the past may be able to predict 
substantial liabilities in a decade or so. But it faces the possibility that its 
cash-out date will be a depressed period for the investment market; an 
insurance company with significant fixed liabilities maturing in 2008 may 
have had more difficulty paying than one paying the same liabilities in 
1998.  
As it stands, an insurance company can respond to such risks by 
shifting from risky, illiquid assets (that may earn higher returns) into 
comparatively safer, liquid assets (that may earn less attractive returns). 
This is a method of mitigating risk, but it is a crude method and it sacrifices 
returns.   
Insurance companies would do better if they could periodically 
update their inter-temporal diversification.268 With a robust secondary 
market, an insurance company could buy policies due to mature at the same 
time as those they have issued. Then they would be due payments at the 
same time their own liabilities matured. Put simply, insurers could make 
sure that cash was flowing in to match the cash that was flowing out. The 
more robust the secondary market, and the easier to pool insurance-linked 
assets, the easier and cheaper for insurance companies to rebalance their 
portfolios. It is perhaps no wonder that the largest insurance policy 
securitization to date, and the only rated securitization, was internal to an 
insurance company.269 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
The advantages of having a single commercial law govern secured 
transactions in every state were known to the drafters of the Code and have 
since been demonstrated to practitioners who may have been initially 
skeptical. Life insurance policies were excluded from the scope of Article 9 
because of industry resistance, but that resistance rested on skepticism 
about the merits of Article 9.  
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
268 See IAN AYRES & BARY NALEBUFF, LIFECYCLE INVESTING (2010) 
(describing the Samuelson Share, and methods for investors to achieve 
intertemporal diversification). ?
269 Meg Green, AIG Files First Rated Life Settlement Securitization, 
BESTWEEK, Apr. 16, 2009 ($8.4 billion transaction internal to an AIG subsidiary); 
see also SEC STAFF REPORT, supra note 52, at 15-16 (discussing securitizations).?
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The time for skepticism is over. Importantly, the legal morass of 
the common law has become more of a problem since the time when the 
code was contemplated. Removing almost all other secured transactions to 
the Code has left insurance alone to develop the case law, leaving industry 
practices to exist in uncertain tension with the throwback common law.  
The law governing perfection and surplus allocation is unclear and 
at odds with creditors’ expectations. The reservation problem, too, stands 
as an impediment on securitization and resale, and a source of potential 
litigation.  
All these problems would be solved by bringing interests in life 
insurance policies into the scope of the UCC. The nature of the inclusion 
can be debated. The simplest, clearest solution is for life insurance policies 
to be treated as general intangibles, but even if they are given their own 
rules within the UCC, as they are in California and Louisiana, the system 
will be much improved.  
 The path leading away from exclusion has ramifications for reform 
projects generally. In reform projects, compromises may sometimes be 
struck. But the transactions left unchanged because they are “good 
enough,” do not remain good enough as the market grows in response to 
the reform.  
Perhaps if Article 9 had not created a unified security regime, the 
disparate types of security agreements would have grown together 
organically, jurisdiction to jurisdiction, with life insurance policies lending 
among them. But the growth of non-UCC securitization has been isolated 
and localized life insurance policy collateral, stunting the growth and 
rationalization of the law of insurance-backed-lending.   
Moreover, the success of Article 9 security agreements in other 
areas has led to a rise in successful securitizations. The market expects that 
assets can be used in sophisticated financing agreements and 
securitizations. Article 9 has created an expectation of, and appetite for, a 
high standard of efficiency and predictability in financing transaction. As it 
stands, life insurance policies cannot satisfy that appetite.  Every reform 
compromise carries with it the possibility of regression, making the 
unreformed law even worse than before. For the life insurance policy 
exclusion, and other opportunities for reform, fuller reform is the better 
policy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Sexual offenders constitute a grave social problem in contemporary 
American society.1  For a quarter century, sexual abuse claims have been 
brought against an increasing number of Roman Catholic dioceses and 
priests,2 and against members of other religious denominations as well.3   
                                                                                                                 
1 See, e.g., MySpace Pulls 90,000 Sex Offenders From Site, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH, Feb. 4, 2009, at A3 (noting that this figure was nearly double what 
MySpace officials had originally reported the previous year). 
2 See, e.g., Scott Glover & Jack Leonard, Cardinal Mahony Under Federal 
Fraud Probe Over Abusive Priests, Sources Say, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2009 
(reporting that Cardinal Mahony “was accused of transferring priests who molested 
children to other parishes rather than removing them from the priesthood and 
alerting authorities.”); see also David L. Gregory, Some Reflections on Labor and 
Employment Ramifications of Diocesan Bankruptcy Filings, 47 J. CATH. LEGAL 
STUD. 97 (2008) (discussing the significance of Roman Catholic dioceses filing for 
bankruptcy in the wake of clergy sexual abuse scandals, and making significant 
mention of liability insurers proactively filing declaratory judgment actions to 
avoid coverage in clergy sexual abuse claims). Clergy sexual abuse claims have 
not been limited to the United States, and high profile clergy sexual abuse claims 
also have been reported in a number of other countries as well, including Australia, 
Brazil, Britain, Ireland, France, Italy, Germany, and Belgium. See, e.g., Henry 
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 Sexual predators who abuse minor children should be prosecuted to 
the fullest extent of the law, and face serious criminal and civil liability for 
their detestable acts.  But should these sexual abuse claims, including 
clergy sexual abuse, be covered under liability insurance policies, which 
commonly exclude acts that are “expected or intended from the viewpoint 
of the insured”?  The courts have been far from uniform in addressing this 
and other related issues arising under liability insurance policies.4 
Beginning with the earliest claims for insurance for sexual abuse, 
liability insurers typically have denied coverage for such claims under 
standard liability insurance policies.  Insurers long have contended that the 
                                                                                                                 
Chu, Cardinal Asked Victim to Keep Silent, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 31, 2010 (“The 
former head of Belgium’s Roman Catholic Church acknowledged Monday that he 
was wrong to have urged a sexual abuse victim to stay quiet until after the bishop 
who repeatedly molested him over a span of 13 years could retire.”). 
3 See, e.g., Carolyn Peirce, Jewish Coalition Want Abuse Victims to Speak Out, 
WASH. EXAMINER, Jan. 25, 2009, available at http://washingtonexaminer.com 
/local/jewish-coalition-want-abuse-victims-speak-out (reporting on an Orthodox 
Jewish cantor who had previously participated in an international child 
pornography ring. “It’s like the Catholic Church all over, but not as large,” one 
coalition member stated.); see also Charles Toutant, Mormon Church Sued on 
Charges of Sexual Abuse by Youth Leader, 185 N.J. L.J. 475 (2006) (reporting that 
a Mormon bishop from Provo, Utah notified the child abuser’s new ward, or 
congregation, about his previous criminal sexual offenses in Utah and Wisconsin, 
but the ward still put him in positions working with children in Dallas, Texas, and 
later working with children in Ledgewood, New Jersey). 
4 See, e.g., STEVEN PLITT, DANIEL MALDONADO & JOSHUA D. ROGERS, 
COUCH ON INSURANCE 3D §§ 127:24-127:28 (2008 rev. ed.) [hereinafter COUCH 
ON INSURANCE]; JERRET E. SALE & LINDA M. BOLDUAN, Insurance Coverage for 
Sexual Molestation, in 3 Rowland H. Long, The Law Of Liability Insurance Ch. 
11C (Matthew Bender ed. 2010) [hereinafter LONG ON LIABILITY INSURANCE]; see 
also Jesse J. Cooke, Book Note, Beyond an Unfortunate “Occurrence”: Insurance 
Coverage and the Equitable Redress of Victims of Sexual Predator Priests, 36 
ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1039 (2004); Barron L. Weinstein, Sexual Misconduct Claims: A 
Policyholder’s Perspective of Key Coverage Issues, 38 THE BRIEF 49 (2009); 
James L. Rigelhaupt, Jr., Annotation, Construction and Application of Provisions 
of Liability Insurance Policy Expressly Excluding Injuries Intended or Expected by 
Insured, 31 A.L.R. 4th 957 (1984); Joseph Conder, Annotation, Liability of Church 
or Religious Society for Sexual Misconduct of Clergy, 5 A.L.R. 5th 530 (1992), 
superseded in part by Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, Liability of Church or 
Religious Organization for Negligent Hiring, Retention, or Supervision of Priest, 
Minister, or Other Clergy Based on Sexual Misconduct, 101 A.L.R. 5th 1 (2002).    
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standard general liability policy was not intended to cover intentional acts, 
including sexual abuse.5 
 At the same time, the insurance industry has made available a 
special “sexual abuse” coverage endorsement to add coverage specifically 
for sexual abuse.  When the sexual abuse endorsement is purchased, 
liability coverage for sexual abuse is expressly afforded.6  However, most 
insureds have not purchased this add-on coverage.   
 Because insurance generally exists only to provide indemnity for 
fortuitous, unexpected, and accidental loss, and because insurance 
generally does not provide coverage for intentional acts, liability insurers 
usually except from coverage intentional acts, or “expected or intended” 
injury.7   Indeed, the underlying public policy rationale against insurance 
indemnification for intended loss is so strong that the courts will in some 
circumstances forbid payment of insurance benefits, even if the insurance 
policy is silent on this particular point. However, the states differ markedly 
on the type of intentional conduct that is sufficiently volitional in nature to 
bar coverage.8 
 Over the last decade, a number of policyholders facing sexual 
abuse claims, including clergy sexual abuse, have taken the position that 
even if a sexual offender’s acts arguably were  “expected or intended,” and 
therefore excluded from coverage under a liability insurance policy’s 
“expected or intended” provision, the sexual offender’s employer, 
supervisor, or religious order might still come within policy coverage under 
the legal doctrine of negligent supervision, negligent hiring, negligent 
                                                                                                                 
5 See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So. 2d 158, 158-59 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1974); Altena v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 422 N.W.2d 485, 490 
(Iowa 1988); Rodriguez ex rel. Brennan v. Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1986) (“The average person purchasing homeowner’s insurance would 
cringe at the very suggestion” that the person was paying for coverage for sexual 
abuse, “[a]nd certainly [the person] would not want to share that type of risk with 
other homeowner’s policy holders.”). 
6 See, e.g., Jane D. v. Ordinary Mut., 38 Cal. Rptr. 2d 131 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1995); Dobbs v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 773 N.E.2d 1251 (Ill. App. Ct. 2002). 
7 See generally ROBERT H. JERRY II & DOUGLAS R. RICHMOND, 
UNDERSTANDING INSURANCE LAW § 63C (4th ed. 2007); JEFFREY R. STEMPEL, 
STEMPEL ON INSURANCE CONTRACTS §§ 1.06[B], 1.08[2] (3d ed., rev. vol. 2010). 
8 See generally EMERIC FISCHER, PETER N. SWISHER & JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, 
PRINCIPLES OF INSURANCE LAW 58-68 (3d rev. ed. 2006). 
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retention,  or under similar doctrines based upon negligence principles 
rather than based on intentional acts by the insured.9 
This article addresses issues that arise when a policyholder under a 
standard general liability insurance policy, not containing an express sexual 
abuse coverage endorsement (or an express sexual abuse exclusion), seeks 
insurance coverage for sexual abuse claims.  Such cases continue to 
increase in frequency as the legacy of sexual abuse and molestation 
generates an unrelenting deluge of insurance coverage claims.  
The purpose of this article is to explore and analyze the case law 
and various legal theories supporting and rejecting liability insurance 
coverage claims involving institutional sexual abuse allegations. This 
article concludes by recommending a better-reasoned objective concurrent 
causation legal doctrine that would bring a realistic, and more uniform, 
judicial approach to the liability insurance interpretive conundrum 
involving clergy sexual abuse coverage disputes.  The article also 
synthesizes the law concerning other prominent coverage issues in the 
rapidly developing area of sexual abuse insurance claims.   
 
A. CIVIL ACTIONS TO RECOVER FOR SEXUAL ABUSE. 
 
Until the 1980s, civil actions for sexual abuse were uncommon, 
although examples dating back more than fifty years can be found.10  
Certainly, in the United States there were far fewer reports of clergy sexual 
abuse in earlier years, and almost certainly fewer instances of sexual abuse 
                                                                                                                 
9 See, e.g., Evangelical Lutheran Church in Am. v. Atl. Mut. Ins. Co., 169 F.3d 
947 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying Illinois law) (holding that the negligent training and 
supervision of a minister was covered, even though the minister’s sexual assault 
was not covered); Mfrs. & Merchs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Harvey, 498 S.E.2d 222 (S.C. 
Ct. App. 1998) (holding that a claim of negligent entrustment was covered, 
although sexual molestation of minors by the insured was not covered). But see 
Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (10th Cir. 1996) 
(applying Minnesota law) (holding that negligent and reckless supervision claims 
involving a priest child molester were not covered since the Archdiocese knew or 
should have known that personal injury from child sexual abuse was highly likely 
to occur); Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002) (holding 
that a separate negligent supervision claim was not covered since it causally 
resulted in the sexual molestation of a child).   
10 See, e.g., McLeod v. Grant Cnty. Sch. Dist. No. 128, 255 P.2d 360 (Wash. 
1953) (student who allegedly was raped at school claimed school was negligent in 
leaving students unsupervised and allowing access to darkened area). 
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in general.11  However, by the late 1970s, reports of sexual abuse of 
children had sharply increased,12 and claims seeking financial 
compensation for sexual molestation increased rapidly. 
In recent decades, assorted youth organizations have been sued for 
sexual molestation, although in many cases the courts have held such 
sexual abuse was not foreseeable.13 In some of these cases, plaintiffs have 
alleged prior knowledge on the part of a responsible parent or supervisor.  
However, allegations concerning pervasive knowledge and deliberate 
tolerance of sexual abuse – and even conspiracies to allow it or to conceal 
it – are rarely pled in suits against lay organizations, although they have 
became a staple of clergy sexual abuse lawsuits during the last two 
decades, as discussed below. 
Adults sued for sexual abuse occurring within their own home also 
have been held subject to liability under principles set forth in Restatement 
(Second) of Torts § 316 (Duty of Parent to Control Conduct of Child).14   
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 316 provides that parents are obligated to 
prevent their children from creating a risk of bodily harm to others if the 
parent “(a) knows or has reason to know that he has the ability to control 
his child, and (b) knows or should know of the necessity and opportunity 
for exercising such control.”15  
Similarly, one may be subject to liability for sexual offenses 
committed by one’s spouse.  “[W]hen a spouse has actual knowledge or 
special reason to know of the likelihood of his or her spouse engaging in 
sexually abusive behavior against a particular person or persons, a spouse 
has a duty of care to take reasonable steps to prevent or warn of the harm . . 
                                                                                                                 
11 See THE NAT’L REVIEW BD. FOR THE PROT. OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG 
PEOPLE, A REPORT ON THE CRISIS IN THE CATHOLIC CHURCH IN THE UNITED 
STATES 22-25 (2004). 
12 Id. at 23. 
13 See, e.g., Doe v. Goff, 716 N.E.2d 323 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999) (holding that the 
Boy Scouts of America could not be held liable for failure to prevent the sexual 
assault of a Boy Scout because it was unforeseeable); H.B. ex rel. Clark v. 
Whittemore, 552 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1996) (holding that a trailer park manager 
did not have a duty to warn or protect children whom she knew were being 
sexually abused by a resident); Montgomery v. YMCA of Cincinnati, 531 N.E.2d 
731 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996). 
14 See, e.g., Gritzner v. Michael R., 611 N.W.2d 906 (Wis. 2000). 
15 Id. Likewise, there is a duty to control the conduct of a third person as to 
prevent him from causing physical harm to another if a “special relationship” 
exists between the actor and the other person that gives to the other a right of 
protection. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 315(a)–(b) (2010). 
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.  [and] breach of such a duty constitutes a proximate cause of the resultant 
injury, the sexual abuse of the victim.”16  For example, a wife who invited 
children to visit her house, when she knew her husband had molested 
women and children in the past, was subject to liability in negligence.17  
Even a grandmother was held subject to liability for failing to protect her 
granddaughter from a known risk of sexual abuse by the grandfather.18   
Such actions, however, rarely compare to clergy sexual abuse 
litigation in terms of the alleged degree of institutional knowledge and 
culture of tolerance of sexual abuse.  It is largely these features that 
generate profound questions whether general liability policies afford 
coverage in regard to clergy sexual abuse actions. 
 
B. CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL ACTIONS AGAINST RELIGIOUS 
ORGANIZATIONS AND ORDERS 
 
Public knowledge of sexual abuse by Roman Catholic clergy 
became widespread in 1984 with the well-publicized revelations 
concerning Father Gilbert Gauthe in Lafayette, Louisiana.  Prior to 1984, 
the Catholic Church, like many organizations that minister to minors, long 
had been troubled by pedophilia and similar abuse by its employees and 
agents.19  In 1957, a Church expert in treating offenders reportedly had 
advised one or more archbishops that: “Experience has taught us these men 
are too dangerous to the children of the parish and the neighborhood” to 
                                                                                                                 
16 J.S. ex rel. C.S. v. B.J.H., 714 A.2d 924, 935 (N.J. 2000). 
17 Pamela L. v. Farmer, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980). See also Big 
Brother/Big Sister of Metro Atlanta, Inc. v. Terrell, 359 S.E.2d 241 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1987) (social service organization); Enumclaw v. Wilcox, 843 P.2d 154 (Idaho 
1982) (wife’s “acts or failure to act . . . may have created or contributed to the 
environment which permitted her ex-husband’s [molestation],” but did not 
constitute an occurrence under insurance policy because it was not the conduct that 
caused the injury); Metro. Prop. & Cas Ins. Co. v. Miller, 589 N.W.2d 297, 300 
(Minn. 1999) (suing wife for her “alleged failure to warn of or prevent the abuse” 
where husband molested minor child). 
18 Doe v. Franklin, 930 S.W.2d 921 (Tex. App. 1996). But see, e.g., T.A. ex 
rel. Kramer v. Allen, 669 A.2d 360 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that step-
grandparent did not owe any special duty to step-grandchildren to control her 
husband’s conduct, and was thus not liable for her husband’s abuse under 
negligence theory). 
19 See generally Rev. Thomas Doyle, A Very Short History of Clergy Sexual 
Abuse in the Catholic Church, CRUSADE AGAINST CLERGY ABUSE, 
http:\\www.crusadeagainstclergysbuse.com/htm/AShortHistory.htm (last visited 
Feb. 22, 2011). 
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continue in their current ministries.20  By 1971, there allegedly were 
discussions at the bishopric level concerning clergy sexual abuse.21 
The perceived institutional character of the sexual abuse problem 
(particularly pedophilia) in religious organizations helps explain why civil 
complaints frequently allege facts indicating such organizations possessed 
a high degree of knowledge that minor laity were in jeopardy of abuse by 
priests.  For example, complaints not uncommonly allege the failure of the 
religious organization to report prior known instances of child abuse.22  
Allegations of prior knowledge are alleged with distinct conviction.  A 
representative complaint alleges: 
 
Although [defendant order of friars] knew Father Posey 
was unsuitable for his position, they failed to review and 
monitor his performance, to confront him, and to sanction 
him about “known irregularities in his employment,” e.g., 
taking young children on trips and to his home.23 
 
Civil conspiracy claims also frequently accompany claims of 
clergy sexual assault or abuse.24  A typical complaint alleges that school 
administrators: 
 
agreed or otherwise conspired to cover up incidents of 
sexual abuse of minors by Salesian priests and/or 
educators and to prevent disclosure, prosecution and civil 
litigation including, but not limited to: failure to report 
incidents of abuse to law enforcement or child protection 
agencies; denial of abuse [they] had substantiated; aiding 
criminal child molesters in evading detection, arrest and 
prosecution; allowing criminal child molesters to cross 
state and international borders for purposes of gaining 
access to uninformed parents whose innocent children 
could be sexually abused; failure to warn; and failure to 
                                                                                                                 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 See, e.g., Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07-2091, 2008 WL 
1743436, at *6 (D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2008). 
23 John Doe CS v. Capuchin Franciscan Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d 1124, 1130 
(E.D. Mo. 2007). 
24 See Nunnery, 2008 WL 1743436.   
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seek out and redress the injuries its priests and / or 
educators had caused.25 
 
In litigation against Capuchin Franciscan Friars, it was 
alleged: 
 
Defendants knowingly failed to disclose Father Posey’s 
sexual misconduct.  … Defendant[s] and the Roman 
Catholic Archdiocese of St. Louis and the Archbishop of 
the Archdiocese of St. Louis, in concert with one another, 
and with the intent to conceal and defraud, conspired and 
came to a meeting of the minds whereby they would 
misrepresent, conceal, or fail to disclose information 
relating to the sexual misconduct of Defendant[s]’ agents.  
By so concealing, Defendant[s] committed at least one act 
in furtherance of the conspiracy.26   
 
Such allegations, it has been held, are premised on factual assertions and 
thus “cannot be characterized as . . . ‘bald assertions’ and ‘legal 
conclusions draped in the guise of factual allegations …“allegations.’”27 
In sum, complaints against clergy and religious institutions are 
often distinguished by (1) allegations of specific facts constituting prior 
knowledge, and (2) allegations of conspiracy, fraud, and other similar 
schemes. These alleged fact patterns form the predicate for an expanding 
body of law concerning insurance coverage for clergy sexual abuse.28 
Liability insurance policyholders who would be barred from 
coverage for acts of sexual misconduct that are expected or intended from 
                                                                                                                 
25 Id. at *7.  
26 Capuchin Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1129. 
27 Nunnery, 2008 WL 1743436 at *7. 
28 Moreover, since a number of sexual abuse “occurrences” have taken place 
over a period of many decades, and since some states have suspended otherwise 
applicable statutes of limitation, and now allow plaintiffs in sexual abuse cases to 
bring previously barred claims, the possibility of multiple liability insurers and 
“lost policies” over many years may constitute another real problem. See, e.g., City 
of Sharonville v. Am. Emp’rs Ins. Co., 846 N.E.2d 833 (Ohio 2006) (holding that 
when a liability insurance policy has been lost or destroyed, the existence of 
coverage may be proved by secondary evidence other than the policy itself, 
including circumstantial evidence of payment records, renewal letters, 
miscellaneous correspondence, or prior claim files, unless the record contains 
evidence that the policy was lost or destroyed in bad faith). 
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the viewpoint of the sexual molester,29 are increasingly bringing coverage 
claims they assert are predicated upon negligence-based claims against the 
sexual molester’s employer, supervisor, religious organization, or another 
co-insured.  These underlying claims typically are based upon claims of 
negligent supervision, negligent employment, negligent retention, and other 
negligence principles involving vicarious liability.  The courts have been 
far from uniform in how they treat such claims.30 
 Although many courts have not recognized vicarious sexual abuse 
liability claims based upon agency principles31 or based upon the doctrine 
of respondeat superior,32 nevertheless the courts are deeply divided on the 
                                                                                                                 
29 See generally infra Part II (discussing and analyzing the Intentional Acts 
Exclusion). 
30 See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, § 127:27; LONG ON 
LIABILITY INSURANCE, supra note 4, ch. 11C.02[8]; Cooke, supra note 4; 
Weinstein, supra note 4; Conder, supra note 4; Shields, supra note 4. 
31 See, e.g., Capuchin Friars, 520 F. Supp. 2d at 1137 (holding that sexual 
misconduct by a Roman Catholic priest toward his student did not fall within the 
scope of the priest’s employment under Missouri law, and therefore a religious 
order could not be held liable for the priest’s actions under an agency theory); Gray 
v. Ward, 950 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. 1997) (en banc) (similar holding); Eckler v. Gen. 
Council of Assemblies of God, 784 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App. 1990) (summary 
judgment granted to defendant church based on an agency theory alleged by the 
plaintiff). 
32 See, e.g., Tichenor v. Roman Catholic Church, 869 F. Supp. 429 (E.D. La. 
1993), aff’d, 32 F.3d 953 (5th Cir. 1994) (holding that the Roman Catholic church 
was not liable under the doctrine of respondeat superior for the alleged illicit 
sexual acts of a Roman Catholic priest, where such acts were not in furtherance of 
the priest’s duties and did not advance church doctrine, and where there was no 
evidence that the church authorized the priest’s illicit sexual acts in advance, or 
ratified them afterwards); Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 
79 Cal. Rptr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that the doctrine of respondeat 
superior was not available to impose liability on a religious institution based upon 
allegations of childhood sexual abuse by a priest, since this sexual abuse was 
outside the scope of the cleric’s employment); Doe v. Norwich Roman Catholic 
Diocese, 909 A.2d 983 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2006) (holding that a bishop, monsignor, 
and the church were not vicariously liable under the doctrine of respondeat 
superior for sexual assaults committed by a priest on a minor since it was contrary 
to the teachings of the church, and the priest’s sexual assaults on the minor were 
repugnant to his employer’s business and in contravention to the employer’s aims 
and rules); Elders v. United Methodist Church, 793 So.2d 1038 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
2001) (holding that the local church, the church conference, and church district 
superintendents were not liable to a member of the congregation for alleged sexual 
misconduct by a pastor under the doctrine of respondeat superior, since the sexual 
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issue of whether a church or other religious organization should be held 
liable for the negligent hiring, the negligent retention, or the negligent 
supervision of a priest, minister, or other clergy member based upon 
allegations of sexual misconduct.   
 A number of courts have recognized such claims based upon 
vicarious liability principles of negligent hiring, negligent retention, or 
negligent supervision of a priest or other clergy member.33  Other courts, 
                                                                                                                 
misconduct of the pastor was for personal motives, and not to further the interests 
of the church); Olinger v. Corp. of the President of the Church of Jesus Christ of 
Latter-Day Saints, 521 F. Supp. 2d 577 (E.D. Ky. 2007) (holding that the church 
could not be vicariously liable under Kentucky law for a missionary’s alleged 
sexual molestation of a minor child, since there was no evidence that the 
missionary or anyone else believed that he was acting to further the interest of the 
church at the time of the alleged sexual misconduct, and such sexual molestation 
was clearly outside the scope of the missionary’s employment).  But see Doe v. 
Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d 1027 (N.D. Iowa 1999) (plaintiff’s respondeat superior 
claim survived motion to dismiss on basis that church knew or should have known 
about past misconduct and mental disease or defect made misconduct a realistic 
threat, but noting that this was a “remarkably tenuous” basis for imposing 
respondeat superior liability); Parks v. Kownacki, 711 N.E.2d 1208 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1999) (holding that questions of material fact as to whether a parish priest was a 
child abuser or not, and whether the church or diocese which appointed the priest 
knew, or should have known, of his tendencies precluded the dismissal of a lawsuit 
against the church and the diocese based on the doctrine of respondeat superior), 
rev’d, 737 N.E.2d 287 (Ill. 2000).     
33 See, e.g., Nutt v. Norwich Roman Catholic Diocese, 56 F. Supp. 2d 195 (D. 
Conn. 1999) (applying Conn. law) (holding that the Roman Catholic Marianist 
Society had actual or constructive knowledge of the priest’s grossly inappropriate 
sexual misconduct toward the plaintiffs); Hartz, 52 F. Supp. 2d at 1077-78  
(applying Iowa law) (holding that a parishioner’s allegation that the church, 
diocese, and bishop knew of a priest’s “mental disease or defect” and the threat 
posed to parishioners was sufficient to state a claim for negligent supervision 
arising out of the priest’s sexual assault of the parishioner); Mark K., 79 Cal. Rptr. 
2d at 78 (holding that in an action for negligent supervision and retention of a 
priest who sexually molested a child, the archdiocese had failed to warn the victim 
of the priest’s known propensity for engaging in sexual misconduct with boys); 
Fortin v. The Roman Catholic Bishop of Portland, 871 A.2d 1208 (Maine 2005) 
(stating there were sufficient facts to hold the diocese liable for negligent 
supervision of a priest who sexually abused a parochial school student and altar 
boy); Hutchison ex rel. Hutchinson v. Luddy, 742 A.2d 1052 (Pa. 1999) (finding 
that the Roman Catholic Church, bishop, and diocese negligently hired, supervised, 
and retained a priest, despite knowledge of his pedophilic disposition, when the 
priest later molested a minor in a motel room).    
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however, have not recognized these vicarious liability claims sounding in 
negligence.34  Still other courts have split in holding that the First 
Amendment of the United States Constitution may—or may not—bar a 
legal action against a church or other religious organization for the 
negligent retention or supervision of a clergy member who engaged in 
sexual misconduct.35 
                                                                                                                 
34 See, e.g., Wilson v. Diocese of N.Y. of the Episcopal Church, No. 96 Civ. 
2400, 1998 WL 82921 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 26, 1998) (applying N.Y. law) (holding that 
an Episcopal diocese and individual church were not liable for the negligent 
supervision or training of a priest who allegedly sexually assaulted the plaintiff, 
where there was no evidence that the diocese knew, or should have known, of any 
alleged propensity on the priest’s part to commit sexual assault); Beach v. Jean, 
746 A.2d 228 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1999) (holding that defendant Roman Catholic 
diocese and church could not foresee the specific sexual harm alleged by the 
plaintiff, and did not know or suspect that the pastor posed a risk to minors); 
Iglesia Cristiana La Casa Del Señor, Inc. v. L.M., 783 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 2001) (holding that the church did not have actual or constructive notice of 
the pastor’s sexual misconduct); Pachulski v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Grand 
Rapids, No. 205293, 1999 WL 33441139 (Mich. Ct. App. June 18, 1999) (holding 
that the diocese and the diocese’s bishop had no actual knowledge of the priest’s 
sexual misconduct with a minor); C.B. ex rel. L.B. v. Evangelical Lutheran Church 
in Am., 726 N.W.2d 127 (Minn. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that church entities were 
not liable for the minister’s sexual abuse of a minor under the theory of negligent 
supervision, since there was no evidence that the church was put on notice of  the 
minister’s sexual abuse); N.H. v. Presbyterian Church, 998 P.2d 592 (Okla. 1999) 
(holding that the critical element for recovery under a negligent hiring, retention, 
or supervision theory is the employer’s prior knowledge of an employee’s 
propensity to commit the harm, and the national organization had no notice of any 
previous act or incident that would have alerted it to the fact that the minister was a 
pedophile, and was sexually abusing children); Eckler, 784 S.W.2d at 941 (holding 
that in order for an act of negligence to be a proximate cause of the injury, it must 
be a cause in fact of the injury, and the injury must be reasonably foreseeable. The 
court noted that the general church council had not been notified of any complaints 
against the local church or a youth minister who had allegedly sexually abused 
children, and therefore it had no duty to supervise or investigate the local church 
and its ministers); Doe v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, 700 N.W.2d 180 (Wis. 2005) 
(holding the archdiocese was not liable under a negligent supervision claim, since 
there was no evidence that the archdiocese knew or should have known of the 
priest’s abusive tendencies at or before the time the minor was sexually abused). 
35 See, e.g., Ehrens v. Lutheran Church—Missouri Synod, 269 F. Supp. 2d 328 
(S.D.N.Y. 2003); Schmidt v. Bishop, 779 F. Supp. 321 (S.D.N.Y. 1991) 
(purportedly applying New York law); Gray, 950 S.W.2d 232; Mars v. Diocese of 
Rochester, 763 N.Y.S.2d 885 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2003); L.L.N. v. Clauder, 563 
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 When the religious organization is subject to liability, the 
organization almost invariably looks to its insurer to defend it and to pay 
claims.  We now analyze and discuss the developing law concerning 
insurance coverage for sexual abuse claims. 
 
II. THE DEVELOPING LAW OF LIABILITY INSURANCE 
COVERAGE FOR SEXUAL ABUSE CLAIMS 
 
A. OVERVIEW OF INSURANCE COVERAGE ISSUES 
 
Modern standard general liability policies condition insurance 
coverage on whether there has been an “occurrence.” These policies 
typically define “occurrence” as: 
     
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
general conditions, resulting in bodily injury or property 
damages neither expected nor intended from the standpoint 
of the insured. 
     
Also, standard general liability policies often include the following 
exclusion: 
     
We will not provide insurance:   
2.  For personal injury or property damage: 
a.  which is either expected or intended by you; 
     
This is known as the “intentional act exclusion.”   
In light of the afore-cited and similar provisions, many sexual 
abuse coverage disputes have turned upon: (1) whether sexual molestation 
falls within the policy’s intentional act exclusion, or (2) whether sexual 
molestation meets the “occurrence” definition in the policy.  The decisions 
usually analyze whether bodily injury was “expected” or “intended” by the 
insured.  In addition, some courts ask a threshold question: whether sexual 
abuse itself can be an “accident.” 
                                                                                                                 
N.W.2d 434 (Wis. 1997). But see Bivin v. Wright, 656 N.E.2d 1121 (Ill. App. Ct. 
1995); Fortin, 871 A.2d 1208; Olson v. First Church of the Nazarene, 661 N.W.2d 
254 (Minn. Ct. App. 2003); Kenneth R. v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Brooklyn, 
654 N.Y.S.2d 791 (App. Div. 1997); Christopher B. v. Schoeneck, No. 99-0450, 
1999 WL 1102901 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 7, 1999), review denied, 2000 Wisc. 
LEXIS 305 (Feb. 22, 2000).   
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The “expected or intended” question must be addressed even when 
the policy does not contain an “intentional act” exclusion.  This is because 
the “occurrence” definition, contained in the vast majority of standard 
general liability policies, affords coverage only for bodily injury that is 
“neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”  It has 
been held that this “neither expected nor intended” clause in the 
“occurrence” definition is the equivalent of the intentional act exclusion.36  
Accordingly, decisions applying the intentional act exclusion, as discussed 
infra § IIB, frequently provide guidance regarding the “occurrence” 
question. 
 
B. THE “EXPECTED” OR “INTENDED” ISSUE UNDER GENERAL 
LIABILITY POLICIES 
 
 An “occurrence” in homeowners and commercial general liability 
insurance generally is limited to unexpected, unintended, and accidental 
loss.37   Also, many liability insurance policies contain an “intentional act 
exclusion” providing that coverage is excluded for “bodily injury or 
property damage that is expected or intended by the insured.”38  The 
underlying public policy rationale of this “intentional act exclusion” in 
liability insurance is that it would defeat the purpose of insurance and 
encourage “moral hazard” if a policyholder could be compensated for 
losses he intentionally brings about, knowing that the insurer would be 
liable for any resulting damages or personal injury.39   
But how have the courts decided which acts are “expected or 
intended by the insured”?  There are currently three major judicial 
                                                                                                                 
36 W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 492 (W. Va. 2004) 
(citing Patrons-Oxford Mut. Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 426 A.2d 888, 891 (Me. 1981)). 
37  See generally STEMPEL, supra note 7, at § 1.06[B][1]. 
38 See 1 SUSAN J. MILLER & PHILLIP LEFEBVRE, MILLER’S STANDARD 
INSURANCE POLICIES ANNOTATED 214, 409, 414 (4th ed. 1995) (citing to the 
Insurance Services Office, Inc. (ISO) Forms HO 00 03 04 91 (Homeowners 
Insurance) and CG 00 01 10 93 (Commercial General Liability Insurance)); see, 
e.g., Transamerica Ins. Grp. v. Meere, 694 P.2d 181, 186 (Ariz. 1984) (en banc) 
(holding that there is a strong underlying public policy that forbids insurers from 
indemnifying persons against loss resulting from their own willful wrongdoing. 
The intentional act exclusion therefore “is designed to prevent an insured from 
acting wrongfully with the security of knowing that his insurance company will 
‘pay the piper’ for the damages”).  
39 See, e.g., W. Nat’l Assurance Co. v. Hecker, 719 P.2d 954, 959-60 (Wash. 
Ct. App. 1986). 
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approaches for interpreting the “expected” or “intended” question under 
liability insurance policies involving sexual abuse claims: (1) the 
“objective” or “classic tort” standard for determining acts that are intended 
or expected from the viewpoint of the insured; (2) the “subjective” or 
“particular insured” standard for determining acts that are intended or 
expected from the viewpoint of the insured; and (3) the “inferred intent” 
standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases.40 
 
1. The “Objective” or “Classic Tort” Standard for 
Determining Intentional Acts in Liability Insurance 
Coverage Disputes 
   
Under an “objective” or “classic tort” standard, a court will look at 
the natural and probable consequences of the insured’s deliberate act in 
order to determine the insured’s intent.41  If an intentional act by the 
insured results in injuries that are, in an objective sense, the natural, 
foreseeable, and probable result of the insured’s intentional act, such loss is 
excluded from coverage under the liability insurance intentional acts 
exclusion.42 Commentators have differed, however, on whether this 
                                                                                                                 
40 See, e.g., Peter C. Haley, Paradigms of Proximate Cause, 36 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 147, 149 (2000) (“Proximate cause is a factor in all three types of civil actions 
seeking damages: common law torts, common law contract, and statutory. 
However, tort actions have been the subject of most of the judicial and scholarly 
attention devoted to proximate cause.”). 
41 See, e.g., CNA Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984) 
(sexual assault of a minor); see also Truck Ins. Exch. v. Pickering, 642 S.W.2d 
113, 116 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (involving an intentional wrongful death action and 
holding that “one is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences of 
his acts and conduct.”); Mutual Serv. Cas. Co. v. McGehee, 711 P.2d 826, 827-28 
(Mont. 1985) (action for battery); Fuisz v. Selective Ins. Co. of America, 61 F.3d 
238 (4th Cir. 1995) (applying Va. law) (defamation action). But see also Rodriguez 
v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 629-30 (Wash. 1986) (en banc) (criticizing this 
“objective” or “classic tort” standard in an insurance law context). See also infra 
note 43 (citing additional authority). 
42 See, e.g., COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, at § 127:2d (“A majority of 
courts utilize an objective standard to determine whether the injury was intentional. 
Accordingly, sexual abuse is considered an intentional act when the injury is the 
natural and probable consequence of the insured’s conduct.”) (citing to a number 
of cases arguably supporting this proposition, including B.B. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 8 
F.3d 1288, 2195 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying Mo. law); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. 
Fore, 785 F. Supp. 947, 956 (M.D. Ala. 1992); Troy v. Allstate Ins. Co., 789 F. 
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traditional “objective” or “classic tort” standard applied to cases of rape, 
sexual assault, and sexual molestation is the majority view,43 or a minority 
view.44  
  
2. The “Subjective” or “Particular Insured” Standard for 
Determining Intentional Acts in Liability Insurance 
Coverage Disputes 
 
Under a “subjective” or “particular insured” standard, the court 
must find not only that the insured intended a specific act, but also that the 
insured intended a specific harm.45  The “subjective” standard—that the 
insured must have intended both the conduct in question, and the insured 
must have intended some type of injury,46 or a particular type of injury,47 is 
the majority approach today48 involving most intentional acts committed by 
                                                                                                                 
Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Kan. 1992); Fernandez v. Strand, 63 F. Supp. 2d 949, 956 
(E.D. Wis. 1999)). 
42 See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 439-69 (commenting that the 
“classic tort” or “objective” standard is a minority approach); LONG ON LIABILITY, 
supra note 4, at § 11C.02[1][c][i] (same). 
43 See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H. 
1984) (concerning battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims 
arising out of the alleged sexual abuse of a minor); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope, 
No. 09-078, 2010 WL 3934335, at *5 (Vt. 2010).   
44 See, e.g., JERRY & RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 439-69 (commenting that the 
“classic tort” or “objective” standard is a minority approach); LONG ON LIABILITY, 
supra note 4, at § 11C.02[1][c][i] (same). 
45 See, e.g., MacKinnon v. Hanover Ins. Co., 471 A.2d 1166, 1167 (N.H. 
1984) (concerning battery and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims 
arising out of the alleged sexual abuse of a minor); N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Stanhope, 
No. 09-078, 2010 WL 3934335, at *5 (Vt. 2010);   
46 See, e.g., Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Johnson, 816 P.2d 952 (Colo. 1991) 
(assault and battery claims); Amco Ins. Co. v. Haht, 490 N.W.2d 843 (Iowa 1992) 
(alleged battery and wrongful death claim caused by a thrown baseball); Tenn. 
Farmers Mut. Ins. Co. v. Evans, 814 S.W.2d 49 (Tenn. 1991) (alleged arson of 
property). 
47 See, e.g., Providence Mut. Ins. Co. v. Scanlon, 638 A.2d 1246 (N.H. 1994) 
(personal injury from a BB gun); Columbia Cas. Co. v. Westfield Ins. Co., 617 
S.E.2d 797 (W.Va. 2005) (suicide deaths of inmates). But see also FISCHER, 
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 62 (“The specific intent view errs too greatly 
in favor of the policyholder by insulating him or her from the financial 
consequences of antisocial conduct.”).   
48  But see supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
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an insured in liability insurance coverage disputes other than child sexual 
abuse cases.49    
A growing number of courts have questioned whether this majority 
“subjective” standard approach is appropriate in liability insurance claims 
involving child sexual abuse allegations.  Although an insured seeking 
coverage for injuries arising out of sexual misconduct and sexual abuse 
may argue that he or she had no subjective intent to “harm” the minor 
child,50 most courts have characterized these subjective assertions made by 
adult sexual molesters that they did not subjectively intend to harm their 
child sexual abuse victims as “absurd” and “irrational”51  For example, the 
California Supreme Court in the case of J.C. Penney Casualty Insurance 
Co. v. M.K.,52  observed that the insurer contended coverage was excluded: 
 
[T]he [sexual] molestations were intentional. Defendants 
respond that even an intentional and wrongful act is not 
excluded from coverage unless the insured acted with a 
“preconceived design to inflict injury.” They contend 
psychiatric testimony shows that molesters . . . often intend 
no harm despite the depravity of their acts, and that the 
                                                                                                                 
49  See generally FISCHER, SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 58-65; JERRY 
& RICHMOND, supra note 7, at 463-67. 
50  See, e.g., Atl. Emp’rs Ins. Co. v. Tots & Toddlers Pre-Sch. Day Care Ctr., 
Inc., 571 A.2d 300, 303 (N.J. Super. 1990) (“While socially unacceptable, [the 
insured sexual molester] argue[s] a pedophile or other sexual deviant may not 
necessarily [subjectively] intend to cause his or her victims any injury, even though 
that behavior may constitute criminal activity.”); see also Northland Ins. Cos. v. 
Coconut Island Corp., 961 F. Supp. 20, 22 (D. Maine, 1997); Fire Ins. Exch. v. 
Abbott, 251 Cal. Rptr. 620, 629 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (similar subjective arguments 
made by sexual abusers). 
51  See, e.g., Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989) 
(holding that the sexual molester’s subjective argument “defied logic”); Mut. of 
Enumclaw v. Merrill, 794 P.2d 818, 820 (Ore. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that the 
sexual molester’s subjective argument was “little short of absurd”); see also CNA 
Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 666 S.W.2d 689, 691 (Ark. 1984) (“We agree with the view 
expressed by the dissent in the Court of Appeals in this case, that for a stepfather in 
such a situation ‘to claim that he did not expect or intend to cause injury, flies in 
the face of all reason, common sense and experience.’”) (quoting CNA Ins. Co. v. 
McGinnis, 663 S.W.2d 182, 185 (Ark. Ct. App. 1984) (Corbin, J., dissenting)). 
52 J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. M.K, 804 P.2d 689 (Cal.), cert. denied sub nom, 
502 U.S. 902 (1991). 
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molestation is often a misguided attempt to display love 
and affection for the child.53 
 
The court concluded: 
 
We conclude there is no coverage as a matter of law. No 
rational person can reasonably believe that sexual 
fondling, penetration, and oral copulation of a five-year-
old child are nothing more than acts of tender mercy . . . 
The courts of many other states also have considered the 
issue and, almost without exception, have held there is no 
coverage.54 
 
 Because the subjective intent test is capable of reaching a 
conclusion – that the molester intended no harm – that is anathema to 
prevailing logic and public policy sensibilities regarding child abuse and 
molestation, it has fallen into extreme disfavor over the last decade.  
Accordingly, the “inferred intent” standard has emerged as the majority 
view today. 
 
3. The “Inferred Intent” Standard as Applied to Child Sexual 
Abuse Cases 
 
 A substantial majority of courts have applied an “inferred intent” 
standard to bar coverage in sexual molestation cases involving an adult 
sexual predator and a sexually abused child, even when the insured sexual 
molester asserts the absence of any subjective intent to harm the child.55  
                                                                                                                 
53 Id. at 693. 
54  Id. 
55 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Abraio, 874 F.2d 619, 623 (9th Cir. 
1989) (applying Cal. law) (holding that there is an irrebuttable presumption of 
intent to harm as a matter of law in child molestation cases); J.C. Penney, 804 P.2d 
at 695 (“There is no such thing as negligent or even reckless sexual molestation. 
The very essence of child molestation is the gratification of sexual desire. The act 
is the harm. There cannot be one without the other. Thus, the intent to molest is, by 
itself, the same as the intent to harm.”), cert. denied sub nom, Kelley v. J.C. 
Penney Cas. Ins. Co., 502 U.S. 902 (1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 
N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992) (“[I]n the exceptional case of an act of child 
molestation, cause and effect cannot be separated; that to do the act is necessarily 
to do the harm which is its consequence; and that since unquestionably the act is 
intended, so also is the harm.”).  See generally Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. 
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The underlying public policy rationale for this “inferred intent” standard 
when applied to child sexual abuse claims is premised on a state’s criminal 
prohibition of sexual contact between an adult and a child,56 as well as the 
reasonable expectations of the parties to coverage.57 
Although a majority of courts have adopted and applied this 
“inferred intent” standard in cases where the insured asserts a subjective 
intent not to harm the minor victim, a more subtle issue is raised when the 
insured asserts an incapacity to form any requisite intent.  Some courts 
have reasoned that if the nature and character of the act are such that an 
intent to harm may be inferred, such as in cases involving the insured’s acts 
of child sexual abuse, then any question of an inability to form this intent to 
harm, whether it arises out of alleged mental disease or incapacity, or 
whether it arises out of voluntary intoxication, is immaterial in resolving 
the insurer’s obligation to coverage, and the insured’s intent to harm in 
                                                                                                                 
Co., 995 F.2d 457, 461-62 nn.5-6 (3d Cir. 1993) (applying Pa. law) (stating that 
this majority “inferred intent” standard applied as a matter of law to child sexual 
abuse claims has been adopted in Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Illinois, Indiana, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, 
New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon 
Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin); see also 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Roelfs, 698 F. Supp. 815 (D. Alaska 1987); State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Co. v. Davis, 612 So.2d  458, 463-64 (Ala. 1993) (also collecting cases from 
other jurisdictions); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 418-19 (Colo. 
1990), rev’g, 768 P.2d 731 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 
589 N.E.2d 365, 368 (N.Y. 1992), rev’g, 561 N.Y.S.2d 35 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990) 
(also collecting cases from other jurisdictions).    
56 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Smith, 907 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir. 
1990) (predicting Nev. law); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So. 2d 1051, 1053 
(Fla. 1989); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 N.E.2d 365, 369 (N.Y. 1992); 
Nationwide Ins. Co. v. Abernethy, 445 S.E.2d 618, 620 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994); 
Rodriguez v. Williams, 729 P.2d 627, 630 (Wash. 1986). 
57 See, e.g., Wiley v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 464 (3d Cir. 
1993) (applying Pa. law) (“[T]he average person purchasing homeowner’s 
insurance would cringe at the very suggestion that he was paying for [coverage for 
liability arising out of his sexual abuse of a child]. And certainly he would not 
want to share that type of risk with other homeowner’s policy holders.”) (quoting 
Rodriguez ex rel. Brennan v. Williams, 713 P.2d 135, 137-38 (Wash. Ct. App.), 
aff’d, 729 P.2d 627 (Wash. 1986)); see also Allstate Ins. Co. v. Mugavero, 589 
N.E.2d 365, 370 (N.Y. 1992); Horace Mann Ins. Co. v. Leeber, 376 S.E.2d 581, 
586 (W. Va. 1988) (similar holdings).      
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such a context therefore is irrelevant.58  Other courts hold that, as a matter 
of law, an insured may never assert a lack of capacity to form intent caused 
by voluntary intoxication as a defense to the application of an intentional 
act exclusion, regardless of the act committed.59  A minority of other courts 
have held, however, that where an incapacity to form intent to harm is 
alleged, that incapacity may render unintentional any harm caused by the 
insured, so that such an incapacity must be considered by the finder of fact 
when resolving the issue of any existence of intent to harm.60 
In conclusion, under either the “objective” or “classic tort” 
standard,61 or under an  “inferred intent” standard,62 the overwhelming 
majority of American courts have persuasively-- and correctly-- held that 
an adult sexual molester of an abused child will not be entitled to coverage 
under a liability insurance policy based upon its intentional acts 
exclusion.63   
                                                                                                                 
58 See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Estate of Jenner, 874 F.2d 604, 605, 
607 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying Cal. Law); Landis v. Allstate Ins. Co., 546 So.2d 
1051, 1053 (Fla. 1989); Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rash, 740 P.2d 370, 373 
(Wash. Ct. App. 1987). 
59 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hampton, 433 N.W.2d 334, 336 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 1988); Hanover Ins. Co. v. Newcomer, 585 S.W.2d 285, 289 (Mo. Ct. App. 
1979). 
60 This is the minority “Arizona rule.”  See, e.g., Globe Am. Cas. Co. v. 
Lyons, 641 P.2d 251, 254 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1981) (“derangement of . . . intellect”); 
Parkinson v. Farmers Ins. Co., 594 P.2d 1039, 1041 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1979) 
(voluntary intoxication); see also Hanover Ins. Co. v. Talhouni, 604 N.E.2d 689, 
691-93 (Mass. 1992) (further explaining Worchester Ins. Co. v. Fells Acres Day 
Sch., Inc., 558 N.E.2d 958, 965 (Mass. 1990)). See Wiley v. State Farm Fire & 
Cas. Ins. Co., 995 F.2d 457, 465-67 (3d Cir. 1993), for the application of 
Pennsylvania law to and a general discussion of these three judicial approaches to 
the “inferred intent” rule when the insured asserts his or her incapacity for an intent 
to harm. 
61  See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.  
62  See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
63 See generally COUCH ON INSURANCE, supra note 4, at § 127:26; FISCHER, 
SWISHER & STEMPEL, supra note 8, at 64-66; LONG ON LIABILITY, supra note 4, at 
§ 11C:02[1]. Although the underlying rationale for applying an “inferred intent” 
standard when the sexual abuse victim is a minor may not always apply when the 
victim is an adult, a majority of courts nevertheless still apply this “inferred intent” 
standard to adult sexual abuse victims, as well as to child sexual abuse victims. 
See, e.g., W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Vago, 553 N.E.2d 1181, 1185 (Ill. Ct. App. 1990); 
Rulli v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 479 N.W.2d 87, 89 (Minn. Ct. App. 1992); see 
also W. Nat’l Assur. Co. v. Heckler, 719 P.2d 954, 960 (Wash. Ct. App. 1986) 
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C. THE “EXPECTED OR INTENDED” STANDARD APPLIED TO 
INSURANCE CLAIMS BY EMPLOYERS AND SUPERVISORS OF 
THE ABUSER 
 
Most current insurance coverage claims involve the sexual 
molester’s employer, supervisor, or religious organization who is allegedly 
responsible under a legal doctrine of negligent supervision, negligent 
hiring, negligent retention, or under a similar vicarious liability doctrine 
based upon negligence principles, rather than based upon the intentional 
acts of a sexual molester that were “expected or intended” by the insured.   
 
1. The “Accident” Requirement 
 
Most contemporary homeowners and general liability insurance 
policies provide coverage only for accidental “occurrences.”  For example, 
a typical homeowner’s policy provides coverage for “bodily injury” or 
“property damage” caused by an “occurrence.” Occurrence typically is 
defined to mean “an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
substantially the same general harmful conditions.”64  General liability 
insurance policies likewise cover “bodily injury” or “property damage” 
caused by an “occurrence,” where an “occurrence” generally is defined as 
“an accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to conditions, 
which results in bodily injury or property damage neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured.”65      
   An “occurrence” under liability insurance coverage must be an 
accidental event.  It has been said that an “accident” is an unintended and 
unanticipated event, and that it occurs without design, coordination, or 
expectation.66  In other words, bodily injury or property damage that is the 
                                                                                                                 
(“[T]he nature of the act, its forcible and nonconsensual character, and the harm 
that certainly results makes the inference of intent no less strong [than in a child 
sexual abuse case]”). 
64 See, e.g., Insurance Services Office Inc. [ISO] Form HO 00 03 04 91 
[Homeowners Insurance]. 
65 See, e.g., Insurance Services Office Inc. [ISO] Form GL 00 00 01 73 
[General Liability Insurance] (emphasis in original). See generally LONG ON 
LIABILITY, supra note 4, at § 11C.02[1][a].    
66 See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996) 
(applying Minn. law) (“[An accident is] an unexpected happening without 
intention or design.”); High Country Assocs. v. N. H. Ins. Co., 648 A.2d 474, 478 
(N.H. 1994) (“[W]e interpret ‘accident’ in the definition of ‘occurrence’ to mean 
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probable, intended, or expected result of the insured’s actions is not injury 
or damage that was caused by an accidental occurrence.67  Whether an 
accidental event occurred for the purpose of liability insurance coverage 
usually is considered from the viewpoint of the tortfeasor-insured.68 
Decisions outside the realm of sexual abuse claims sometimes have 
turned on the “neither expected nor intended” wording in the “occurrence” 
clause in determining whether particular forms of misconduct qualified as 
an “occurrence.”  These decisions assume that if the resulting injury was 
not expected or intended by the insured, coverage exists even if the 
underlying tort, such as gradual pollution or long-term asbestos exposure 
arguably was not what ordinary people would refer to as an “accident.”69   
Such decisions do not treat “accident” as an independent 
requirement for an “occurrence” to exist.70  Rather, they implicitly 
conclude that the “expected or intended” clause does not narrow the 
meaning of “accident,” but instead subsumes the term “accident.”  A 
                                                                                                                 
circumstances . . . that were unexpected and unintended from the viewpoint of the 
insured.”); St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. McCormick & Baxter Creosoting 
Co., 923 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Ore. 1996) ([T]he word ‘accident’ denotes an incident 
or occurrence that happened by chance, without design, and contrary to intention 
and expectation.”) (quoting Finley v. Prudential Ins. Co., 388 P.2d 21, 26 (Or. 
1963)). 
67 See, e.g., Fed. Ins. Co. v. Gen. Mach. Corp., 699 F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Pa. 
1988) (“An ‘accident’ is an event which takes place without having been foreseen, 
expected, or anticipated by anyone . . . . If an occurrence is the ordinary and 
expected result of the performance of an operation, then it cannot be termed an 
accident.”); Green Const. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1000, 
1002 (W.D. Mo. 1991) (“An ‘accident,’ as that term is used in standard CGL 
policies ‘means that which happens by chance or fortuitously, without intention or 
design, and which is unexpected, unusual, and unforeseen.’”), vacated on other 
grounds, 975 F. Supp. 1365 (W.D. Mo. 1996); Gassaway v. Travelers Ins. Co., 439 
S.W.2d 605, 608 (Tenn. 1969) (“[D]efined accident as used in liability insurance 
policies as an event not reasonably to be foreseen, unexpected and fortuitous.”).   
68 See, e.g., Capitol Indem. Corp. v. Blazer, 51 F. Supp. 2d 1080, 1085 (D. 
Nev. 1999); Agoado Realty Corp. v. United Int’l Ins. Co., 733 N.E.2d 213, 216 
(N.Y. 2000). 
69 E.g., Mass. Bonding & Ins. Co. v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 416 S.W.2d at 
396, 400-01 (Tex. 1967) (holding that the negligent application of a pesticide that 
had a cumulative toxic effect was an “accident”); see also King v. Dallas Fire Ins. 
Co., 27 S.W.3d 117, 123 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).   
70 See Sheets v. Brethren Mut. Ins. Co., 679 A.2d 540, 548 (Md. 1996) 
(negligence is deemed “accidental” so long as it causes damage that is unforeseen 
or unexpected by the insured). 
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number of decisions have followed this analysis in sexual abuse cases, 
concluding that damage was not “expected or intended,” without 
considering further whether what occurred would be regarded by anyone as 
an “accident.”71 
These decisions, however, do not confront the issue of whether the 
term “accident” in the definition of “occurrence” possesses a meaning that 
is independent of the “neither expected nor intended” clause.  On the other 
hand, a significant number of other courts – particularly when addressing 
sexual abuse and molestation claims on public policy grounds – have 
concluded that the term “accident” does have independent meaning.  These 
decisions, involving sexual abuse allegations, generally hold that, in 
determining whether the sexual misconduct has resulted in an 
“occurrence,” the threshold question is whether the alleged misconduct can 
aptly be regarded as an “accident.”  If it cannot, there is no further inquiry. 
For example, as the Colorado Court of Appeals, in Mountain States 
Mutual Casualty Co. v. Hauser, recently observed, even if the insured’s 
negligence in hiring the perpetrator is alleged as a cause of the victim’s 
injuries, “it was not a risk covered by the policy since it was not an 
‘accident.’”72  Citing decisions from California and New York, the court 
held: “Negligent hiring/supervision [of a sexual molester] is not an 
‘accident.’”73  The court explained further: 
 
[The insured] cites no case where an intentional act of 
sexual assault constituted an ‘“accident” or ‘“occurrence” 
within the meaning of a comprehensive general liability 
policy.  Rather than resort to “head-spinning judicial 
efforts at definition,” we conclude that the common 
understanding of an “accident” does not include the 
[sexual] assault that occur here.74   
                                                                                                                 
71 See Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. White, 913 N.E. 2d 426, 431-32 (Ohio 2009) 
(citing cases in other jurisdictions). 
72 Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 60 (Colo. Ct. App. 
2009) (citing Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, 756 F. 
Supp. 1287, 1290 (N.D. Cal. 1991) (cab company employee sexually molested a 
passenger)). 
73 Id. at 60 (citing Bay Area Cab Lease, 756 F. Supp. at 1289). 
74 Id. The Hauser court indicated that absent an “accident” the “standpoint of 
the insured-employer” was irrelevant.  However, because the insured-employer 
allegedly expected injury, the court did not need to decide whether a non-
expectation of injury has any relevance where the underlying event was not an 
“accident.”  Id. at 62. 
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 An accident is never present when a deliberate act is performed 
unless some additional, unexpected, independent and unforeseen happening 
occurs which produces the damage, the court added.75 This analysis 
assumes particular importance in “negligent hiring” and “negligent 
supervision” cases (as in Hauser) where the policyholder usually asserts 
the injuries were neither “expected nor intended” from its standpoint (as 
distinguished from the molester’s standpoint).  The “accident” requirement 
also can limit coverage for abuse claims based on alleged 
“misrepresentations” by a school or church that children would be safe 
from abuse.76 
It is difficult to predict how influential the Hauser approach will 
be. Certainly, the alternate approach – which focuses exclusively on the 
“expected or intended” clause – may be unwelcome in those jurisdictions 
that claim to place particular emphasis on reading insurance contract 
provisions as a whole, so that each provision is afforded meaning.77  But 
                                                                                                                 
75 Id.  
76 John Doe 1 v. Archdiocese of Milwaukee, No. 2009AP2266, 2010 WL 
4723728, at *4 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 23, 2010) (“The cause of the plaintiffs’ 
injuries, the misrepresentation by the Archdiocese, cannot be characterized as 
accidental.  The affirmative representations of safety by the Archdiocese did not 
occur by chance, nor was it unforeseen or unintended. . . .”). 
77 See, e.g., Ohio Cas. Ins. Co. v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 469 F.3d 1158, 1163 
(8th Cir. 2006) (applying Ark. law) (“Different clauses of an insurance contract are 
read together to harmonize all parts because it is error to give effect to one clause 
over another when the two clauses are reconcilable.”); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. 
Treesdale, Inc., 418 F.3d 330, 336 (3d Cir. 2005) (applying Penn. law) (“[Insured] 
focuses on phrases that it believes are favorable to its interpretation and ignores all 
of the other language that runs counter to its interpretation."); Premcor USA, Inc. 
v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 400 F.3d 523, 529 (7th Cir. 2005), as amended on reh'g, 
(Apr. 21, 2005) (applying Ill. law) (“Our task is to determine whether this 
provision remains ambiguous when viewed in the context of the entire . . . 
policy."); Herman Miller, Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 454, 455 (6th Cir. 
1998) (applying Mich. law) ("Viewed alone, we could not say that the terms 
'piracy,' 'idea misappropriation,' or 'unfair competition' could never constitute 
patent infringement. However, to draw such an inference when considering these 
terms within the policy as a whole construes them too broadly."); Silverball 
Amusement, Inc. v. Utah Home Fire Ins. Co., 842 F. Supp. 1151, 1159 (W.D. Ark. 
1994), aff'd, 33 F.3d 1476 (8th Cir. 1994); Am. Guarantee and Liab. Ins. Co. v. 
Shel-Ray Underwriters, Inc., 844 F. Supp. 325, 331 (S.D. Tex. 1993); Allstate Ins. 
Co. v. Hardnett, 763 So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 2000) ("The provisions of the policy 
cannot be read in isolation, but, instead, each provision must be read in context 
with all other provisions."); Van Ness v. Blue Cross of Cal., 104 Cal. Rptr. 2d 511, 
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those court decisions that conflate “injury neither expected nor intended” 
with “accident” seem to read the policy as if it defined “occurrence” as: 
 
An accident, meaning an event, including continuous or 
repeated exposure to conditions, causing property damage 
or bodily injury that is neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the insured. 
 
However, this questionable interpretation differs from how the clause 
actually reads, which is: 
 
An accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to 
conditions, resulting in property damage or bodily injury 
that is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of 
the insured. 
 
Thus, in the “occurrence” definition, as it actually reads, the clause 
beginning “resulting in” modifies, and narrows, the definition of 
“accident.”  By analogy, the words “that is” within this clause have an 
effect much like they would in a sentence reading: “I am looking to buy a 
                                                                                                                 
516 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001); O'Brien v. Progressive N. Ins. Co., 785 A.2d 281, 287 
(Del. 2001) ("[A] court's interpretation of an insurance contact [sic] must rely on a 
reading of all of the pertinent provisions of the policy as a whole, and not on any 
single passage in isolation."); Playtex FP, Inc. v. Columbia Cas. Co., 622 A.2d 
1074, 1076 (Del. Super. Ct. 1992) ("[T]he meaning which arises from a particular 
portion of an agreement cannot control the meaning of the entire agreement where 
such inference runs counter to the agreement's overall scheme or plan.") (citations 
omitted); Clarenden Am. Ins. Co. v. 69 W. Wash. Mgmt. LLC, 870 N.E.2d 978, 
983 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); Emp’rs Mut. Liab. Ins. Co. of Wis. v. Mich. Mut. Auto 
Ins. Co., 300 N.W.2d 682, 684 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); Northbrook Ins. Co. v. Am. 
States Ins. Co., 495 N.W.2d 450, 453 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993); Ins. Co. of Pa. v. W. 
Plains Air, Inc., 637 S.W.2d 444, 446 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982); Lindell v. Ruthford, 
598 P.2d 616, 618 (Mont. 1979); Commercial Union Assur. Cos. v. Gollan, 394 
A.2d 839, 842 (N.H. 1978); Atlas Assur. Co. v. General Builders, Inc., 600 P.2d 
850, 852 (N.M. Ct. App. 1979); Long Island Lighting Co. v. Allianz Underwriters 
Ins. Co., 749 N.Y.S.2d 488, 494 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002); Little v. Blue Cross of W. 
N.Y., Inc., 424 N.Y.S.2d 553, 555 (N.Y. App. Div. 1980); Burgess v. N.C. Farm 
Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 261 S.E.2d 234, 236 (N.C. Ct. App. 1980); Cincinnati Ins. 
Co. v. CPS Holdings, Inc., 875 N.E.2d 31, 34 (Ohio 2007); Nat’l Union Fire Ins. 
Co. v. Shane & Shane Co., 605 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Ohio Ct. App. 1992); 
Eddystone Fire Co. No. 1 v. Cont’l Ins. Cos., 425 A.2d 803, 805 (Pa. Super. 1981). 
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new car that is neither damaged nor defective.”78  No one reading this 
particular sentence would conclude that the writer had made an offer to 
accept an undamaged and non-defective used car.  True, “undamaged and 
non-defective” are essential characteristics of a new car – just as 
“unexpected and unintended injury” are essential characteristics of an 
“accident” – but the meaning is quite clear: the car must be new.  In the 
same interpretive manner, for an “occurrence” to be found, even 
unintended injury must still result from an “accident.”   
As one court has explained, the final clause to the “occurrence” 
definition “makes it clear that not all injuries from an intended act will be 
excluded, but only those injuries that were intended.”79  And as another 
court has correctly observed: “There are two components that must be 
shown to establish an ‘occurrence’ under the policy:  (1) an accident; and 
(2) personal injury or property damage neither expected nor intended from 
the standpoint of the insured.”80 
Courts that give independent meaning to the term “accident” 
persuasively conclude that sexual abuse and molestation is not an 
“occurrence,” even if such an injury was not expected or intended by the 
supervisor-insured.  In contrast, those judicial decisions that conflate the 
two prongs of the “occurrence” definition do not explain how their 
particular approach can avoid offending the interpretative rule, emphasized 
in so many jurisdictions, that insurance contract provisions must be read as 
a whole, giving meaning to the entire document.81  
Had the “occurrence” definition merely provided that “occurrence” 
means “property damage or bodily injury neither expected nor intended 
from the standpoint of the insured” – omitting the “accident” predicate – 
then whether the act itself was “accidental” would be beside the point.  But 
given that “occurrence” is defined as “an accident … resulting in damage 
                                                                                                                 
78 See generally. N. Crossarm, Inc. v. Chem. Specialties, Inc., No. 03-C-415-
C, 2004 WL 602648 (W.D. Wis. Mar. 16, 2004); Faris Mailing v. Dep’t of State 
Revenue, 512 N.E.2d 480, 485 (Ind. T.C. 1987). 
79 Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Gaspard, 608 So. 2d 981, 985 (La. 1992); see also 
United Pac. Co. v. McGuire Co., 281 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) (“Since 
the word ‘event’ is not limited to fortuitous happenings, the phrase ‘not expected 
or intended’ cannot be read as language confirming the meaning of the term; . . . 
the phrase must be regarded as language of limitation, narrowing the coverage 
otherwise provided by the word ‘event.’”). 
80 Norwalk Ready Mixed Concrete, Inc. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 246 F.3d 1132, 
1137 (8th Cir. 2001) (quoting W. Bend Mut. Ins. Co. v. Iowa Iron Works, Inc., 503 
N.W.2d 596, 600 (Iowa 1993)). 
81 See supra note 75 and accompanying text. 
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neither expected nor intended by the insured, a different intent is apparent.  
That is: 
 
1.  Something must happen that an ordinary person would 
regard as an “accident;” 
2.  If an “accident” has occurred, there is coverage if it 
results in bodily injury that is neither expected nor 
intended from the standpoint of the insured claiming 
coverage. 
 
Nevertheless, the courts are still divided between those that grant 
meaning to the term “accident” within the “occurrence” definition, and 
those that focus exclusively on the “expected or intended” clause.  Courts 
following the former line of decisions are likely to regard claims arising 
from sexual abuse and molestation as falling outside the subject of 
insurance coverage, while those courts following the latter line of decisions 
must determine whether the insured “expected or intended” the sexual 
abuse.82 
  
2. The “Objective” or “Classic Tort” Standard Applied to 
Insurance Claims Arising from Negligent Hiring or 
Supervision of a Molester 
  
The crucial underlying legal requirement found in most clergy 
negligent hiring, negligent retention, and negligent supervision cases is 
largely based upon whether the priest or clergyman’s supervising church, 
bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or should have known 
of the offender’s sexual abuse toward minors.83 The courts have been far 
from uniform in addressing this issue. As discussed earlier,84 for many 
claims arising from sexual abuse, whether an “occurrence” has transpired 
frequently is determined according to whether the injury caused by the 
sexual misconduct was “expected or intended from the viewpoint of the 
insured.”  This test is derived from the final clause of the “occurrence” 
definition, requiring that the injury has been neither “expected” nor 
“intended.” 
                                                                                                                 
82 See generally infra Part II.B (involving the molester-insured); infra Part 
II.C.2 (involving the supervisor-insured).  
83 See supra note 33 and accompanying text.    
84 See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
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 Only a few cases across the country have comprehensively 
analyzed whether liability insurers can defeat coverage by asserting that, 
based on their knowledge of the circumstances, an employer or supervisor 
“expected or intended” injury to a sexual molestation victim.85  One 
commentator notes that some courts have applied an objective standard of 
what a reasonable supervisor-insured “knew or should have known,” 
involving the “substantial probability” that certain consequences would 
result; while other courts have applied a subjective standard involving what 
a particular supervisor-insured actually “knew or believed.”86     
 A prime example of this objective standard is the case of Diocese 
of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co. et al.87   The particular 
circumstances surrounding this liability insurance coverage dispute 
involved a pedophilic priest, Father Adamson, who subjected several 
children to prolonged periods of sexual molestation.88    The plaintiff, 
Mrozka, sued the Diocese and Archdiocese, alleging they negligently and 
recklessly supervised Adamson, allowing Adamson to sexually abuse 
Mrozka when he was a minor.  Both the Diocese and the Archdiocese 
conceded negligence, but disputed their recklessness.  “The jury awarded 
Mrozka $821,250 in compensatory damages and, finding recklessness, 
awarded $2,700,000 in punitive damages,” a punitive damage award that 
was later reduced to $187,000.89  The Minnesota Court of Appeals 
previously had found sufficient evidence “from which the jury could 
conclude that Church officials repeatedly and knowingly placed Adamson 
in situations where he could sexually abuse boys and then failed to properly 
supervise him and disclose his sexual problem.”90  
 During the period Mrozka was sexually abused by Father 
Adamson, the Diocese and the Archdiocese had standard occurrence-based 
Commercial General Liability (CGL) policies from various insurers 
covering, among other things, “an accident, including continuous or 
                                                                                                                 
85 See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 4, at 50. 
86 Id. 
87 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 
1996) (applying Minn. law). 
88 See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 858 F. Supp. 1407 (D. 
Minn. 1994) (detailing facts surrounding Father Adamson’s accused sexual 
molestation); Mrozka v. Archdiocese of St. Paul & Minneapolis, 482 N.W.2d 806 
(Minn. Ct. App. 1992) (same).  
89 89 F.3d at 1389.   
90 482 N.W.2d at 813. 
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repeated exposure to conditions, which results in personal injury . . . which 
is neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”91 
 The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals stated that although “an 
insured has a reasonable expectation in securing a CGL policy that the 
policy will cover some negligent acts, it does not necessarily follow that all 
negligent acts are covered.”92  Accordingly: 
 
[t]he issue then is whether a reasonably prudent person in 
the position of the Diocese and the Archdiocese knew or 
should have known that Adamson’s abuse of Mrozka was 
substantially probable as a result of the continuing 
exposure caused by their willful indifference. In defining 
substantial probability, this court has stated, “[t]he 
indications must be strong enough to alert a reasonably 
prudent man not only to the possibility of the results 
occurring but the indications also must be sufficient to 
forewarn him that the results are highly likely to occur.”93  
 
The case therefore was remanded to the federal district court to enter 
judgment in accordance with this objective “reasonable person” 
standard.94   
 On the other hand, an example of a subjective or “particular 
insured” standard is found in the case of Roman Catholic Bishop of San 
Diego v. Superior Court,95 where a parish priest, Father Omemaga, 
sexually abused 15-year-old Jane D. The plaintiff alleged that the Roman 
Catholic diocese and church negligently hired, retained, and supervised 
Omemaga, since it knew or should have known of his dangerous 
propensities as a sexual exploiter of children.   
 
The church moved for summary judgment on the basis 
[that] it was not negligent because it did not know and had 
no reason to suspect Omemaga posed any risk to 
parishioners prior to Jane’s report.  In essence, the church 
argued it had no civil duty to investigate its employees and 
the constitutional requirement separating church and state 
                                                                                                                 
91 89 F.3d at 1389-91 (emphasis added).    
92 Id. at 1392 (emphasis added).  
93 Id. at 1391 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
94 Id. at 1399. 
95 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 399 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). 
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barred Jane’s civil action for negligent hiring and 
supervision of a priest.96  
 
 As evidence of negligent hiring and negligent supervision of Father 
Omemaga, the plaintiff submitted Bishop Robert Brom’s interrogatory 
response stating that “depending on whether a priest is new to the Diocese 
or whether he is known within the Diocese, the Chancellor of the Diocese 
may ask priests … whether they have any past or present problems with 
their celibacy, and whether anyone has ever made a claim of sexual 
misconduct against them.” And “[a]lthough there were no detailed 
guidelines how a priest demonstrates his fitness,” Father Thomas Doyle, a 
canon law expert, and an expert in the field of sexual abuse of children by 
clergy, testified “it is expected that a host bishop make specific inquiries as 
to the priest’s background, his work record, and his character” and “Doyle 
expected bishops to be ‘much more careful and even scrupulous when 
investigating the qualifications of priests who will work in their 
dioceses.”97 Moreover, there was also evidence that Omemaga had two 
prior sexual relationships in the Philippines, and one sexual relationship in 
San Diego with a parishioner, and Jane’s attorney argued that the church 
was negligent in hiring Omemaga because, as part of the screening process, 
the church failed to ask him “whether he had problems with his vows of 
celibacy.”98  
 Nevertheless, the California Court of Appeal observed that Jane D. 
did not have an actionable negligent hiring, negligent retention, or 
negligent supervision claim against the Diocese under a subjective 
“particular insured” standard.  Opined the court: “Even if the church had 
learned of Omemaga’s prior sexual affairs with adults, it is illogical to 
conclude the church should have anticipated Omemaga would commit 
sexual crimes on a minor.”99 The decision demonstrates how the subjective 
standard varies from the objective standard exemplified in cases such as 
Diocese of Winona.  As one commentator notes, in jurisdictions that apply 
                                                                                                                 
96 Id. at 400-01.   
97 Id. at 403. 
98 Id. at 401, 405. 
99 Id. at 405.  But query:  Why is it so “illogical” that a priest who has broken 
his vow of celibacy with adults may also break his vow of celibacy with minors as 
well?  See also Mark K. v. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Los Angeles, 79 Cal. 
Rtpr. 2d 73 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) (holding that in an action for negligent retention 
and negligent supervision of a priest who sexually molested a child, the 
archdiocese failed to warn the victim of the priest’s propensity for engaging in 
sexual misconduct with boys). 
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this subjective standard, “even the egregious facts in Diocese of Winona 
likely would not be sufficient to trigger the expected or intended exclusion” 
to liability insurance coverage.100 
 Which is the better-reasoned interpretive approach—the objective 
standard as illustrated in the Diocese of Winona case, supra, or the 
subjective standard as illustrated in the Bishop of San Diego case, supra? 
 It is submitted that the objective standard clearly is the better-
reasoned interpretive approach for four compelling reasons:   
 First, the claims of negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and 
negligent retention brought against church organizations and their 
supervisors for the sexual abuse of minors by priests or other clergymen all 
sound in negligence which traditionally is based upon an objective 
“reasonable person” standard of care.101  Moreover, in a liability insurance 
context involving claims of negligence, a court generally applies an “eight 
corners rule”—that is, the court will compare the “four corners” of the 
underlying tort complaint with the “four corners” of the insurance policy to 
determine coverage.102 
Second, the “objective” or “classic tort” standard for determining 
intentional acts in liability insurance coverage disputes, or alternately the 
“inferred intent” standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases, is 
generally recognized in an overwhelming majority of states as opposed to 
the minority “subjective” or “particular insured” standard, based upon 
strong public policy reasons.103  
 Third, a substantial majority of courts have now recognized that the 
crucial underlying requirement in negligent hiring, negligent retention, and 
negligent supervision of clergy cases largely is based upon whether the 
priest or clergyman’s supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other 
                                                                                                                 
100 Weinstein, supra note 4, at 50. 
101 The law of negligence generally imposes on each person an obligation to 
conform to a reasonable person of ordinary prudence standard, an objective 
standard that is now well-established in American negligence law. See, e.g., W. 
PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32 (W. Page 
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984); see also DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 258 
(2000). 
102 See, e.g., Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) 
(finding no duty to defend the insured in a sexual molestation case). 
103 See generally infra Part II.B. 
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religious organization knew or should have known of the sexual offender’s 
abuse toward minors—which, again, is an objective standard.104  
 Fourth, and of primary importance, the crucial causation 
requirement in both tort law and insurance contract law also requires the 
application of an objective “efficient or predominant cause” interpretive 
analysis, as is discussed in more detail directly below.  
 
3. Reassessing the Crucial Causation Requirement in 
Liability Insurance Coverage Disputes Involving Sexual 
Abuse of Minors 
 
The causation requirement is a crucial factor in both tort law105 and 
insurance law,106 especially involving liability insurance coverage disputes.   
                                                                                                                 
104 See Cooke, supra note 4, at 1063 (“If a reasonably prudent person in the 
position of the Church would expect or should expect that an employee is a danger 
to innocent life, the church should bear responsibility for all resulting liability.”). 
105 According to Professor William Lloyd Prosser, to establish a bona fide tort 
action sounding in negligence, the plaintiff must plead and prove: (1) that the 
defendant owed plaintiff a duty of due care to act in a reasonable manner toward 
the plaintiff; (2) that defendant breached this duty of due care to the plaintiff; (3) 
that defendant’s acts were the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct 
and the resulting injury; that is to say, it was the cause in fact and the proximate 
cause of plaintiff’s injury or loss; and (4) actual damage or loss occurred to the 
plaintiff as a result of defendant’s actions.  See, e.g., Keeton, supra note 101, at 
164-65.  The proposed RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 6 cmt. b (2010) states 
that there are five elements to any prima facie case in negligence: (1) “duty”; (2) 
“failure to exercise reasonable care”; (3) “factual cause”; (4) “physical harm”; and 
(5) “harm within the scope of liability (which historically has been called 
‘proximate cause’)” (emphasis added). 
106 In an insurance law context, Professor Banks McDowell argues that the 
following four factors need to be considered: (1) the coverage provisions of an 
insurance policy; (2) the occurrence of the event; (3) the loss or damage; and (4) 
the causal “connector” between the event and the loss. Banks McDowell, 
Causation in Contracts and Insurance, 20 CONN. L. REV. 569, 575 (1988) 
(emphasis added).  McDowell goes on to state that causation “should be limited to 
the connector between what, consistent with insurance terminology, may be called 
an ‘occurrence,’ and the loss suffered by the insured . . . .” Id. at 575-76. See also 
Sidney I. Simon, Proximate Cause in Insurance, 10 AM. BUS. L.J. 33, 35-36 
(1972) (“The insurance rule is that only the proximate cause of the loss, and not the 
remote cause, is to be regarded in determining whether recovery may be had under 
an insurance policy, and the loss must have been proximately caused by a peril 
insured against. . . . The proximate cause of loss or damage to an insured’s 
property or injury to his person is not necessarily the last link in the chain of 
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 In an insurance law context, the courts are split on whether to apply 
causation rules recognizing either: (1) the cause nearest the loss;107 or (2) 
the efficient or predominant cause of the loss.108  As one of the authors of 
this article previously has observed: 
 
A growing number of American courts … have rejected a 
strict immediate cause rule in favor of an efficient or 
dominant proximate cause rule, analogous to a tort-based 
proximate cause rule, in order to validate the reasonable 
expectations of the insured policyholder to coverage. 
Under this reasonable expectations hybrid of tort and 
contract causation law, there will be coverage if a risk of 
loss that is specifically insured against in the insurance 
policy sets in motion, in an unbroken causal sequence, the 
events that cause the ultimate loss, even though the last 
immediate cause in the chain of causation is an excluded 
cause.109 
                                                                                                                 
preceding events, but the procuring, efficient cause from which the effect might be 
expected to follow without concurrence of any unforeseen circumstances.”).       
107 See. e.g., Queen Ins. Co. of Am. v. Globe & Rutgers Fire Ins. Co., 263 U.S. 
487, 492 (1924) (involving a war risk marine insurance policy) (“[T]he common 
understanding is that in construing these [insurance] policies we are not to take 
broad views but generally are to stop our inquiries with the cause nearest to the 
loss.”); Pan Am. World Airways, Inc. v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 505 F.2d 989, 
1007 (2d Cir. 1974) (applying N.Y. law) (involving aviation insurance) (“These 
cases establish a mechanical test of proximate causation for insurance cases, a test 
that looks only to the ‘causes nearest to the loss.’”).  See also Bruener v. Turin City 
Fire Ins. Co., 222 P.2d 833, 834-35 (Wash. 1950) (involving automobile 
insurance) (similar holding), overruled by Graham v. Pub. Emps. Mut. Ins. Co., 
656 P.2d 1077, 1081 (Wash. 1983) (involving a homeowners insurance coverage 
dispute) (adopted the efficient or predominant proximate cause rule). 
108 See, e.g., TNT Speed & Sport Ctr., Inc. v. Am. States Ins. Co., 114 F.3d 
731, 733 (8th Cir. 1997) (applying Mo. law) (involving commercial property 
insurance); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Roberts, 697 A.2d 667 (Vt. 1997) 
(involving automobile insurance). See generally Stempel, supra note 7, § 7.02; 
Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, § 67[b]. 
109 Peter Nash Swisher, Causation Requirements in Tort and Insurance Law 
Practice: Demystifying Some Legal Causation “Riddles”, 43 TORT TRIAL & INS. 
PRAC. L.J. 1, 23-24 (2007) (citing as authority Graham, 656 P.2d at 1081 (Wash. 
1983) (involving homeowners insurance)).  See also John Drennon & Sons Co. v. 
N.H. Ins. Co., 637 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Mo. Ct. App. 1982) (involving machinery and 
equipment insurance).    
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 This is especially true with liability insurance coverage issues, 
since in order to determine  
 
whether an insurer has a duty to defend [or provide 
coverage for] its insured in a lawsuit, a court should 
generally apply an “eight corners rule”—that is, the court 
should compare the four corners of the underlying tort 
complaint with the four corners of the insurance policy and 
determine whether the facts alleged in the underlying 
complaint fall within, or potentially within, the insurance 
policy’s coverage.110 
 
 Next, this crucial causation “connector” requires proof by the 
plaintiff of the probability of harm—rather than a mere “possibility” of 
harm—based upon defendant’s conduct toward the plaintiff.111 
 Finally, when two or more defendants actively cause the plaintiff 
harm, most courts will apply a “substantial factor” test, which holds that 
those defendants who were a “substantial factor” and constituted the 
“efficient or predominant cause” of the ultimate harm to the plaintiff, 
within an unbroken casual chain of events, will be the cause-in-fact and the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff’s injuries.112 This “efficient or predominant 
                                                                                                                 
 If the clergy sexual abuse was the “efficient or predominant cause” of the 
injury, and if it is excluded from coverage under an intentional acts exclusion in 
the policy, then the insured will not be able to recover under the liability insurance 
policy.  This same result would also occur under “the cause nearest the loss” 
interpretive analysis.   
110 Pekin Ins. Co. v. Dial, 823 N.E.2d 986, 990 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (finding 
there was no duty to defend the insured in a sexual molestation action).  
111 See generally Keeton, supra note 101, at 269-72; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) 
OF TORTS §§ 430-433 (1965). See, e.g., Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & 
Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1391 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying Minn. law) (“The issue 
then is whether a reasonably prudent person in the position of the Diocese and the 
Archdiocese knew or should have known that Adamson’s abuse of Mrozka was 
substantially probable as a result of the continuing [clergy sexual abuse] exposure 
caused by their willful indifference.  In defining substantial probability, this court 
has stated, ‘[t]he indications must be strong enough to alert a reasonably prudent 
man not only to the possibility of the results occurring but the indications also must 
be sufficient to forewarn him that the results are highly likely to occur.’”) (citations 
omitted). 
112 See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 431, 432(2), 433, 435 
(1965).  See generally Dobbs, supra note 101, at 414-17, 447-51; Keeton, supra 
note 101, at 263-68.    
2011 CLERGY SEXUAL ABUSE CASES 389 
cause” analysis is recognized in an insurance law context as well.113  But in 
a liability insurance context, what “efficient or predominant cause” would 
(or would not) constitute an “occurrence” in a causal chain of events 
involving more than one defendant?  
 Since few cases to date have comprehensively analyzed whether 
liability insurers can defeat coverage by asserting that a church 
organization, employer, or supervisor negligently “knew or should have 
known” of the “expected or intended” injuries to a sexual molestation 
victim initially caused by a priest or clergyman, especially from a 
necessary causation perspective, we need to analyze some analogous 
liability insurance cases dealing with this crucial causation requirement. 
 For example, in the analogous case of Farmers Alliance Mutual 
Insurance Co. v. Salazar,114 a homeowner’s insurer brought a declaratory 
judgment action, seeking judicial determination that it had no obligation to 
defend or indemnify either the insured son, Manuel Corrales, for his 
negligent entrustment of his gun to a fellow gang member, or the insured 
mother, Ofelia Salazar, for her negligent supervision of her 16-year-old son 
Manuel, based on wrongful death claims arising out of her son’s 
participation in the murder of another boy, Thomas Byus.115   
 The insurance company’s “duty to defend and indemnify Ms. 
Salazar and Manuel Corrales turns on whether Thomas Byus’s death was a 
‘bodily injury . . . caused by an occurrence’” under the homeowners’ 
liability insurance coverage.  Farmers Alliance Insurance Company argued 
that the murder of Thomas Byus, by firing the bullet into his head, was the 
event that must qualify as an “occurrence.”  Byus’s administrator in this 
wrongful death action, however, “asks us to cast our focus further up the 
causal chain to Ms. Salazar’s negligent supervision of Manuel and 
Manuel’s negligent entrustment of the murder weapon to Jacob De 
LaCruz.”116 
 In a case of first impression, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
applying Oklahoma law, stated: 
 
Our search for “occurrence” policy case law addressing a 
causal chain that begins with a negligent act or omission 
                                                                                                                 
113 See generally Jerry & Richmond, supra note 7, § 67[b]; Stempel, supra 
note 7, § 7.02; see also Keeton, supra note 100, § 82 (Liability Insurance and its 
Impact on Tort Law). 
114 77 F.3d 1291 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying Okla. law). 
115 Id. at 1293-94.  
116 Id. at 1295. 
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and ends with an intentional tort has uncovered the 
decisional equivalent of a famine.  We have located no 
cases addressing the issue facing us today.  Therefore, we 
begin our analysis with cases that might help by analogy or 
deduction.  Of the scores of decisions interpreting 
“occurrence” policies, two categories of cases prove 
particularly instructive. The first category answers the 
question of when an “occurrence” happens, and the second 
focuses on where.117 
 
 The court then discussed the generally prevailing rule, recognized 
by most courts, that “the time of an ‘occurrence’ generally is determined by 
‘the time the complaining party was actually damaged,’” and “the location 
of an ‘occurrence’ is determined by the place where the injury happened;  it 
does not matter that a precipitating event took place elsewhere.”118   
Although these cases did not address the court’s causal link issue directly, 
the court found their reasoning to be dispositive. Accordingly, the court 
held in determining whether a bodily injury was “‘caused by an 
occurrence’ the question of whether there was an ‘occurrence’ should be 
resolved by focusing on the injury and its immediately attendant causative 
circumstances.”119  
 Based upon the facts of this particular case, the “occurrence” was 
when and where Jacob De La Cruz murdered Thomas Byus, which was an 
intentional act, and therefore it could not qualify as an “accident . . . [that 
was] neither expected nor intended from the standpoint of the insured.”120  
Consequently, the court concluded that it “need not reach the issue of 
whether Ms. Salazar or Manuel Corrales actually intended or expected 
Thomas Byus’s death, because intentional murder is not ‘an accident’ 
under the insurance policy’s ‘occurrence’ provision.”121 
This same legal argument might also be applied in a liability 
insurance context when a priest or clergyman intentionally sexually abuses 
                                                                                                                 
117 Id. 
118 Id. at 1296 (citation omitted). 
119 Id. 
120 Salazar, 77 F.3d at 1297. 
121 Id.  Although the court did not directly address the negligent supervision 
allegation involving Ms. Salazar in this particular case, the court may also have 
utilized the same causation analysis found in analogous cases interpreting “Liquor 
Liability Exclusions” or “Assault and Battery Exclusions” as discussed below.  See 
supra notes 95-103 and accompanying text. 
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a minor, which clearly is not an “accidental” occurrence under the policy 
coverage provisions.122 
 Other analogous cases have dealt with “Liquor Liability 
Exclusions” or “Assault and Battery Exclusions,” which are conceptually 
similar to the “Intentional Act Exclusions” involved in clergy sexual abuse 
claims. For example, in the case of Property Owners Ins. Co. v. Ted’s 
Tavern, Inc.,123 a tavern’s commercial general liability (CGL) insurance 
policy contained an exclusion—exclusion 2(c)—concerning bodily injury 
resulting from causing or contributing to the intoxication of a person, or 
furnishing alcoholic drinks to someone who was under the influence of 
alcohol.124 When a motorist was killed by a drunk patron, who was driving 
home from the tavern, the personal representative of the deceased motorist 
brought a wrongful death action against the tavern’s liability insurance 
carrier, arguing that the Ted’s Tavern and its employees were liable under 
the CGL policy for their negligent hiring, negligence training, and 
negligent supervision, rather than coming under the policy’s liquor liability 
exclusion 2(c).  But the Indiana Court of Appeals disagreed with the 
plaintiff’s argument, based upon relevant legal causation principles: 
 
Regardless of the theories of liability a resourceful 
attorney may fashion from the circumstances of this case, 
the allegations [of negligently hiring, training, and 
supervising the tavern employees] are general 
“rephrasings” of the core negligence claim for 
causing/contributing to [the patron’s] drunk driving. The 
events outlined in [the plaintiff’s complaint] simply are 
not wholly independent of “carelessly and negligently” 
serving and continuing to serve alcoholic beverages to [the 
impaired patron] when the defendants knew or should have 
known he was intoxicated and soon thereafter could be 
driving drunk. To the contrary, the… negligent hiring, 
training, and supervision are so inextricably intertwined 
with the underlying negligence [under the liquor liability 
exclusion] that there is no independent act that would 
avoid exclusion 2(c).  Hence, while a valiant effort to 
procure coverage, the creative pleadings of [negligent 
hiring, negligent training, and negligent supervision of the 
                                                                                                                 
122 See supra notes 64-81 and accompanying text. 
123 853 N.E.2d 973 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). 
124 Id. at 978. 
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employees] cannot hide the reality that the immediate and 
efficient cause of the injuries was drunk driving 
precipitated by the negligent service of alcohol.  As such, 
exclusion 2(c) precludes coverage.125  
 
Thus, the Ted’s Tavern court adopted an “efficient or predominant 
cause” analysis, where the liquor liability exclusion—exclusion 2(c)—
barred any recovery from the liability insurance company, since the related 
allegations of negligent hiring, negligent training, and negligent 
supervision were not wholly independent of, and were inextricably 
intertwined with, the liquor liability exclusion. 
Allegations of misconduct have been deemed to be 
“interdependent” with a negligence claim when the negligence claim 
incorporated the facts alleged to support deliberate misconduct.126  Thus, 
for example, if Count I of the complaint alleges that the insured knew the 
molester presented a high level of risk of injury to children, and Count II of 
the complaint “incorporates and realleges” the facts set forth in Count I, 
then the court may conclude that the “negligence” count reflects an 
“expectation” of harm as well. 
This holding is consistent with decisions from other jurisdictions as 
well.127  A Delaware court, for example, considered a case in which, 
following the forcible removal of a patron from an amusement park, the 
patron sued the park alleging assault, battery, false imprisonment, and 
‘injury with ill will, intent to injure or malice,” and also pled “negligent 
supervision.”128    The court observed: “where negligence claims against an 
employer such as negligent hiring, negligent training, and negligent 
entrustment, are related to and interdependent on the intentional 
misconduct of an employee, the “ultimate question” for coverage purposes 
is whether the employee’s intentional misconduct itself falls within the 
definition of ‘occurrence.’”  Likewise, a Missouri court observed, in an 
action against a bar owner for injuries inflicted by intoxicated patrons, that: 
                                                                                                                 
125 Id. at 983 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). See also Scottsdale Ins. Co. 
v. Lankford, No. 07C-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL 4150212 (Del. Super. Ct. Nov. 21, 
2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008) (similar holding). 
126 See, e.g., Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co., 666 
S.E.2d 897, 900 (S.C. 2008).   
127 See Bituminous Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v.  Huttu, No. 4:06CV67TSL-
LAA, 2007 WL 188661, at *1 (S.D. Miss. Jan. 23, 2007). 
128 TIG Ins. Co. v. Premier Parks, No. Civ.A02C04126JRS, 2004 WL 728858 
(Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004). 
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The damages arise from the assault and battery.  Without 
the underlying assault and battery, there would have been 
no injury and therefore no basis for plaintiffs’ action 
against Harverfield for negligence.  The assault and battery 
and Haverfield’s negligence are not mutually exclusive; 
rather the acts are related and interdependent.129 
 
Courts in Texas have applied this doctrine in several other cases as well.130   
When a supervisor’s liability is stated to be on account of its own 
negligence, but this negligence is alleged to be interrelated with deliberate 
misconduct, the deliberate misconduct, according to these courts, becomes 
determinative.131  When the negligent hiring or negligent supervision 
claims require “proof of misconduct” by the offender, the only question is 
whether the offender’s acts are covered under the definition of 
“occurrence.”132 
Accordingly, an emerging line of cases persuasively hold that 
when the insured’s liability is “related to and interdependent on other 
tortious activities,” the nature of that other tortious activity will determine 
whether the insurance policy covers the insured supervisor.133  In Mt. 
Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Stagebands, for example, claims of “negligent 
design” (of a parking lot) did not permit a finding that injury was expected 
or intended.  The court observed: 
 
There is no question Cortes’s injuries were caused by the 
gun-shot – even if the parking layout was an after-the-fact 
contributing and worsening cause.  In sum, the fact that 
[the insureds’] parking design negligence may have 
                                                                                                                 
129 Hunt v. Capitol Indem. Corp., 26 S.W.3d 341, 345 (Mo. Ct. App. 2000).   
130 See State Farm Lloyds v. Borum, 53 S.W.3d 887 (Tex. App. 2001); Folsom 
Invs. Inc. v. Am. Motorists Ins. Co., 265 S.W.3d 556, 559 (Tex. App. 2000). 
131 Cornhill Ins. PLC v. Valsamis, Inc., 106 F.3d 80, 87 (5th Cir. 1997) 
(applying Tex. law) (citing to N.Y. Life Ins. Co. v. Travelers Ins. Co., 92 F.3d 336 
(5th Cir. 1996) (applying Tex. law)).   
132 Id. 
133 See Am. States Ins. Co. v. Bailey, 133 F.3d 363, 371 (5th Cir. 1998) 
(applying Tex. law); Cornhill, 106 F.3d at 87 (no duty to defend employer for 
negligent hiring and failure to provide safe workplace where employee sexually 
harassed another employee); cf. Mount Vernon Fire Ins. Co. v. Stagebands Inc., 
636 F. Supp. 2d 143 (D. R.I. 2009).  
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affected [the victim] after he was shot does not make it 
unrelated and independent of the assault.134  
  
When courts have applied this analysis to negligent supervision claims in 
the context of sexual abuse and molestation, they have held that the 
resulting injury was not an “occurrence” within the meaning of a general 
liability insurance policy:  
 
If [the perpetrator] had not sexually molested the Isbell 
daughters, Linda Isbell would have no claim for damages 
against [the mother-defendant].  Thus, we find [her] 
liability to be ‘related to and interdependent on’ the 
tortious acts of [the perpetrator].  Because [the 
perpetrator’s] underlying acts are not encompassed within 
the definition of ‘occurrence,’ [the insurer] has no duty to 
defend.135 
 
These decisions reason that negligent hiring and supervision, in and of 
themselves, are not actionable, and hence immaterial, absent the non-
accidental act of molestation.   
Other cases are in accord with this persuasive and compelling 
causation analysis. For example, in the case of Terra Nova Insurance Co. v. 
Nanticoke Pines, Ltd.,136 a liability insurer brought an action seeking a 
declaratory judgment that it had no obligation to defend or indemnify its 
insured tavern keeper for claims asserted by Kevin Gibbs, who was shot by 
the tavern’s security officer, John Hargett. The plaintiff argued that the 
liability insurance coverage was premised on the negligent hiring and the 
negligent supervision of the tavern’s security guard under the doctrine of 
respondeat superior.137  The insurer argued, however, that it was not liable 
under its “assault and battery” exclusion in the policy. 
 
 The federal district court, applying Delaware law, held that:  
                                                                                                                 
134 Stagebands, 636 F. Supp. 2d. at 148-49. 
135 Am. Nat. Gen. Ins. Cos. v. Ryan, 274 F.3d 319, 325 (5th Cir. 2001) 
(applying Tex. law); accord W. Am. Ins. Co. v. Embry, No. Civ.A. 3:04CV-47-H, 
2005 WL 1026185 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 25,  2005); Nw. G.F. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Norgard, 
518 N.W.2d 179, 184 (N.D. 1994).   
136 743 F. Supp. 293 (D. Del. 1990).    
137 Id. at 294. 
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based on the assault and battery exclusion, the complaint 
does not allege a risk covered by the policy…. [T]he plain 
language of the exclusion bars coverage for any claim 
based on assault and battery….All the issues the complaint 
raises about Nanticoke’s negligence and recklessness 
[including allegations of negligent hiring and negligent 
supervision] concern conduct of Nanticoke that helped 
make the assault possible, and are thus fundamentally 
premised on the assault itself.138  
 
 Delaware’s “fundamentally premised” causation analysis is 
essentially the same as the “efficient or predominant cause” analysis 
adopted in the Ted’s Tavern case, supra,139 and a number of other cases 
also are in accord with this generally accepted causation analysis.140 
On the other hand, policyholders might contend that the “expected 
or intended” clause is not offended by affording coverage to a supervisor-
insured, given that, in such a case, “the insured” claiming coverage is not 
the perpetrator. The Terra Nova court noted, without deciding, this 
particular distinction.141  Also, an Ohio court recently opined: “[T]orts like 
negligent supervision, hiring, retention, and entrustment are separate and 
distinct from the related intentional torts (committed by other actors) that 
make the negligent torts actionable.  Thus, in determining whether a policy 
exclusion precludes coverage for that negligent act, we must examine the 
injuries arising from the negligent act on their own accord, not as part of 
the intentional act.”142  The court reasoned that the negligent act, standing 
alone, was the “occurrence.”  
Insurers might respond that, given the inevitable presence of 
supervisors in connection with any such claim under a commercial liability 
                                                                                                                 
138 Id. at 297 (emphasis added). 
139 See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Lankford, No. 07C-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL 
4150212, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. 2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008).    
140 See, e.g., Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. Thee Kandy Store Inc., 679 F. Supp. 476, 
478 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (“Regardless of the language of the allegations, the original 
cause of the harm arose from an alleged assault and battery”); Terra Nova Ins. Co. 
v. North Carolina Ted, Inc., 715 F. Supp. 688, 691 (E.D. Pa. 1989) (similar 
holding); see generally Kimberly J. Winbush, Annotation, Validity, Construction, 
and Effect of Assault and Battery Exclusion in Liability Insurance Policy at Issue, 
44 A.L.R. 5TH 91 (1996) (reporting that the vast majority of cases are in accord 
with this general causation principle).    
141 Nanticoke Pines, 743 F. Supp. at 298 n. 9. 
142 Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426, 434 (Ohio 2009). 
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policy issued to an organization, the “fundamentally premised” doctrine 
properly serves to avoid nullifying the “expected or intended” clause.  
Further, courts applying the “fundamentally premised doctrine” to 
exclusions, consistently have supported their decisions as necessary to 
defeat “artful pleading” by underlying plaintiffs.143  As stated in a decision 
recently affirmed by the Delaware Supreme Court in Lankford v. Scottsdale 
Insurance Co., “[t]he purpose of Delaware’s ‘fundamentally premised’ 
analysis is to prevent an injured party from circumventing the clear terms 
of an insurance policy by allying with the insured and by fashioning 
expansive theories of liability.”144  The Lankford  court cited an American 
Law Reports annotation’s recognition of “the anomalous legal posture of 
an insured and a victim, adversaries in one case, siding against an insurer 
seeking to apply an … exclusion to the litigated claims.”145   
In Nationwide Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Lajoie, for example, the 
Vermont Supreme Court rejected a claim for “negligent infliction of 
emotional distress” arising from the insured’s alleged sexual abuse of a 
minor as “simply a disingenuous attempt to create a factual dispute.”146  
Courts should seek to prevent the absurdity, and possible fraud upon the 
court, that might result if the law were to allow a superficial claim of 
“negligence” to supersede factual allegations that reveal intentional and 
deliberate conduct by the insured.147 
 Accordingly, this “efficient or predominant cause” interpretive 
analysis may be applied—and, indeed, should be applied—to clergy sexual 
abuse claims.  For example, a number of courts have held that various 
churches, bishops, dioceses, and other religious organizations may be held 
tortiously liable for their negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or 
negligent retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman if the church, 
bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or should have known 
of the priest’s or clergyman’s sexual misconduct.148   But in a liability 
insurance context, if this negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or 
negligent retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman was so 
inextricably intertwined with, interdependent, and not independent of, the 
priest or clergyman’s sexual misconduct—which was excluded under the 
                                                                                                                 
143 See, e.g., Winbush, supra note 140. 
144 See, e.g., Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Lankford, No. 076-06-254 RRC, 2007 WL 
4150212, at *8 (Del. Super. 2007), aff’d, 947 A.2d 1121 (Del. 2008). 
145 Id. at *8 n.47 (citing Winbush, supra note 140, at 91). 
146 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Lajoie, 661 A.2d 85, 86 (Vt. 1995).   
147 The distinction between actual “negligence” and the mere labeling of a 
claim as “negligence” is discussed in further detail below. See infra Part II.E. 
148  See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text. 
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liability insurance policy’s intentional act exclusion, and which was the 
“efficient or predominant cause” of the plaintiff’s sexual abuse claim—then 
the supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization 
should not  be covered by its liability insurer under generally accepted tort 
and insurance law cause-in-fact and proximate cause causation 
principles.149 
 Consequently, if a priest or clergyman sexually abuses a minor, 
this sexual abuse generally will be barred under a liability insurance 
policy’s “expected or intended” exclusion, under either an objective or 
“classic tort” analysis,150 or under an “inferred intent” standard as applied 
to child sexual abuse cases.151 Likewise, if a supervisory church, diocese, 
bishop, or other religious organization objectively knew or should have 
known of the priest’s or clergyman’s sexual abuse of a minor—which was 
the “efficient or predominant cause” of the minor’s sexual abuse claim—
and this negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of the sexually abusive 
priest or clergyman was connected to and was not independent from the 
priest or clergyman’s sexual misconduct, then liability insurance should not 
cover such negligence under relevant cause-in-fact and proximate cause 
principles either.   
 
4. What is “Expected” Injury, and Does “Expected” have a 
Meaning Independent from “Intended”? 
 
 As discussed above, the question whether an insured “intended” 
injury has been regarded by a significant number of courts as governed by 
an “objective” standard or, with children, an “inferred intent” standard.152   
If a reasonable person would have foreseen injury, then, consistent with tort 
law precedent, the insured’s state of mind will be deemed to reflect intent. 
                                                                                                                 
149 See supra notes 82-103 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Diocese of 
Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 1996) (applying 
Minn. law); see also Am. Commerce Ins. Co. v. Porto, 811 A.2d 1185 (R.I. 2002) 
(holding that a separate negligent supervision claim was not covered since it was 
causally connected to the sexual molestation of a child, which was excluded from 
coverage under the parties’ homeowners insurance policy).  This same result 
would apply if a particular jurisdiction applies a more traditional “cause nearest the 
loss” interpretive analysis, rather than applying the modern and majority “efficient 
or predominant cause” interpretive analysis.     
150 See supra notes 41-44 and accompanying text. 
151 See supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text. 
152 See infra Part II.B. 
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In interpreting “expected” or “intended” provisions, however, the 
“expected” prong, inexplicably, is often overlooked.  Yet it is as much an 
interpretive hurdle to a finding of coverage as the requirement that the 
injury would not have been “intended.”  Thus, even when the injury was 
not “intended,” a second question still remains: If injury was not 
“intended,” might it nevertheless have been “expected”?   The answer is 
“yes,” when supported by operative facts, according to those courts that 
have given independent meaning to both terms: i.e., “expected,” as well as 
“intended.”  
Some decisions, it should be noted, have deemed “expected” to be 
synonymous with “intended.”153  A few courts have assumed there is no 
difference between the terms “expected” and “intended” in determining 
whether the “intentional acts exclusion” applies.154  Other courts, however, 
have concluded that the terms “expected” and “intended” are not 
synonymous.155  It has been observed: “Determining a person’s expectation 
involves a different inquiry than does determining his or her intent.”156  If 
only “intention” needed to be considered, the use of the word ‘expected’ 
would be mere surplusage, which is a result to be avoided in 
interpretation.”157   
Generally speaking, an insured “expects an injury if he or she is 
subjectively aware that injury is substantially certain to result.”158  
                                                                                                                 
153 See, e.g., Poston v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9, 11-12 (Wis. Ct. 
App. 1982).    
154 See, e.g., Grange Mut. Cas. Co. v. Thomas, 301 So.2d 158 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1974); Jones v. Norval, 279 N.W.2d 388  (Neb. 1979); State v. Glens Falls 
Ins. Co., 404 A.2d 101 (Vt. 1979); Poston v. U. S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 320 N.W.2d 9 
(Wis. Ct. App. 1982).    
155 See, e.g., Badger Mut. Ins. Co. v. Murry, 370 N.E.2d 295, 299-300 (Ill. Ct. 
App. 1977) (pointing out that if “intended” and “expected” were synonymous, 
there would be no point in including them both within the language of the 
intentional act exclusion); see also Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 
1052 (8th Cir. 1979) (applying Iowa law); Armstrong Cleaners, Inc. v. Erie Ins. 
Exch., 364 F. Supp. 2d 797 (S.D. Ind. 2005); Farm Bureau Town & Country Ins. 
Co. of Mo. v. Turnbo, 740 S.W.2d 232 (Mo. Ct. App. 1987); Nw. Nat. Cas. Co. v. 
Phalen, 597 P.2d 720 (Mont. 1979); Seymour v. Lenoir Cnty., 567 S.E.2d 799 
(N.C. Ct. App. 2002); Abrams v. Gen. Star Indem. Co., 67 P.3d 931 (Or. 2003).    
156 N. Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 156, 158 (Vt. 2001) (citing City of 
Burlington v. Ass’n of Gas and Electric Ins. Serv., LTD., 751 A.2d 284, 288 (Vt. 
2000)); Espinet v. Horvath, 597 A.2d 307, 310 (Vt. 1991). 
157 Horvath, 597 A.2d at 310; see also Phalen, 597 P.2d at 726.   
158 Perron, 777 A.2d at 158 (citing Horvath, 597 A.2d at 310); accord Jenkins 
v. Koester, No. 268175 2007 WL 2429846, at *1 (Mich. Ct. App. Aug. 28, 2007); 
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However, given that the insured rarely will concede that he or she expected 
harm, the analysis usually turns on whether, objectively, the insured should 
be regarded as having expected injury.159  The Eighth Circuit, in Diocese of 
Winona defined this standard as follows:  
 
[U]nder the substantially probable test … if an insured is 
alerted to the problem, its cause, and knows or should have 
known of the likelihood of the problem’s recurrence, it 
cannot ignore such problem and then look to its insurer to 
reimburse it for the liability incurred by reason of such 
inaction.160 
 
Thus, even in jurisdictions that have not expressly recognized an 
objective test for “intended” injury, coverage may be barred for insureds 
that did not wish harm to anyone, if the insured expected such injury.  A 
prominent case concerning expectation of harm in the context of insurance 
where injury is a “substantial probability” is the Eighth Circuit’s decision 
in City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.  There, the court 
held that “substantial probability” means “[t]he indications must be strong 
enough to alert a reasonably prudent man not only to the possibility of the 
results occurring, but the indications also must be sufficient to forewarn 
him that the results are highly likely to occur.”161  Similarly, California 
courts have held that: “[t]he appropriate test for ‘expected’ damage is 
whether the insured knew or believed its conduct was substantially certain 
or highly likely to result in that kind of damage.”162 
It is sometimes argued that giving the term “expected” its usual 
meaning, and precluding claims where the insured “should have known” 
                                                                                                                 
Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 882 P.2d. 703, 721-27 
(Wash. 1994).  
159 Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(“whether [property damage] was expected is a subjective inquiry, but a subjective 
expectation can be inferred from objective evidence that the injury was the natural 
and probable result from the act.”) .  
160 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392  (8th 
Cir. 1996) (applying Minn. law) (citing City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. 
Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th Cir. 1979)); accord Baystate Ins. Co. v. Wilson, 451 
N.E.2d 880, 882-83 (Ill. 1983); cf. Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Catholic 
Risk Retention Grp., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1513 (N.D. Okla. 1995).  
161 City of Carter Lake v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 604 F.2d 1052, 1059 (8th 
Cir. 1979) (applying Neb. law).  
162 FMC Corp. v. Plaisted & Cos., 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 467 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). 
400 CONNECTICUT INSURANCE LAW JOURNAL Vol. 17.2 
 
the harm would occur, cuts too broadly in precluding coverage for a 
“negligence” claim.  However, in Diocese of Winona, the court explained 
that giving meaning to the term “expected” bars coverage only for some, 
but not all, negligence claims.  “While an insured has a reasonable 
expectation in securing a CGL policy that the policy will cover some 
negligent acts, it does not necessarily follow that all negligent acts are 
covered.… [T]here may be instances when, although an insured was 
negligent, she knew or should have known that resulting damage was 
expected.”163  Ordinary negligence has not been deemed sufficient reason 
to conclude that sexual abuse was “expected” by a supervisor or employer.  
In such instances, the “expected” prong has not been deemed to bar 
coverage.164  
The requisite level of “expectation” was well-explained in a 
homeowners insurance case in which the underlying complaint alleged that 
the parents had knowledge of their son’s deviant sexual propensities, and 
that he was a “continuing danger” to the claimant.165  These facts, the court 
held, showed that “as competent adults, [the insureds] would have at least 
expected harm to result to [the claimants] as a result of their conduct.”166  
Similarly, under New Jersey law, if a spouse, even if ignorant of the actual 
abuse, has “special reason to know that it was likely to occur,” no insurance 
coverage exists.  “Although the bodily injury for which she was being sued 
may have been unintended from her perspective … it was not unexpected; 
consequently, it was not an accident from her perspective and it was 
outside the coverage of the policy.”167  
In a recent decision, an Ohio court of appeals observed that an 
insured’s denial of intent to harm was irrelevant when the act in question 
was “substantially certain to result in injury.”168 There, the court held: 
                                                                                                                 
163 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1392 (8th Cir. 
1996) (applying Minn. law) (citing Auto Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 
719 (8th Cir. 1981)).  
164 See, e.g., Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Catholic Risk Retention 
Grp., Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1512-13 (N.D. Okla. 1995) (distinguishing ordinary 
negligence, which may give rise to a covered “occurrence,” from gross negligence, 
which may not); accord Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bower, No. 1:07 CV 254, 
2010 WL 4630486 (N.D. Ind. Nov. 5, 2010).  
165 W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 498 (W.Va. 2004). 
166 Id. at 497. 
167 J.C. v. Allstate Ins. Co., 762 A.2d 1062, 1064 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 
2000) (citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Steele, 74 F.3d 878, 880 (8th Cir. 1996)).   
168 Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Oblates of St. Francis de Sales, No. L-09-1146, 2010 
WL 3610451, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Sept. 17, 2010). 
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Based upon the Oblates’ knowledge of Rapp’s history and 
his need for supervision and ongoing treatment, the 
Oblates’ decision to give Rapp unfettered access to 
Assumption’s parishioners, without warning, was 
substantially certain to result in additional incidents of 
sexual molestation of boys.  Accordingly, we find that the 
Oblates’ actions did not cause accidental injury to Rapp’s 
victim.169 
 
“Rather,” the court concluded, “the injury to Rapp’s victim was expected, 
i.e., substantially certain to occur, and, therefore, the Oblates’ actions were 
not ‘occurrences’ pursuant to CIC’s policy.”170 
Applied in this manner, the “expected” standard is akin to a gross 
negligence standard.171 Thus, where the claimant alleged that the 
perpetrator had a history of mistreating and assaulting female employees, 
and the supervisor-insured knew of at least one incident where the 
perpetrator had assaulted an employee, the court concluded the insured 
“knew full well what was potentially going to happen with their son [the 
employee-perpetrator] and the female employees and did not care.”172  The 
insurer demonstrated that the perpetrator’s “conduct was foreseeable and 
not unexpected” on the part of the supervisor.  Thus, with a negligent hiring 
claim, “foreseeability of harm to the plaintiff is a prime factor in the duty 
analysis.”173  The court concluded:  “Under such circumstances, we cannot 
conclude that the negligent hiring and supervision … was an ‘occurrence’ 
or ‘accident’ within the meaning of the policy.”174   
                                                                                                                 
169 Id. 
170 Id. 
171 “Ordinary negligence” has been defined as “want of ordinary care and 
diligence” where “gross negligence” is defined as the “want of slight care and 
diligence.” See Lutheran Benevolent Ins. Co. v. Nat’l Catholic Risk Retention Grp. 
Inc., 939 F. Supp. 1506, 1512 (N.D. Okla. 1995).      
172 Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 58 (Colo. App. 
2009). 
173 Id. at 61 (citing Raleigh v. Performance Plumbing & Heating, Inc., 130 
P.3d 1011, 1016 (Colo. 2006)). 
174 Id. In light of the high degree of foreseeability required to establish 
negligent hiring/supervision, the court indicated that injury in such cases may, by 
definition, be “expected” (and thus ineligible for insurance coverage), though the 
court did not need to decide the point in light of the allegations that the insured 
knew of prior incidents.    
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“The terms ‘expected’ and ‘intended’ are not synonymous…; 
expectation is easier to prove…”175  “Intended” injury will always be 
“expected,” but “expected” injury may not have been intended.  This 
distinction between “expected” and “intended” is of the greatest 
significance where the insured was not the sexual abuser, and may not have 
intended injury. For example, a religious institution might be deemed to 
have “expected” its employee to sexually molest minors if that employee 
had a significant history of inappropriate conduct concerning minors.   
In sum, “expected” appears to present a lower threshold than 
“intended,” coming into play in circumstances when the insured-
supervisor’s error is principally one of omission rather than of commission. 
“Injury is ‘expected’ even when the damages are not accomplished by 
design or plan, i.e., not ‘intended,’ but are ‘of such a nature that they should 
have been reasonably anticipated (expected) by the insured.’”176  As the 
Eighth Circuit concluded, “[t]he difference between damages that are 
reasonably foreseeable and damages that are substantially probable is one 
of degree of expectibility.”177 
 
D. DECISIONS CONSIDERING WHETHER “NEGLIGENT 
SUPERVISION” CAN EVER BE AN “OCCURRENCE” 
 
A significant number of courts have concluded explicitly or 
implicitly that negligent supervision is, by itself, an “occurrence,”178  and 
such courts will “examine the injuries arising from the negligent act on 
their own accord, not as part of the negligent acts.”179   
Decisions holding to the contrary, however, have reasoned that the 
tort of negligent supervision requires, as an essential element, damage to a 
                                                                                                                 
175 Argento v. Vill. of Melrose Park, 838 F.2d 1483, 1497 (7th Cir. 1988) 
(applying Ill. law). 
176 Westfield Mut. Ins. Co. v. Cont’l Cmty. Bank & Trust Co., 804 N.E.2d 
601, 608 (Ill. 2003).   
177 Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co., 89 F.3d 1386, 1392 
(8th Cir. 1996) (citing Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v. Jensen, 667 F.2d 714, 719 (8th Cir. 
1981)). 
178 See, e.g., Safeco Ins. Co. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 426, 434 (Ohio 2009) 
(“torts like negligent supervision, hiring, retention, and entrustment are separate 
and distinct from the related intentional torts [committed by other actors] that make 
the negligent tort actionable.”). 
179  Id. 
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third party.180  “The elements of a claim for negligent hiring are: (1) a 
specific tortious act by the employee; (2) the employee’s incompetence or 
unfitness; (3) the employer’s actual or constructive notice of the 
employee’s incompetency or unfitness; and (4) injury.”181  Absent the 
fourth element – “injury” – nothing of legal significance has “occurred.”  
As was said in another context, “negligence in the air, so to speak, will not 
do.”182  Hiring, supervision, and retention that fall short of the standard of 
care, without causing injury, are of no legal consequence.   
A line of decisions reasons that, in cases of negligent supervision 
or hiring, the “accident,” for purposes of considering whether an 
“occurrence” happened, remains the injury-causing event – such as sexual 
molestation – rather than any precipitating negligence by the insured.  The 
term “accident,” it has been held, “unambiguously refers to the event 
causing the damage, not the earlier [negligent hiring] creating the potential 
for future injury.”183  Courts in Illinois and in the Eleventh Circuit have 
observed that a claim for negligence against an insured-employer does not 
transform a non-accident (sexual molestation) into an accident, even if the 
insured-employer did not expect harm.184  In SCI Liquidating Corp. v. 
Hartford Ins. Co., for example, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals held 
that allegations of intentional sexual harassment, assault, and battery 
against a manager, which formed the predicate for a claim of “negligent 
retention” by the employer, are not ‘accidents’ and therefore do not 
constitute an “occurrence.” The insurance coverage inquiry, it has been 
held, must “focus on the ‘immediately causative circumstances.’”185   
Molestation, a deliberate act, may mean that allegations of mere negligent 
supervision are irrelevant, because “[t]he intentional act interrupts the 
causal chain between negligent supervision and injury.”186   
                                                                                                                 
180 Canatillo Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 99 
F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir.1996) (applying Tex. law). 
181 White v. Consolidated Planning, Inc., 603 S.E.2d 147 (N.C. 2004), rev. 
denied, 610 S.E.2d 717 (N.C. 2005). 
182 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 162 N.E. 99, 99 (N.Y. 1928), cited in Cooper 
v. Eberly, 508 P. 2d 943 (Kan. 1973). 
183 Maples v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 148 Cal. Rptr. 80, 84 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1978), cited in Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Perron, 777 A.2d 161, 162 (Vt. 2001). 
184 Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nat’l Union, 772 N.E.2d 247, 256 (Ill. 2002); SCI 
Liquidating Corp. v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 181 F.3d 1210, 1214-17 (11th Cir. 
1999). 
185 SCI, 181 F.3d at 1216-17 (applying Ga. law).  
186 TIG Ins. Co. v. Premier Parks, No. Civ.A.02C04126JRS, 2004 WL 
728858, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 10, 2004).   
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In another case, the court considered a sexual assault lawsuit 
brought against the owner of a cab company that had hired a cab driver 
who sexually assaulted his customer.  The court held that whether or not 
the cab company “expected or intended injury” was beside the point.  Its 
hiring of the molester was not the accident.  The cab company’s acts or 
omissions “merely created the potential for injury … but was not itself the 
cause of the injury.”187  And in a case of negligent supervision against a 
woman whose son committed murder, the court reasoned: “[t]hough 
myriad other events of an earlier time and different place may have 
contributed to the claimed injury, to determine whether there was an 
‘occurrence’ within the meaning of the policy we must focus on those 
events directly responsible for the injury.”188   
Each of these decisions reasons that hiring a bad actor, such as a 
pedophile, may be negligence, but it is not an “accident.”  Certainly, 
negligent hiring may form part of the circumstances contributing to 
deliberate injury.  Nevertheless, negligent hiring is not an “accident” within 
the ordinary use of that word, these courts observe, and therefore “sexual 
abuse” claims do not give rise to an “occurrence.”  As one court opined, 
where abuse has been alleged, a negligent supervision claim does not exist 
without the damage caused by the sexual abuse.189   
 
E. CLAIMS IN WHICH NEGLIGENCE IS PLED ALONGSIDE FACTS 
SHOWING ACTUAL KNOWLEDGE OR INTENT: LOOKING 
“BEYOND THE LABEL OF NEGLIGENCE” 
 
An issue of critical significance with regard to an insurer’s duty to 
defend the insured arises when a sexual molestation complaint pleads facts 
showing specific knowledge on the part of a religious organization, 
consistent with an expectation of harm, but adds a count for                                              
“negligence” as well.  Should such a count be regarded as defeating the 
expectation of harm reflected by the complaint’s other allegations? 
A considerable number of decisions acknowledge that when the 
complaint alleges facts consistent with an expectation of harm, further 
allegations that the insured “should have known” of the potential for injury, 
                                                                                                                 
187 Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins. Co. v. Bay Area Cab Lease, Inc., 756 F. 
Supp. 1287, 1289-90 (N.D. Cal. 1991).   
188 Farmers Alliance Mut. Ins. Co. v. Salazar, 77 F.3d 1291, 1296-97 (10th 
Cir. 1996).   
189 Canutillo Ind. Sch. Dist v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 99 
F.3d 695, 705 (5th Cir. 1996) (applying Tex. law).    
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or that the insured acted “negligently and/or intentionally,” do not override 
factual allegations indicating intent.  It has been said that, even when a 
complaint pleads a count for negligence, “we must look beyond the label of 
negligence to determine if the insurer had a duty to defend.”190  
Not all courts agree, and some have allowed a “negligence” 
allegation to override allegations of specific knowledge.  A good example 
of this methodology is found in the Texas Court of Appeals decision in 
Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Casualty Co.191 
There, the sexual abuse victim’s causes of action against the Diocese 
included: 
 
(1) failing to warn of known dangerous propensities; 
(2) knowingly breaching and participating in breaches of its 
fiduciary duties to plaintiff; 
(3) fraud;  
(4) acting with malice and conscious indifference; and 
(5) conspiring to cover up incidents of priests sexually abusing 
minors. 
 
Notwithstanding these allegations, the Complaint also alleged the Diocese 
was negligent in hiring and retaining the priest-molester “when it [knew or] 
should have known of his dangerous sexual propensities.”192  Based on the 
“should have known” allegation, the court concluded the insurer was 
obligated to defend, because the latter allegations did not require the 
Diocese to have known about the perpetrator’s sexual propensities for the 
plaintiff to succeed.  “Viewed from the Diocese’s viewpoint, if it did not 
know of [the perpetrator’s] sexual propensities, then his molesting 
[plaintiff] was both unexpected and unintentional, and [thus potentially] 
within coverage.”193 
In contrast, the vast majority of cases considering whether the mere 
label of negligence overcomes facts demonstrating a higher level of fault 
have concluded that when allegations of negligent supervision are 
accompanied by allegations of deliberate misconduct, the supervisor-
                                                                                                                 
190 Collins Holding Corp. v. Wausau Underwriters, 666 S.E.2d 897, 900 (S.C. 
2008) (where insured distributed gambling machines equipped so as to permit 
manipulation, thus violating laws protecting the public from excessive gambling, 
the allegations failed to support a claim for negligent conduct).   
191 Roman Catholic Diocese of Dallas v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 133 
S.W.3d 887 (Tex. Ct. App. 2004).  
192 Id. at 895. 
193 Id. 
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insured is not entitled to coverage.194  Courts long have recognized that the 
nature of the liability set forth in the complaint is to be “determined by the 
quality and purpose of the transaction as a whole.”195  Courts “looking 
beyond the label of negligence” examine the “‘quality and purpose’ of the 
complaint as a whole, not simply the use of a word such as 
‘negligence.’”196  
In these decisions, the inclusion of a negligence count in the 
complaint does not trigger coverage when “the facts alleged in the 
complaint are inconsistent with unintentional conduct or injury.”197  The 
nature of a tort action, such courts conclude, is not changed merely by 
deploying the word, “negligence.”198  The focus is on the facts alleged 
rather than a label of “negligence.”199 
In this regard, the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has 
observed that the choice of legal theories in the complaint is not important 
in determining whether an insurance company has a duty to defend. 
Instead, the question is whether the “conduct as alleged in the complaint is 
at least arguably within one or more of the categories of wrongdoing that 
the policy covers.”200  Likewise, in C.L. by Guerin v. School Dist. of 
                                                                                                                 
194 See, e.g., Colony Ins. Co. v. Events Plus, Inc., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1156 
(D. Ariz. 2008). 
195 Messersmith v. Am. Fid. Co., 133 N.E. 432 (N.Y. 1921). 
196 Cont’l Cas. Co. v. Moser, No. 4:05CV00979 JLH, 2006 WL 827319, at *4 
(E.D. Ark. 2006) (quoting Fisher v. Travelers Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 892 (Ark. 
1966)).   
197 Serecky v. Nat’l Grange Mut. Ins., 857 A.2d 775, 781 (Vt. 2004) (citing 
TBH ex rel. Howard v. Meyer, 716 A.2d 31, 34 (Vt. 1998)).   
198 Fisher v. Travelers Indem. Co., 398 S.W.2d 892 (Ark. 1966); Standard Fire 
Ins. Co. v. Proctor, 286 F. Supp. 2d 567, 572 (D. Md. 2003). 
199 “We must focus on the factual allegations in [the underlying complaint] 
and not on the legal theories asserted, and unless the complaint alleges facts within 
the coverage of the policies, [the insurer] has no duty to defend of indemnify.” 
Meyer, 716 A.2d at 34. See also Carolina Cas. Ins. Co. v. Pinacol Assur. Co., 425 
F.3d 921, 929 (10th Cir. 2005); accord Colony Ins. Co. v. Events Plus, Inc., 585 F. 
Supp. 2d 1148, 1154-55 (D. Ariz. 2008) (“To conclude otherwise would only 
allow the parties to render such exclusions essentially meaningless through artful 
pleadings and would allow them to circumvent the terms and intent of the policy 
and its exclusions.”); Link Snacks Inc. v. Fed. Ins. Co., No. 08-cv-714-slc, 2009 
WL 3380383 (W.D. Wis. Oct. 20, 2009). 
200 Curtis-Universal, Inc. v. Sheboygan Emergency Med. Servs., Inc., 43 F.3d 
1119, 1122 (7th Cir. 1994) (applying Wis. law). See also St. Paul Fire and Marine 
Ins. Co. v. Hausman, 604 N.W.2d 908, 911-12 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“We 
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Menomonee Falls,201 the court concluded that an insurance company was 
not obligated to defend an insured against a claim labeled “negligence” in 
the complaint, even though the policy – like any standard liability 
insurance policy – covered negligent conduct. The court observed that “the 
facts alleged involved sexual abuse (which is intentional conduct by 
definition),” and thus the complaint did not state a claim that would be 
covered by the policy.  The legal theory denominated in the complaint was 
therefore irrelevant.  
This approach may be particularly apt in sexual abuse cases 
involving the alleged “negligence” of a supervisor or employer.  In such 
cases, courts have discounted nominal allegations of negligence when they 
are side-by-side with allegations of actual knowledge or purposeful action.  
Thus, in an insurance action brought by parents of the alleged molester, the 
court held: “Although the word ‘negligent’ is used in their allegations 
against [the parent-insureds], intentional conduct is actually described.  For 
example, the complaint alleges that Glen and Helen Stanley had actual 
knowledge that Jesse possessed deviant sexual propensities and was a 
continuing danger to [the victim], but that they permitted him to 
continually sexually abuse and sexually exploit [the victim] [as a result of 
their conduct].”202  These decisions analyze whether allegations such as 
“should have known” override allegations of specific knowledge.   
The logic is worth exploring.  Consider the following hypothetical 
allegations: 
 
 The Insured employer: 
(1) knew the molester had molested minors before; 
(2) knew the molester aimed to molest minors again; 
(3) knew and/or should have known the molester was a threat to 
minors. 
 
In this example, does the inclusion of “should have known” in the third 
allegation mean the insured did not expect molestation? Only if the first 
two allegations are (improperly) overlooked.  To illustrate, consider 
another analogous example: 
 
                                                                                                                 
determine whether insurance coverage exists by focusing on the incident itself and 
not the theory of liability.”). 
201 C.L. and T.W. ex rel. Guerin v. Sch. Dist. of Menomonee Falls, 585 
N.W.2d 826, 830 (Wis. Ct. App. 1998). 
202 W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 498 (W. Va. 2004). 
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The Apartment Building: 
(1) Has its top floor on the eighth floor. 
(2) Has an elevator with buttons one through eight. 
(3) Contains up to eight, and at least four, stories. 
 
Does the equivocal third paragraph permit the conclusion that the 
building is less than eight stories high?  Not in light of paragraphs one and 
two.  So too in the first example above, the equivocal “and/or should have 
known” in paragraph three does not mean – in light of paragraphs one and 
two – that something other than intentional harm has occurred. 
Such cases may be contrasted with the common claim of 
“negligence” involving a bouncer or similar employee of an insured tavern 
employer, who batters a bar patron, subjecting the insured to liability. In 
such cases, when the facts may equally suggest (i) an intent to injure, or (ii) 
merely an intent to relocate the patron outside the establishment, courts 
have found a potential “occurrence” under liability policies.203  The 
difficulty of judging specificity of intent in a situation where persons may 
or may not be acting to avoid injuries to third parties, rather than cause 
injuries, explains why the “bar patron” cases, with some justification, tend 
to find the alleged injury was neither “expected nor intended.”204   It is rare 
in such cases to find specific facts demonstrating both expectation of harm 
and intent to harm, in contrast to many clergy sexual abuse cases. 
 
F. CONSPIRACY ALLEGATIONS AND “NEGLIGENCE” 
 
Clergy abuse lawsuits in particular often allege a conspiracy among 
church officials to conceal, if not to permit, abuse by clergymen.  Such 
complaints may allege a fact-based pattern of concerted efforts.  For 
example, allegations against a religious order that supervised a priest 
accused of molestation stated that the supervisors: 
 
agreed or otherwise conspired to cover up 
incidents of sexual abuse of minors by Salesian 
priests and/or educators and to prevent disclosure, 
                                                                                                                 
203 E.g., Britamco Underwriters, Inc. v. Weiner, 636 A.2d 649 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
1994); cf. Gene’s Restaurant, Inc. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 548 A.2d 246 (Pa. 
1988). 
204 See Sans, et al. v. Monticello Ins. Co., 676 N.E.2d 1099 (Ind. Ct. App. 
1999) (shooting that occurred during a bar fight did not necessarily mean the 
shooter “intended” injury). 
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prosecution and civil litigation including, but not 
limited to: failure to report incidents of abuse to 
law enforcement or child protection agencies; 
denial of abuse [they] had substantiated; aiding 
criminal child molesters in evading detection, 
arrest and prosecution; allowing criminal child 
molesters to cross state and international borders 
for purposes of gaining access to uniformed 
parents whose innocent children could be sexually 
abused; failure to warn; and failure to seek out and 
redress the injuries its priests and/or educators had 
caused.205 
 
Conspiracy allegations do not reflect mere negligence, because the 
tort of civil conspiracy involves “actions intended by the insured” and 
therefore does not “meet the definition of ‘occurrence’” under the policy at 
issue.”206  There is no such thing as a “negligent conspiracy.”  There is, 
rather, “a conscious, decision making [sic] element that takes civil 
conspiracies out of the range of behavior encompassed within the meaning 
of ‘occurrence.’”207   
For these reasons, conspiracy allegations have generally been fatal 
to claims for insurance coverage, even when the underlying complaint 
includes allegations of “negligence.”208   
 
G. THE “BODILY INJURY” REQUIREMENT 
 
Standard commercial general liability policies provide coverage 
only for “Personal Injury” or “Bodily Injury.”  Under such policies, even if 
injury was neither “expected nor intended,” and even if the injury was the 
result of an “accident,” there is no coverage unless the claimant suffered 
“bodily injury.” 
Such injury sometimes is defined to mean: “bodily injury or if 
arising out of bodily injury, mental anguish.” “Bodily Injury” frequently is 
                                                                                                                 
205 Nunnery v. Salesian Missions, Inc., No. 07-2091, 2008 WL 1743436, at *7 
(D.N.J. Apr. 15, 2008). 
206 State Bancorp Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Ins. Co., 483 S.E.2d 228 (W. Va, 
1997), quoted in W. Va. Fire & Cas. Co. v. Stanley, 602 S.E.2d 483, 495 (W. Va. 
2004). 
207 Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 376, 
387 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993). 
208 See id. 
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defined in commercial general liability policies to mean “bodily injury, 
sickness, or disease.”  In contrast, other standard form policies define 
“bodily injury” to include mental harm, defining “bodily” or “personal 
injury” as “bodily injury, shock, mental anguish, sickness or disease, 
including death at any time resulting therefrom.” 
 Sexual abuse claims range from an abuser masturbating while in 
proximity to a plaintiff, to instances of penetration, including penetration 
resulting in physical damage.  Sexual abuse involving clergy has included 
penetration by objects, penile or digital penetration, vaginally or anally, as 
well as oral copulation.   Physical injury sometimes is alleged, though often 
complaints allege harm limited to “anxiety, embarrassment, and emotional 
distress.”   
In considering whether the alleged sexual abuse equates to “bodily 
injury,” a number of courts have concluded that emotional damages arising 
from sexual molestation may constitute “bodily injury” under a commercial 
liability policy.209  These courts have held that bodily touching alone is a 
sufficient predicate to support coverage.  Other courts, reasoning that 
physical injury and physical touching are not synonymous, conclude that 
emotional damage (even if arising from touching) is not “bodily injury.”210  
They have held that bodily injury, including sickness and disease, “does not 
include emotional distress, at least where, as here, the distress is not caused 
by physical trauma.”211  
Quite a few courts have held that various forms of touching and 
fondling in the course of sexual abuse do not constitute “bodily injury.”  A 
2005 federal court decision catalogued insurance coverage cases 
nationwide in which plaintiffs’ private parts had been grabbed, squeezed or 
fondled, yet no “bodily injury” was deemed to have occurred.  The court 
held: “The phrase ‘bodily injury’ simply cannot be read as synonymous 
with the phrase ‘physical contact.’”212  In 2008, the New Mexico Court of 
Appeals reasoned that “bodily injury” had not occurred where a neighbor 
molested a child by squeezing her chest through her clothes, and rubbing 
                                                                                                                 
209 Wayne Twp. Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs v. Ind. Ins. Co., 650 N.E.2d 1205, 1210 
(Ind. Ct. App. 1995); Allstate Ins. Co. v. McCranie, 716 F. Supp. 1440, 1443 (S.D. 
Fla. 1989); Cnty. of Chemung v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 496 N.Y.S.2d 933, 935 
(Conn. Super. Ct. 1985). 
210 Am. & Foreign Ins. Co. v. Church Sch., 645 F. Supp. 628, 632 (E.D. Va. 
1986); Chatton v. Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co., 13 Cal. Rptr. 2d 318, 323 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1992). 
211 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Tozer, 392 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2004) (applying Ind. 
law). 
212 Id.   
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his hand up and down her leg.213  These touchings “did not include any 
physical injury such as bruises, scrapes, or cuts.”  Rather, the claim was 
confined to “the physical, cognitive or emotional manifestations of the 
effects of the sexual touching.”214 In insurance cases where the injuries 
alleged are purely emotional or mental in nature, a number of courts have 
held that “bodily injury” coverage is not available.215  In particular, that 
reasoning may be difficult to assail when the policy defines “bodily injury” 
as “bodily injury, sickness or disease,” with no reference to “mental 
anguish.” 
 In contrast, physical penetration of the body has been deemed to 
be a “violation of the bodily integrity of the victim, and therefore an 
infliction of actual physical injury on her, even if not accompanied by 
bleeding or broken bones.”216  A number of jurisdictions have adopted this 
analysis.217  No court has concluded that physical penetration in the course 
of sexual abuse would not represent “bodily injury” for purposes of 
insurance coverage. 
 The decisions that require some actual physical injury, such as 
penetration, as a predicate for insurance coverage, may be influenced by 
the fact that certain insurance policy forms are available to cover emotional 
damages, distress, and mental anguish.  Policy forms that do not include 
these forms of non-bodily harm more likely will be read to preclude 
coverage in the absence of some bodily trauma caused by the sexual abuse. 
 
III. CONCLUSION  
 
 Clergy sexual abuse and molestation of minors constitutes a grave 
contemporary social problem. But not all clergy sexual abuse claims can be 
                                                                                                                 
213 Hart v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co., 193 P.3d 565, 568 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008). 
214 Id. 
215 Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co. v. Mrs. B.G., No. Civ.A. 05-578, 2005 WL 
3434137 (W.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2005) (collecting cases).   
216 United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Doe, 792 N.E.2d 708, 744-45 (Mass. Ct. App. 
2003). 
217 See Prof’l Staffing-A.B.T.S., Inc. v. Ill. Union Ins. Co., No. 8:04-CV-
793T30EAJ, 2005 WL 2290243, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Sept. 19, 2005); Allstate Ins. Co 
. v. Thomas, 684 F. Supp. 1056, 1059-60 (W.D. Okla. 1988); Allstate Ins. Co. v. 
Roefls, 698 F. Supp. 815, 818, 821 (D. Alaska 1987); J.C. Penney Cas. Ins. Co. v. 
M.K., 804 P.2d 689 (Cal. 1991); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Troelstrup, 789 P.2d 415, 417 
n.5 (Colo. 1990) (en banc); Auto-Owners Ins. Co. v .Gardipey, 434 N.W.2d 220 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1988); N.N. v. Moraine Mut. Ins. Co., 450 N.W.2d 445 (Wis. 
1990). 
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compensated through liability insurance coverage, which commonly 
excludes acts “that are expected or intended from the viewpoint of the 
insured.” 
 In a majority of states today, liability insurance coverage for the 
molester-insured generally is barred, either under an “objective” or “classic 
tort” standard for determining intentional acts, or under an “inferred intent” 
standard when applied to child sexual abuse cases. 
 The courts have not been uniform, however, in how they treat 
liability insurance coverage disputes pertaining to the sexual molester’s 
supervisory employer or religious organization, specifically when the 
supervisor-insured is sued for the negligent supervision, employment, or 
retention of a sexually abusive priest or clergyman, rather than based on the 
molester’s intentional acts per se. 
 Some courts have held that an underlying insured “occurrence” 
must also be “accidental,” and therefore “negligent supervision” of a sexual 
molester can never be an “accident.”218  
 Other courts have applied an “objective” or “classic tort” 
interpretive standard to liability insurance claims arising out of the 
negligent hiring, supervision, or retention of a clergyman-molester, 
including the prominent Diocese of Winona case.219 
 It is submitted that the objective Diocese of Winona approach 
applied to liability insurance coverage disputes involving supervisory-
insureds of clergy sexual molesters is the better-reasoned interpretive 
approach for the following reasons:  First, the claims of negligent hiring, 
negligent supervision, and negligent retention brought against church 
organizations and their supervisors for the sexual abuse of minors by 
priests or other clergymen all sound in negligence which traditionally is 
based upon an objective “reasonable person” standard of care.  Second, this 
“objective” or “classic tort” standard for determining intentional acts in 
liability insurance coverage disputes, or alternately the “inferred intent” 
standard as applied to child sexual abuse cases, is recognized in an 
overwhelming majority of states, as opposed to the minority “subjective” or 
“particular insured” standard, based upon strong public policy reasons.  
                                                                                                                 
218 See, e.g., Mountain States Mut. Ins. Co. v. Hauser, 221 P.3d 56, 60 (Colo. 
Ct. App. 2009). But see contra Safeco Ins. Co. of N. Am. v. White, 913 N.E.2d 
426 (Ohio 2009) (holding that torts like negligent supervision, hiring, and retention 
are separate and distinct from the related intentional torts committed by the 
original actor, such as a priest or clergyman-molester). 
219 See Diocese of Winona v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 89 F.3d 1386 (8th Cir. 
1996) (applying Minn. law).   
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Third, a substantial majority of courts now recognize that the crucial 
underlying requirement in negligent hiring, negligent supervision, and 
negligent retention cases is based upon whether the priest of clergyman’s 
supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization knew or 
should have known of the sexual offender’s abuse toward minors—which, 
again, is an objective standard.  Fourth, and of primary importance, the 
crucial causation requirement in both tort law and insurance contract law 
also requires the application of an objective “efficient or predominant 
cause” interpretive analysis.  Thus, in a liability insurance context, if the 
negligent hiring, negligent supervision, or negligent retention of a sexually 
abusive priest or clergyman was so inextricably intertwined with, and not 
independent of, the priest or clergyman’s sexual misconduct, then the 
supervising church, bishop, diocese, or other religious organization should 
not be covered under generally accepted tort and insurance law causation 
principles.       
 In sum, the most commonly litigated issue, as discussed at length 
in this article, is whether injury resulting from clergy sexual abuse and 
molestation was “intended” or “expected” by the molester-insured and the 
supervisor-insured.  It is our conclusion that determining this issue 
according to the “objective” insured test is the better-reasoned approach, 
and is most in accord with generally accepted tort law and insurance law 
principles.  This means that when the supervisor-insured has knowledge 
that harm was substantially likely to occur to the sexual abuse victim, then 
coverage usually will be deemed to have been “intended.”  However, this 
would normally involve a gross negligence standard, rather than an 
ordinary negligence standard, for precluding coverage.  
 The “intent” interpretive issue has dominated many liability 
insurance coverage disputes, sometimes to the exclusion of other important 
interpretive issues raised by liability insurance policy provisions.  The most 
important of these, which may need to be resolved regardless of whether an 
insured “intended” injury or not, are: (1) whether the insured “expected” 
injury; (2) whether the injury arose from an “accident”; and (3) whether 
“bodily injury” occurred.  Courts, policyholders, and insurers must also be 
prepared to confront each of these issues in the context of insurance claims 
for sexual abuse. 
THE STANDARD OF MATERIALITY FOR 
MISREPRESENTATIONS UNDER NEW YORK INSURANCE 
LAW – A STATE OF UNWARRANTED CONFUSION 
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Under New York law, an insurer generally is entitled to rescind an 
insurance policy if an insured makes a material misrepresentation in the 
insured’s application for insurance.  But determining whether or not a 
misrepresentation is “material” can depend on a variety of questions.  This 
article focuses on materiality from the perspective of the insurer, and how 
courts, arbitrators and juries are required under New York law to determine 
if a misrepresentation is material to an insurer in any particular case.  In 
short, in whose eyes does the misrepresentation have to be material?  Is the 
test one of subjective materiality — that the particular insurer at issue 
would not have issued the same policy under the same terms had it known 
the truth, regardless of what any other insurer might have done?  Or is the 
test an objective one focused on what a “reasonable insurer” would have 
done in a similar situation?1   
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1 As discussed in some of the case law cited in this note, other considerations 
sometimes analyzed in deciding whether a material misrepresentation has been 
made—none of which are addressed in this article—might include whether a 
question on an insurance application called for subjective knowledge of an insured 
or an objective fact; whether a misrepresentation was innocently or knowingly 
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In 1937, the New York Court of Appeals directly answered that 
question in Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., making clear that a 
misrepresentation “is material where it appears that a reasonable insurer 
would be induced by the misrepresentation to take action which he might 
not have taken if the truth had been disclosed.”2  Thus, New York’s highest 
court has determined that the test is an objective one, not dependent on 
what the particular insurer at issue would have done. 
The subjective-objective distinction has significant ramifications 
on issues of proof in litigation (including in confidential arbitrations, where 
the question often arises), and very often has the potential to be case 
determinative.  Under a subjective standard, the insurer claiming there is a 
material misrepresentation must prove through witness testimony (such as 
the testimony of its claims representative or underwriter who handled the 
specific policy at issue), specific language in its own claims manuals, or 
other similar evidence, that it would not have issued the policy on the same 
terms but for the misrepresentation, regardless of industry practice or what 
any other insurer would have done.  By contrast, under an objective 
standard, the test of materiality is whether a “reasonable insurer” would 
have offered the same insurance on the same terms if there had been no 
misrepresentation.  Evidence regarding the particular insurer’s practices (or 
vagaries) may be one piece of proof in determining the “reasonable 
insurer” standard, but a “reasonable insurer” test also can be satisfied 
without any evidence at all of the individual insurer’s practices.   
Issues such as these become particularly significant if there are 
missing witnesses or evidence about the particular insurer’s practices, 
including evidence lapses that routinely arise with the passage of time.  If 
the underwriter who negotiated the specific policy is no longer with the 
company, is deceased, or cannot be located, or if claims manuals from 
years (or often decades) earlier cannot be located, an insurer will have a 
very difficult time proving what it would have done in a specific situation, 
with respect to a specific policy, if it had known a particular piece of 
information.  Similarly, given that claims often arise years after a policy is 
written, written communications between the insured and the 
insurer/underwriter—whether electronic or in hard copy—may no longer 
exist, once again defeating any chance that an insurer can prevail if a 
subjective test is applied.   By contrast, where evidence of industry practice 
                                                                                                                 
made; or whether there is a causal connection between the misrepresentation and 
later events, among other issues. 
2 Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 125, 130 (1937). 
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can be introduced through the testimony of experts who have years of 
experience in the industry at issue, these issues of proof can be overcome. 
With such significance riding on this issue, it is not surprising that 
the New York Court of Appeals—over 65 years ago—took pains through 
its decision in Geer to make clear that under New York law, an objective, 
“reasonable insurer” test is to be applied when determining if a 
misrepresentation is material to an insurer in any particular case.  Since 
then, however, beginning with the subsequent 1939 enactment of New 
York Insurance Law Section 149 (now codified as New York Insurance 
Law Section 3105),3 the issue has devolved into a murky quagmire, with 
disputed interpretations of legislative intent and inconsistent and usually 
unreasoned pronouncements by lower courts, even though the Court of 
Appeals has never veered from its “reasonable person” standard and New 
York’s legislature has never clearly abrogated it.  This article explores the 
wayward history resulting in the current confusion among New York’s 
lower courts.  Despite this wayward history, however, given the clear and 
unwavering direction from the New York Court of Appeals, which has not 
been abrogated by any subsequent legislation, courts are obligated to use an 
objective standard when applying New York law to determine if a 
misrepresentation is material to an insurer in any particular case. 
 
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS SETS THE STANDARD FOR 
MATERIALITY IN THE GEER CASE 
 
In 1937, the New York Court of Appeals directly addressed the 
question of what standard governs the question of whether a 
misrepresentation in an application for insurance is material to an insurer in 
any particular case.  In Geer, the plaintiff sought recovery under a life 
insurance policy after her husband died of carbon monoxide poisoning.  
The insurer denied coverage on the grounds that the decedent had failed to 
disclose certain material information in his application for insurance.  The 
application had required the decedent to state whether he had had any 
treatment at any hospital within the past five years and to list all physicians 
                                                                                                                 
3 N.Y. INS. LAW § 3105 (McKinney 1984).  In 1984, Insurance Law § 149 was 
re-enacted as Insurance Law § 3105 but its provisions remained unchanged.  For 
purposes of simplicity, and because many of the cases cited in this article were 
issued prior to 1984 and thus refer to § 149 rather than § 3105, this article will 
refer to the statute as § 149.  A fuller discussion of the specific provisions of 
Insurance Law § 149 (now Insurance Law § 3105) is set forth in Part IV below. 
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he had consulted over the past ten years.4  The decedent listed only one 
physician on his insurance application and failed to disclose that, four years 
earlier, he had visited another physician and was briefly hospitalized with 
flu symptoms, after which he was temporarily diagnosed with paratyphoid 
and ultimately with nervousness.5   
The plaintiff-insured prevailed at trial, after the jury concluded that 
the misrepresentation was not material to the risk because the fact that the 
decedent visited a physician and was diagnosed with nervousness had no 
effect on the risk of dying of carbon monoxide poisoning.6  On appeal, the 
insurer took issue with the jury instruction on materiality, arguing that it is 
entirely reasonable for an insurer to inquire into the medical history of an 
insured and that the mere fact that such an inquiry was made on the 
application establishes its materiality.7  The Appellate Division affirmed, 
concluding that in light of the evidence, the trial court properly presented 
the question of materiality to the jury as a question of fact and that the 
jury’s determination was not against the weight of the evidence.8  In its 
decision, the Appellate Division focused on the fact that decedent had been 
forthcoming with information and that the evidence did not reflect any 
intent “to suppress the truth or to conceal or evade facts.”9   
The Court of Appeals (New York’s highest court) reversed, 
concluding that the failure to disclose the information was a material 
misrepresentation and, further, that the misrepresentation was material as a 
matter of law.  The Court reasoned that:  
 
[W]here an applicant for insurance has notice that before 
the insurance company will act upon the application, it 
demands that specified information shall be furnished for 
the purpose of enabling it to determine whether the risk 
should be accepted, any untrue representation, however 
innocent, which either by affirmation of an untruth or 
suppression of the truth, substantially thwarts the purpose 
for which the information is demanded and induces action 
                                                                                                                 
4 Geer, 7 N.E.2d at 126. 
5 Id. at 126-27. 
6 Id. at 127. 
7 Id. at 131. 
8 Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 288 N.Y.S. 359, 363 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1936). 
9 Id. at 360-62. 
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which the insurance company might otherwise not have 
taken, is material as a matter of law.10 
 
Central to the Court’s analysis was its determination that an insurer 
is free to choose the risks it will assume.  As the Court explained: 
 
[The] question in such case is not whether the insurance 
company might perhaps have decided to issue the policy 
even if it had been apprised of the truth, the question is 
whether failure to state the truth where there was duty to 
speak prevented the insurance company from exercising its 
choice of whether to accept or reject the application upon a 
disclosure of all the facts which might reasonably affect its 
choice.11 
 
Significantly, however, the Court did not limit its decision to the 
question of whether a misrepresentation was or could be material as a 
matter of law.  Rather, the Court went on to address the central topic of this 
article: whether materiality of a misrepresentation to the insurer should be 
judged by an objective or subjective standard.  The Court held that 
“misrepresentations cannot defeat or seriously affect the insurance 
company’s right to reject the application where a disclosure of all the facts 
could not ‘reasonably’ affect the choice of the insurer.”12  The Court further 
explained that “a misrepresentation through concealment of fact in regard 
to a condition of health or physicians consulted . . . is material where it 
appears that a reasonable insurer would be induced by the 
                                                                                                                 
10 Geer, 7 N.E.2d. at 127. 
11 Id. 
12 Id. at 129. It was then and is now settled law in New York that 
“‘[r]easonable belief’ is an objective standard.”  Donovan v. Kaszyski & Sons 
Contractors, Inc., 599 F. Supp. 860, 871 (S.D.N.Y. 1984); see also Agway v. 
Travelers Indem. Co., No. 93-CV-557, 1993 WL 771008, at *12 (N.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 
1993) (holding that policy notice provision formulated in terms of reasonableness 
gives rise to an objective standard); Unigard Sec. Ins. Co. v. North River Ins. Co., 
762 F. Supp. 566, 591 n.9 (S.D.N.Y. 1991), rev’d in part on other grounds, 4 F.3d 
1049 (2d Cir. 1993) (“Although North River’s expert stated that standard should be 
subjective, his description of the test, based on reasonableness, clearly indicated an 
objective one.”); People v. Perretta, 228 A.D. 420, 423 (N.Y. App. Div. 1930) 
(noting that the use of an objective standard would require an examination of the 
actions of a reasonable man). 
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misrepresentation to take action which he might not have taken if the truth 
had been disclosed.”13 
In reaching this holding, the Court of Appeals acknowledged that 
its test was formulated “somewhat different from that approved in Penn 
Mut. Life Ins. Co v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank & Trust Co. and Mutual Life Ins. 
Co. v. Ontario Metal Products Co.” but that the test was nonetheless 
“essentially the same” as in those cases.14  In Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co., the 
court discussed extensively the admission of evidence on the issue of 
materiality through “witnesses who had been long engaged in the . . . 
insurance business,”15 and a long line of cases handed down by English 
courts on this question.  The Penn Mutual court cited numerous instances 
in which evidence was admitted through industry practitioners and experts 
with significant knowledge on general underwriting practices, and while 
various courts rejected the ability of an expert to opine on the ultimate issue 
of whether a misrepresentation was “material”—a question the courts most 
frequently determined had to be decided by the jury—few if any of the 
courts questioned the propriety of admitting evidence of industry practice 
through these experts.16  Thus, the Penn Mutual court determined as 
follows: 
 
A fair test of the materiality of a fact is found, therefore, in 
the answer to the question whether reasonably careful and 
intelligent men would have regarded the fact, 
communicated at the time of effecting the insurance, as 
substantially increasing the chances of the loss insured 
against.  The best evidence of this is to be found in the 
usage and practice of insurance companies in regard to 
raising the rates or in rejecting the risk on becoming aware 
of the fact.  If the rates are not raised in such a case, it may 
be inferred that reasonably careful men do not regard the 
                                                                                                                 
13 Geer, 7 N.E.2d at 130 (emphasis added). 
14 Id. (citing Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 72 
F. 413, 423 (6th Cir. 1896), and Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Ontario Metal Prod. Co., 
[1925] A.C. 344 (P.C.) 351-52 (appeal taken from Can.)) (internal citations 
omitted). 
15 Penn Mut., 72 F. at 423. 
16 See id. at 427-31.  The Penn Mutual court also considered whether the rule 
should be different among fire, health, life, or other types of insurance, ultimately 
concluding that there was no reason for the rule to differ among these types of 
insurance. See id. at 430. 
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fact as material.  If the rates are raised, or the risk is 
rejected, then they do.17 
 
And in Ontario Metal, the Privy Council, substantially concurring with the 
lower court on most issues, stated the rule as whether “had the facts 
concealed been disclosed, they would not have influenced a reasonable 
insurer so as to induce him to refuse the risk or alter the premium.”18   
Both the Penn Mutual and Ontario Metal courts applied an 
objective, “reasonable insurer” test, which the Geer court then explicitly 
endorsed in determining that an objective test governs under New York 
law. 
 
II. THE COURT OF APPEALS REAFFIRMS GEER IN 
SUBSEQUENT YEARS 
 
In the years following Geer, the New York Court of Appeals 
passed over numerous opportunities to revisit, amend, or overturn Geer’s 
objective standard.  Just two years after the decision in Geer, the New York 
state legislature re-codified the insurance law.  Section 149 of the re-
codified insurance law, (which amended and replaced the former New 
York Insurance Law Section 58 (1906)), included new provisions 
governing materiality for misrepresentations in insurance contracts,19 and 
some have suggested that these new provisions abrogated the holding in 
Geer and provide that whether a misrepresentation is material to an insurer 
must be determined using a subjective standard.  These new insurance law 
provisions and the cases that arose under them potentially set the stage for a 
re-evaluation of the objective standard.  Yet the New York Court of 
Appeals never regarded the re-codification as a mandate to depart from the 
objective standard.  In each of the cases it considered following the passage 
of Insurance Law Section 149, the Court of Appeals continued to cite Geer 
                                                                                                                 
17 Id. at 429.  In reaching this holding, while the court stated that “[m]ateriality 
of fact, in insurance law, is subjective,” this was because “it concerns rather the 
impression which the fact claimed to be material would reasonably and naturally 
convey to the insurer’s mind before the event, and at the time the insurance is 
effected, than the subsequent actual causal connection between the fact, or the 
probable cause it evidences, and the event.” Id. at 428.  In other words, 
“subjectivity” as used in this context, meant what could or might have happened if 
events had happened differently, rather than something that could be objectively 
determined after the fact. 
18 Mutual Life Ins. Co., [1925] A.C. 344 (P.C.) at 351-52. 
19 N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(3) (McKinney 1939). 
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as good law.  To this day, the Court of Appeals has not departed from the 
objective standard for the materiality of misrepresentations it established in 
Geer.   
Since the enactment of Section 149, the Court of Appeals has 
engaged in a decades-long discussion on the merits of finding materiality 
as a matter of law, without ever changing its position that an objective, or 
“reasonable insurer” test, should be applied in determining whether a 
misrepresentation is material to an insurer.  In Glickman v. New York Life 
Ins. Co., 50 N.E.2d 538 (N.Y. 1943), decided just four years after the 
enactment of Insurance Law Section 149, neither the majority nor the 
dissent even suggested that Section 149 had the effect of replacing the 
objective standard endorsed by Geer with a new subjective standard.  The 
opinions instead focused on whether the omission of a condition unrelated 
to the insured’s death ought to be found material as a matter of law.  The 
majority affirmed an appellate division reversal of the trial court’s decision 
in favor of the plaintiff-insured, reasoning that any non-trivial ailment that 
goes undisclosed should be found material as a matter of law.20  Although 
the dissent referenced Section 149 as intended “to overcome the legal 
affect” of Geer, it did so only with specific reference to whether materiality 
should be determined as a matter of law or a question of fact, making clear 
that this, and not any change to the objective standard test set out in Geer, 
was the purpose of amending Section 149:   
 
The purpose of the Legislature [in passing Insurance Law § 
149] is not open to debate . . . .  Whether a false 
representation or suppression of a fact for which 
information is requested by the insurer as a condition 
antecedent to the completion of a contract of insurance 
tends to diminish or increase the risk of loss and is material 
to the risk or whether a breach of warranty, if one such 
exists, materially increases the risk of loss are no longer 
questions for the court but are now questions of fact which 
must be determined as such . . . .21   
 
Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Milman, 50 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1943), 
a case decided the same day as Glickman, reversed a lower court decision 
approving the rescission of a life insurance policy where the insured did not 
disclose that he had consulted physicians for minor health issues.  The 
                                                                                                                 
20 Glickman, 50 N.E.2d at 540. 
21 Id. at 541 (emphasis added). 
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Court ruled that a “reasonable construction of the scope of the disclosure 
required” does not include minor ills that “do not impair [the insured’s] 
general health.”22  The Court then explicitly reaffirmed the central holding 
in Geer: that the relevant inquiry for materiality is whether the undisclosed 
facts were ones which “might reasonably affect the choice of the insurance 
company as to whether to accept or reject the application.”23  
Thirty years later, in Vander Veer v. Continental Casualty Co., the 
Court narrowly ruled to reverse a jury verdict in favor of the insured based 
on a determination by the jury that there had been no material 
misrepresentation.24  The questions presented to the Vander Veer Court 
centered on (1) whether the plaintiff misrepresented his health as a matter 
of law and (2) whether the misrepresentation was material as a matter of 
law.25  The Court of Appeals found that each question should have been 
decided as a matter of law, rather than be submitted to the jury.26  In 
reaching its holding, the Court cited with approval to Geer for the 
proposition that a failure to disclose is equivalent to a false affirmative 
statement.27  The court did not comment or veer in any way, however, from 
its holding in Geer that whether a misrepresentation is material to an 
insurer must be determined by an objective or “reasonable insurer” 
standard.28 
The Court took similar action two years later in Leamy v. Berkshire 
Life Ins. Co. where once again it ruled narrowly on the facts in determining 
that the insured had made two material misstatements by failing to disclose 
persistent fainting and dizziness, as well as a recent trip to the hospital.29  
The Leamy Court cited Geer for the proposition that the question of 
whether there has been a material misrepresentation may sometimes be 
answered by the trier of fact.30  The Leamy court never commented, 
however, on the endorsement of an objective standard in Geer, and the 
Leamy ruling focused exclusively on the holding that the insured’s 
misrepresentations were material as a matter of law.31   
                                                                                                                 
22 Equitable Life Assur. Soc. v. Milman, 50 N.E.2d 553 (N.Y. 1943). 
23 Id. at 554 (emphasis added). 
24 Vander Veer v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 312 N.E.2d 156, 157 (N.Y. 1974). 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
28 See id. 
29 Leamy v. Berkshire Life Ins. Co., 347 N.E.2d 889, 890 (N.Y. 1976). 
30 Id. 
31 Through its decisions in Vander Veer and Leamy, the Court of Appeals 
clarified that although the materiality of a misrepresentation is typically treated as 
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In L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co. the New York 
Court of Appeals again reaffirmed Geer without directly reaching the issue 
of the standard of materiality, citing to Geer with approval in support of the 
majority’s finding that it was “manifest” that certain information “would 
have affected defendant’s choice of insuring the risk covered by the policy 
issued to plaintiff.”32   
Although the Court of Appeals, since Geer and since the enactment 
of Section 149, has not provided further detailed analysis regarding 
whether materiality should be judged from an objective or subjective 
standard, it never has disavowed the objective standard it so clearly 
articulated and established in Geer.  The Court instead has embarked on a 
lengthy debate about whether materiality can be decided as a matter of law, 
and repeatedly has cited Geer as good law. 
 
III. THE GEER DISSENT SETS THE STAGE FOR UNCERTAINTY 
 
The Geer court was not unanimous, with Judge Edward Ridley 
Finch writing a vigorous dissent.  Judge Finch voiced concern that the 
majority’s test for determining materiality improperly treated nearly all 
                                                                                                                 
a matter of fact for the jury’s consideration under Section 149, materiality can be a 
matter of law under certain circumstances.  Without any further insight from the 
Court of Appeals, the Appellate Division has construed these cases as allowing the 
court to decide materiality as a matter of law “where the evidence concerning 
materiality is clear and substantially uncontradicted.”  Kroski v. Long Island Sav. 
Bank, 689 N.Y.S.2d 92, 93 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999); see also Aguilar v. U.S. Life 
Ins. Co., 556 N.Y.S.2d 584, 585 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990).  The Appellate Division 
recently has treated this as a subjective inquiry, finding materiality to be clear and 
substantially uncontradicted when the insurer presents “documentation concerning 
its underwriting practices, such as underwriting manuals, bulletins or rules 
pertaining to similar risks, to establish that it would not have issued the same 
policy if the correct information had been disclosed in the application.”  Precision 
Auto Accessories, Inc. v. Utica First Ins. Co., 859 N.Y.S.2d 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2008); see also Shirmer v. Penkert, 840 N.Y.S.2d 796, 799 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007); 
Curanovic v. N.Y. Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 762 N.Y.S.2d 148, 151 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2003).  Thus, while a subjective standard may be applied in determining 
materiality for purposes of summary judgment — i.e., that there is uncontroverted 
evidence that the particular insurer at issue would not have issued the particular 
policy at issue under the same terms and conditions — a court or jury still is 
obligated to apply an objective standard if the case proceeds past summary 
judgment.   
32 L. Smirlock Realty Corp. v. Title Guarantee Co., 418 N.E.2d 650, 653 (N.Y. 
1981). 
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misrepresentations, even those innocently made, as material.33  The dissent 
flatly rejected the insurer’s contention that all misrepresentations or 
omissions concerning health and consultations with physicians were 
material as a matter of law.34  According to Judge Finch, such a test 
unfairly prevented recovery by the insured and vitiated Section 58 of the 
New York Insurance Law (the precursor to Section 149), which had been 
enacted to protect insureds by providing that statements in an insurance 
policy are, in the absence of fraud, representations and not warranties.35  
Thus, Judge Finch viewed the majority’s holding that a material 
misrepresentation could be proven as a matter of law simply by 
demonstrating that the insurer had asked for the information violated 
Section 58 and unfairly and unjustifiably give too much power to insurers 
to determine materiality. 
Notably, however, Judge Finch did not take issue with the 
majority’s use of an objective, “reasonable insurer” standard for deciding 
materiality of a misrepresentation.  In fact, in his dissent, Judge Finch cited 
with approval language from the same Sixth Circuit decision cited by the 
Geer majority which held that “[a] fair test of the materiality of a fact is 
found . . . in answer to the question whether reasonably careful and 
intelligent men would have regarded the fact, communicated at the time of 
effecting the insurance, as substantially increasing the chances of the loss 
insured against.”36  The dissent also cited with approval the Privy Council’s 
Ontario Metal Products decision referenced by the majority which set forth 
a “reasonable insurer” standard as the proper test for materiality.37  A close 
look at the opinions in Geer thus reveals that the conflict between the 
                                                                                                                 
33 Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 7 N.E.2d 125, 132 (N.Y. 1937).   
34 In so doing, the dissent distinguished cases relied upon by the defendant-
insurer on the grounds that they involved instances in which the insured or 
beneficiary refused to waive the doctor-patient privilege, reasoning that 
“[o]bviously the courts could not permit the insured or the beneficiary to argue that 
the omission or misrepresentation was not material while he prevented the 
insurance company from showing its materiality.”  Id. at 134. 
35 Id. at 126.  
36 Id. at 132 (citing Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics Sav. Bank & Trust 
Co., 72 F. 413, 429 (6th Cir. 1896)).   
37 Id. at 133 (citing Ontario Metal Products Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. [1925] 
A.C. 344 (P.C.) [351–52] (appeal taken from S.C.C.) (“[I]t is a question of fact in 
each case whether, if the matters concealed or misrepresented had been truly 
disclosed, they would, on a fair consideration of the evidence, have influenced a 
reasonable insurer to decline the risk or to have stipulated for a higher premium.”) 
(emphasis added).   
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majority and dissent was limited to the extent to which materiality could be 
considered a matter of law.  By contrast, with respect to the question 
addressed in this article—what standard should be applied in determining 
whether a particular misrepresentation was material to an insurer in any 
particular case—both the majority and the dissent agreed that an objective 
or “reasonable insurer” standard applies.   
 
IV. A NEW INSURANCE STATUTE RESULTS IN FURTHER 
CONFUSION 
 
In 1937, the same year that Geer was decided, the Insurance 
Department of New York began an effort to re-codify the existing 
insurance law and released tentative drafts of several proposed statutes.  
This included an initial draft of what later would become Insurance Law 
Section 149, which, while it was a new statutory provision, essentially 
restated long-standing common law principles, including those set out in its 
precursor, Section 58.  In the two years between the issuance of Geer and 
the enactment of Section 149, several New York courts cited Geer, but 
without any substantive discussion of whether to apply an objective or 
subjective standard to determine materiality of a misrepresentation to an 
insurer.38  As enacted into law two years later, Section 149 provided in 
relevant part as follows: 
 
(a):  A representation is a statement as to past or present 
fact, made to the insurer by or by the authority of the 
applicant for insurance or the prospective insured, at or 
before the making of the insurance contract as an 
inducement to the making thereof.  A misrepresentation is 
a false representation, and the facts misrepresented are 
those facts which make the representation false. 
                                                                                                                 
38 See e.g., Wersba v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of U.S., 1 N.Y.S.2d 677, 679 
(N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (citing Geer to support its conclusion that a 
misrepresentation was material as a matter of law); Equitable Life Assur. Soc. of 
U.S. v. Schusterman, 5 N.Y.S.2d 368, 371 (N.Y. App. Div. 1938) (quoting Geer to 
frame the issue of materiality as a determination of “whether the company has been 
induced to accept an application which it might otherwise have refused,” and not 
as a determination of “whether the company might have issued the policy even if 
the information had been furnished.”); Woodworth v. Prudential Ins. Co., 13 
N.Y.S.2d 145, 150 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1939) (citing Geer for the position that an 
insured can “avoid the policy on the ground of misrepresentation as to a material 
fact even though such misrepresentation was innocently made.”). 
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(b): No misrepresentation shall avoid any contract of 
insurance or defeat recovery thereunder unless such 
misrepresentation was material.  No misrepresentation 
shall be deemed material unless knowledge by the insurer 
of the facts misrepresented would have led to a refusal by 
the insurer to make such contract. 
(c): In determining the question of materiality, evidence of 
the practice of the insurer which made such contract with 
respect to the acceptance or rejection of similar risks shall 
be admissible.39 
 
While the legislature is empowered to overrule unpopular or 
problematic court decisions if it so desires, it has become a subject of some 
debate among legal commentators and certain lower courts whether the 
enactment of Section 149 was, indeed, intended to overrule the two-year 
old Geer decision and, if so, whether in whole or in part.   
Those arguing that the legislature intended to overrule Geer point 
to two factors.  First, the statute refers throughout to “the insurer,” rather 
than referring to “an insurer” or “the reasonable insurer.”  Second, while an 
early draft of the statute provided for admissibility of the practices of other 
insurers (in addition to the practices of the particular insured at issue) for 
the purpose of determining whether a misrepresentation was material to an 
insurer, the statute as enacted only refers in subsection (c) to the 
admissibility of the practices of “the insurer which made such contract,” 
which some argue makes clear, or at least suggests, that only the practices 
of the particular insurer at issue are relevant to determining materiality.  
 
A. “THE INSURER” AND “A REASONABLE INSURER” 
 
The repeated use throughout the statute of the phrase “the insurer,” 
rather than “a reasonable insurer” or “a prudent insurer,” might suggest that 
the legislature intended to impose a subjective standard for materiality, 
rather than the objective standard established by the Court of Appeals in 
                                                                                                                 
39 N.Y. INS. LAW § 149 (McKinney 1939). Section 149 also contains a 
subsection (d), which provides that misrepresentations that fail to disclose previous 
medical treatment by applicants for life or accident and health insurance are 
deemed to misrepresent that the applicant has not had the disease or ailment for 
which he or she received treatment.  If the insurer proves such a misrepresentation 
in an action to rescind the insurance contract, then under certain circumstances the 
misrepresentation is presumed material. 
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Geer.40  And, indeed, some of the legislative history surrounding the 
enactment of Section 149 suggests as much.  A Historical Note to the draft 
legislation asserts that “[s]ubsection 2 makes the ultimate test the effect of 
the misrepresentations in inducing the particular insurer.”41  The Historical 
Note directly addresses Geer, stating that “the majority opinion contains 
language inconsistent with the rule of subsection 2 above, but the decision 
in that case was based upon peculiar facts.”42   
Notably, however, the Historical Note is internally inconsistent.  
The Note states that the rule proposed in the draft legislation “is in accord 
with the able dissenting opinion by Judge Finch” in Geer, in which he 
“relie[d] upon the decision of the Privy Council of England.”43  The 
commentators appear to suggest by this language that the statute conforms 
with the Geer dissent but not the Geer majority.  As discussed above in 
Part I, however, the Privy Council decision cited approvingly by Judge 
Finch (Ontario Metal) applied an objective standard of materiality, just like 
the Geer majority.44  Moreover, since the Geer dissent did not take issue 
with the majority’s imposition of an objective standard, but rather with the 
majority’s determination that materiality could be determined as a matter of 
law, the statement referenced in the Historical Note might be better read as 
relating to the latter point.   
Significantly, the leading commentary on Section 149, published in 
1940 and endorsed by the then New York Superintendent of Insurance, 
explains that the drafters intended Section 149 to codify existing “common 
law principles long established in the field of insurance.”45  As an example 
of the existing common law, the Commentaries cite to the following 
holding in Cox v. C.G. Blake Co., 166 N.Y.S. 294 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917):   
 
The duty on the part of the assured to disclose material 
facts is not limited to facts which have a direct bearing on 
                                                                                                                 
40 See Geer, 7 N.E.2d. at 127. 
41 N.Y. INS. LAW § 149 (McKinney 1939) (Historical Note). 
42 Id.  
43 Id.  
44 Ont. Metal Prod. Co. v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., [1925] A.C. 344 
(P.C.) [352] (appeal taken from S.C.C.) (“In this finding their Lordships 
substantially concur, although they would have expressed the finding somewhat 
differently and would have preferred to say that had the facts concealed been 
disclosed, they would not have influenced a reasonable insurer so as to induce him 
to refuse the risk or later the premium.”). 
45 ABRAHAM KAPLAN & GEORGE I. GROSS, COMMENTARIES ON THE REVISED 
INSURANCE LAW OF NEW YORK (“Commentaries”) 338 (1940).   
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the extent of the risks or dangers, to which the subject of 
the insurance will be exposed.  All facts are material 
which would affect the mind of a rational underwriter, 
governing himself by the principles on which 
underwriters in practice act, as to either of the following 
points:  First, whether he will take the risk at all; second, at 
what premium he will take it.46 
 
The test set out in Cox, phrased in terms of whether a fact would “affect the 
mind of a rational underwriter,” clearly is objective in nature. 
 
B. SUBSECTION (3) OF SECTION 149 
 
While repeated references to “the insurer” in Section 149 have 
raised questions, subsection (3) and its legislative history have raised even 
more.  As noted above, subsection (3) provides that in determining 
materiality, “evidence of the practice of the insurer which made such 
contract with respect to the acceptance or rejection of similar risks shall be 
admissible.”47  This differs from the language originally proposed, which 
allowed a court to admit evidence “of the practices of the insurer which 
made such contract and of other insurers in reference to the making of 
similar insurance contracts.”48   
Some have argued that the omission in the enacted version of the 
“and of other insurers” language precludes a court from admitting evidence 
regarding industry custom and practice, thus negating an objective or 
“reasonable insurer” standard.49  The Historical Note following the enacted 
text provides some support for this argument, stating that “[u]nder the rule 
laid down by the Privy Council of England the ultimate test is the effect of 
the misrepresentation upon a ‘prudent insurer.’  Under subsection 3 above, 
                                                                                                                 
46 Commentaries at 340, citing Cox v. C.G. Blake Co., 166 N.Y.S. 294, 297 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1917) (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
47 N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(3) (McKinney 1939). 
48 LOUIS H. PINK, INS. DEP’T OF N.Y., INSURANCE LAW REVISION OF THE 
STATE OF NEW YORK, TENTATIVE DRAFT § 63(4), at 143 (1937) (emphasis added) 
(the italicized language, subsequently omitted, originally was released in a draft 
under Art. VII § 63(4)).   
49 See, e.g., Edwin W. Patterson, Misrepresentations by Insured under the New 
York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 241, 243 n.16 (1944) (arguing that the 
“and of other insurers” language “was eliminated in order to avoid possible 
confusion of the ‘individual insurer’ test, here adopted, with the ‘prudent insurer’ 
test”). 
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proof of what a prudent insurer would have done . . . is not the conclusive 
test.”50 
However, once again the Historical Note does not clearly rule out 
an objective test, saying only that a “prudent insurer” analysis is “not . . . 
conclusive,”51 and in fact the Historical Note raises more questions than it 
answers.  The Historical Note provides that “proof of what a prudent 
insurer would have done is merely evidence to show what the insurer in 
question would have done,”52 although as just noted the enacted text makes 
no reference to the admissibility of evidence relating to industry custom 
and practice.  The Historical Note also provides:  “Subsection 3 gives the 
plaintiff an opportunity to rebut the insurer’s evidence that it would have 
rejected the application if the misrepresentation had not been relied upon, 
by permitting the insured to show the practices of other insurers.”53  It is 
interesting to consider why the Historical Note refers to the admissibility of 
evidence relating to “practices of other insurers” when the enacted text 
makes no such reference.  Does this indicate that the insured can provide 
evidence of industry practice only to rebut an insurer’s subjective showing 
of materiality?  One possible explanation is that the Historical Note relates 
to the earlier draft of the subsection, and does not actually explain the 
intent behind the statute as finally amended. 
Another explanation may be found in the change from the use of 
the word “may” to the use of the word “shall” in Subsection (3).  Draft 
statute Section 63 (a draft precursor to Section 149) provided that evidence 
of the practices of other insurers “may be admitted in the discretion of the 
trial court.”54  As enacted, the statute only provides the type of evidence 
that “shall be admissible.”55  It is very possible that the legislature removed 
reference to evidence of the practices of other insurers because they wanted 
to keep its admission at the discretion of the trial court, but chose to ensure 
the admissibility of evidence of the practices of the individual insurer by 
making a definitive statement that it “shall be” admissible under all 
circumstances.  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
50 N.Y. INS. LAW § 149 (McKinney 1949) (Historical Note). 
51 Id. 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
54 PINK, supra note 48, at § 63(4) (emphasis added). 
55 N.Y. INS. LAW § 149(3) (McKinney 1949) (emphasis added). 
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V. PRACTICES OF OTHER STATES IN APPLYING AN 
OBJECTIVE OR SUBJECTIVE TEST 
The same issues of interpretation present in the New York courts 
also exist in other jurisdictions.  Several states have statutes with language 
similar to New York’s, and courts in those states have interpreted their 
statutes to support the use of an objective test in determining materiality.  
While the statutory language in these states, as in New York, ostensibly 
suggests a subjective test by focusing on the actions of “the insurer” in 
question, the highest courts in these states nevertheless have concluded 
their statutes support an objective test.56   
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has provided the most 
thorough analysis on the issue in York Mutual Insurance Co. v. Bowman, 
746 A.2d 906, 909 (2000).  Maine’s statutory text finds a misrepresentation 
to be material when “the insurer in good faith” would have acted 
differently “if the true facts had been known to the insurer as required” by 
the policy or contract.57  Notwithstanding this language, Maine’s highest 
court explicitly held that the test of materiality is whether disclosure by the 
insured “would have influenced a reasonable insurer in deciding whether 
to accept or reject the risk of entering into the contract, fixing the premium 
rate, in fixing the amount of insurance coverage, or in providing coverage 
with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss.”58  According to the 
Supreme Court of Maine, the relevant inquiry did not involve the particular 
instances of the loss in question, but rather an objective examination from 
the point of view of the “reasonable insurer.”59  Indeed, the court noted that 
while there is disagreement among jurisdictions with similar statutes as to 
other issues relating to materiality, they all used an objective test, stating 
that the “common factor [among these states] is that materiality is treated 
as an objective test.”60 
                                                                                                                 
56 For the most part, these statutes do not contain a provision similar to § 
149(3), regulating the admissibility of evidence of the practices of “the insurer.”  
As discussed below, Michigan is a notable exception. 
57 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24-A, § 2411(2) (1990) (emphasis added). 
58 York Mut. Ins. Co. v. Bowman, 746 A.2d 906, 909 (Me. 2000) (emphasis 
added). 
59 Id. 
60 Id. (citing Woods v. Independent Fire Ins. Co., 749 F.2d 1493, 1497 (11th 
Cir. 1985); Singer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128–29 
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987); Central Nat’l Life Ins. Co. v. Peterson, 529 P.2d 1213, 
1216 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1975); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d 
935, 941 (Okla. 1965); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Conway, 240 S.W.2d 
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Arizona’s insurance statute governing misrepresentations employs 
a similar substantive form as that of Maine, also utilizing the phrase “the 
insurer.”61  Consistent with Maine’s highest court, Arizona’s Court of 
Appeals explicitly has held that the statutory language supports an 
objective rather than a subjective test.  The court in Valley Farms, Ltd. v. 
Transcontinental Insurance Co., 206 Ariz. 349, 353 (Ct. App. 2004) stated 
that the test for materiality “is whether the facts, if truly stated, might have 
influenced a reasonable insurer in deciding whether to accept or reject the 
risk.”62  The Ninth Circuit, in applying Arizona insurance law in Mutual 
Life Insurance Co. of New York v. Morairty, 178 F.2d 470, 474 (9th Cir. 
1950), also explicitly held that the test for materiality under Arizona law is 
an objective one, explaining that the inquiry is to be examined from the 
perspective of a “reasonable insurer.”63  More recently, in 2008, the 
Arizona federal district court in Medical Protective Co. v. Pang, 606 F. 
Supp. 2d 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2008) reiterated the previous endorsement of 
an objective test by holding that “materiality exists if the facts, if truly 
stated, might have influenced a reasonable insurer in deciding whether to 
accept or reject the risk.”64  
Florida and West Virginia also have followed suit behind Maine 
and Arizona in interpreting their respective statutory provisions regarding 
materiality of misrepresentations as requiring an objective test, despite 
references to “the insurer” and not “an insurer” or “reasonable insurer” in 
the statutory language of each state.65  Courts in each of these states have 
interpreted the provision as focusing on how a reasonably prudent insurer 
                                                                                                                 
644, 646 (Ky. Ct. App. 1951); Massachusetts Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Allen, 416 P.2d 
935, 941 (Okla. 1965); Powell v. Time Ins. Co., 382 S.E.2d 342, 349–50 (W.Va 
1989)). 
61 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 20-1109(3) (2010) (“The insurer in good faith 
would either not have issued the policy, or would have not issued a policy in as 
large an amount, or would not have provide coverage with respect to the hazard 
resulting in the loss, if the true facts had been made known to the insurer as 
required either by the application for the policy or otherwise.”). 
62 Valley Farms v. Transcontinental Ins. Co., 78 P.3d 1070, 1074 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2003). 
63 Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Morairty, 178 F.2d 470, 474 (11th Cir. 1949) (“The 
test of materiality is whether the facts, if truly stated, might have influenced a 
reasonable insurer in deciding whether to accept or reject the risk; the insurer need 
not show that it would have rejected the applicant had it known of the falsity of the 
claim.”). 
64 Med. Protective Co. v. Pang, 606 F. Supp. 2d 1049, 1058 (D. Ariz. 2008). 
65 See FLA. STAT. § 627.409 (2005); W. VA. CODE § 33-6-7(c) (2006). 
2011 MATERIALITY FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS 433 
would have proceeded if not for the misrepresentation.66  Georgia’s 
statutory language mirrors that of New York, Florida, Maine, Arizona and 
West Virginia in its use of the phrase “the insurer.”67  Both the Eleventh 
Circuit applying Georgia law and the Court of Appeals of Georgia 
definitively characterize the standard by which materiality is examined as 
objective, stating that the “standard has been interpreted to be an objective 
one.”68 
Michigan is the only state which appears to use language similar to 
Subsection (3) of New York’s Section 149 in its statute governing 
materiality of misrepresentations.69  While historical decisions by Michigan 
courts have interpreted M.C.L.A. § 500.2218 to require a subjective test, 
the more recent trend is towards an objective test for determining 
materiality.  Older Michigan case law is explicit in its support of a 
subjective test, describing the analysis as focused on the “reliance or non-
reliance of the particular insurance company involved” and excluding 
evidence of what other insurers, similarly situated, may have done.70  
However, more recently, the highest court in Michigan has employed 
plainly objective language, describing the inquiry as one analyzing the 
decisions of a “reasonable” insurer.71  Thus, with respect to language in the 
                                                                                                                 
66 See Singer v. Nationwide Mut. Fire Ins., 512 So.2d 1125, 1128-29 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1987) (“A misrepresentation is material if it does not enable a 
reasonable insurer to adequately estimate the nature of the risk in determining 
whether to assume the risk.”); Powell v. Time Ins. Co., 382 S.E.2d 342, 350 (W. 
Va. 1989) (adopting a test for materiality of “whether a reasonably prudent insurer 
would consider the misrepresentation material to the contract”).  
67 GA. CODE ANN. § 33-24-7(b)(3) (2003) (“The insurer in good faith would 
either not have issued the policy or contract or would not have issued a policy or 
contract in as large an amount or at the premium rate as applied for or would not 
have provided coverage with respect to the hazard resulting in the loss of the true 
facts had been known to the insurer as required either by the application for the 
policy or contract or otherwise.”). 
68 Am. Gen. Life. Ins. Co. v. Schoenthal Family L.L.C., 556 F.3d 1331, 1340 
(11th Cir. 2009); Lively v. S. Heritage Ins. Co., 568 S.E.2d 98, 100 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2002). 
69 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 500.2218 (2008) (“In determining questions of 
materiality, evidence of the practices of the insurer which made such contract with 
respect to the acceptance or rejection of similar risks shall be admissible.”). 
70 See Mannino v. Dominion Life Assurance Co., 539 F. Supp. 323, 327 (E.D. 
Mich. 1982); Clark v. John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co., 447 N.W.2d 783, 785 
(Mich. Ct. App. 1989). 
71 See Oade v. Jackson Nat’l Life Ins. Co. of Mich., 632 N.W.2d 126, 131 
(Mich. 2001) (The “inquiry under the statutory ‘materiality’ test is whether a 
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Michigan statute similar to Subsection (3) of Section 149, the current trend 
in Michigan law supports the conclusion that Michigan courts read their 
statutory language as requiring an objective test when determining 
materiality.  
It therefore is clear from a survey of the case law of various other 
states that courts in those states have applied an objective test when 
determining materiality despite references to “the insurer” in their statute.72 
 
VI. POST-GEER APPLICATION OF A SUBJECTIVE STANDARD 
BY LOWER COURTS IN NEW YORK 
 
A. POST-GEER RULINGS APPLYING NEW YORK LAW 
 
Since the enactment of Section 149, many lower courts in New 
York have departed from Geer’s objective standard, and instead have 
determined materiality based on how the specific insurer at issue would 
have acted if it had known the true facts.  It is entirely unclear, however, 
how these courts have determined which standard to apply, and even less 
clear that they collectively could or have established a new regime of 
subjectivity in New York.  No court in New York, either appellate or 
otherwise, has ever expressly stated that Geer no longer is good law on the 
                                                                                                                 
reasonable underwriter would have regarded [the plaintiff’s revised answers to the 
health questionnaire] sufficient grounds for rejecting the risk or charging an 
increased premium . . .”). 
72 It is important to note that California courts, cited for their steadfast 
adherence to the subjective test in determining materiality, have interpreted vastly 
different statutory language when making that determination.  Rather than leaving 
the interpretative burden to their courts, the California legislature specifically 
defined materiality as a subjective test inquiry.  See CAL. INS. CODE § 334 (2005) 
(“Materiality is to be determined not by the event, but solely by the probable and 
reasonable influence of the facts upon the party to whom the communication is 
due, in forming his estimate of the disadvantages of the proposed contract, or in 
making his inquiries.”); Superior Dispatch, Inc. v. Ins. Corp. of N.Y., 181 Cal. 
App. 4th 175, 191 (2010) (explaining that the test of materiality is a “subjective 
test view from the insurer’s perspective”); Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Columbia 
Cas. Co., 11 Cal. App. 4th 1176, 1189 n.4 (1992).  The only other state which 
appears to use language similar to that in the California statute is North Dakota.  
See N.D. CENT. CODE § 26.1-29-17 (2010) (“Materiality is to be determined not by 
the event, but solely by the probable and reasonable influence of the facts upon the 
party to whom the communication is due in forming the party’s estimate of the 
disadvantages of the proposed contract or in making the party’s inquiries.”).  While 
still good law, the North Dakota statute has been cited only a handful of times.  
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issue of applying an objective standard for determining whether a 
misrepresentation is material to an insurer. 
In fact, not one lower New York court appears to have conducted a 
thorough analysis into Section 149’s ambiguous and inconsistent legislative 
history.73  The lower court dockets frequently have encountered cases, 
however, that involved the use of or reference to a subjective or objective 
standard, even in cases where the standard itself was not at issue.  Without 
additional guidance from the highest court, the lower courts have wandered 
and sometimes departed from the objective standard precedent of Geer. 
The lower courts often wander and depart from Geer by using phrases like 
“the insurer” instead of “an insurer,” but without even realizing they have 
made a choice between two very different standards.  Indeed, in many 
cases, the lower courts have assumed the standard to be subjective without 
actually justifying that assumption.  Despite arguments from some 
commentators, however, these lower court rulings do not amount to an 
abrogation of Geer, nor do they constitute a justifiable shift away from the 
objective standard. 
There are several prominent examples among these cases.  In 
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberger, the trial court rejected plaintiff 
insurance company’s action to rescind defendant’s insurance policies when 
it ruled as a matter of law that the misrepresentations made on plaintiff’s 
applications were not material.74  The court opined that misrepresentations 
could be material only if “knowledge by the insurer of the facts 
misrepresented would have led to its refusal to issue the policy.”75  In 
support of using a subjective standard, the court cites a 1944 note in the 
Columbia Law Review entitled Misrepresentation by Insured Under the 
New York Insurance Law.76  This note clearly is not an authoritative source 
on the meaning of Section 149 and most certainly does not trump the law 
set down by the New York Court of Appeals in Geer. 
Other more recent New York cases where lower courts appear to 
embrace a subjective test for materiality include rulings in Zilkha v. Mut. 
Life Ins. Co. of N.Y. (“A misrepresentation is material if the insurer would 
                                                                                                                 
73 Of course, the Court of Appeals, the highest court in New York, also has not 
conducted a thorough analysis of this issue since the enactment of Section 149. 
74 Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Goldberger, 155 N.Y.S.2d 305, 306 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
1956). 
75 Id. 
76 Id. (citing Edwin W. Patterson, Misrepresentation by Insured Under the 
New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. REV. 24 (1944)). 
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not have issued the policy had it known the facts misrepresented.”)77 and 
Feldman v. Friedman (“A fact is material so as to avoid ab initio an 
insurance contract if, had it been revealed, the insurer or reinsurer would 
either not have issued the policy or would have only at a higher 
premium.”),78 both appellate level decisions handed down in 2001 and 
1997, respectively.79  Because the courts fail to offer robust explanations of 
their rulings, it is not particularly clear whether they have endorsed or 
applied a subjective standard based on a thorough examination of the 
legislative history and case law.  In fact, in each of these cases—as appears 
to be the case in decisions by many other courts—references to “the” 
insurer, which arguably imply subjectivity, may simply be a loose choice of 
words not intended to have any precedential or substantive meaning.  
Indeed, these two appellate court decisions provide only a cursory 
quotation to the term “the insurer” in the statutory text or cite to past 
decisions that also use subjective language without explanation.  None of 
these sources constitutes a binding interpretation of the statute, and none of 
them amounts to an abrogation of the standard set forth by the Court of 
Appeals in Geer. 
Another case which has engendered significant confusion among 
lower courts is the Appellate Division’s decision in Aguilar v. U.S. Life 
Insurance Company.80  In Aguilar, the court encountered an appeal of 
summary judgment entered in favor of the insurance company, which had 
moved to rescind the life insurance policy of plaintiff for failure to disclose 
certain mental disorders.81  The court actually cited Geer throughout, yet 
                                                                                                                 
77 Zilkha v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 732 N.Y.S.2d. 51, 52 (N.Y. App. Div. 
2001) (emphasis added). 
78 Feldman v. Friedman, 661 N.Y.S.2d. 9, 10 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997) (quoting 
Christiana Gen. Ins. Corp. v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 979 F.2d 268, 278 (2d Cir. 
1992)) (emphasis added). 
79 For further examples see Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Remling, 268 A.D.2d 
572, 573 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000) (citing Insurance Law § 3105(b) and Gugleotti v. 
Lincoln Sec. Life Ins. Co., 234 A.D.2d. 514 (N.Y. App. Div. 1996), to support the 
proposition that “for a misrepresentation to warrant the voiding of an insurance 
policy, the misrepresentation must be material, meaning that had the insurer 
known the truth, it would not have issued the policy.”) (emphasis added); 
Gugleotti, 234 A.D.2d. at 514-15 (finding that revelation of scuba diving activities 
would have resulted in a different classification of the insured by the insurance 
company and permitting the insurance company to rescind the policy) (emphasis 
added).   
80 Aguilar v. U.S. Life Ins. Co., 162 A.D. 209, 211 (N.Y. App. Div. 1990). 
81 Id. at 209-10. 
2011 MATERIALITY FOR MISREPRESENTATIONS 437 
also repeatedly referred to what “the insurer” would have done, seemingly 
applying, based on Geer, a subjective test on materiality.  Thus, the Aguilar 
case quotes Geer for the proposition noting that a showing that the 
misrepresentation “substantially thwarts the purpose for which the 
information is demanded and induces action which the insurance company 
might otherwise not have taken.”82  The court also includes the following 
cite from Geer: “The question in such case is not whether the company 
might have issued the policy even if the information had been furnished; 
the question in each case is whether the company had been induced to 
accept an application which it might otherwise have refused.”83  The 
Aguilar court then “appl[ies] this test” and affirms the lower court.84  But 
what test did the court apply, exactly?  The language from Geer cited in 
Aguilar cannot resolve the issue because it only tells half the story.  Gone 
from Aguilar is the language of the “reasonable” or “prudent” insurer that 
featured so prominently in Geer and that is critical to the quotations lifted 
out of context by the court in Aguilar.  And deciding whether an objective 
or subjective standard applies was not central to the issue decided by the 
Aquilar court. 
Even more problematic and egregious is the ruling in Greene v. 
United Mut. Life Ins. Co.,85 in which the trial court rejected the jury’s 
findings and granted a directed verdict in favor of the insured as to whether 
material misrepresentations had been made.  Here, the trial court directly 
took on the question of “[w]hat constitutes a material misrepresentation 
sufficient to justify an avoidance of the policy.”86  The trial court referred 
to the Corpus Juris Secundum which stated “the test to be ‘whether 
knowledge of the true facts would have influenced a prudent insurer in 
determining whether to accept the risk or in fixing the amount of 
premiums.’”87 The Greene court then continued, reaching a shocking 
conclusion: 
 
However, the test in New York has been laid down by its 
Court of Appeals in Geer v. Union Life Ins. Co. . . . .  It 
gives a narrower test, it is not the test of what any other 
                                                                                                                 
82 Id. at 210-211 (quoting Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261, 
271) (1937)). 
83 Id. at 211 (quoting Geer, 273 NY at 269) (emphasis in original). 
84 Id. 
85 Greene v. United Mut. Life Ins. Co. 38 Misc. 2d 728 N.Y.S. 2d 809, 815-16 
(N.Y. Gen. Term 1963). 
86 Id. at 731, 813. 
87 Id. (citing 45 C.J.S. Insurance § 595). 
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insurance company would have done, but what the 
particular insurance company might have done.  It is not 
the test stated in the dissenting opinion of that case, 
quoting from an opinion in the Federal reports of Judge, 
later Chief Justice TAFT, i.e. “whether reasonably careful 
and intelligent men would have regarded the fact, 
communicated at the time of effecting the insurance, as 
substantially increasing the chances of loss insured 
against.”  Judge LEHMAN, speaking for the court, 
declared the test to be “The question . . . is not whether the 
company might have issued the policy even if the 
information had been furnished; the question in each case 
is whether the company might have issued the policy even 
if the information had been furnished; the question in each 
case is whether the company has been induced to accept an 
application which it might otherwise have refused.”88 
 
One has to wonder if the Greene court simply stopped reading the Geer 
opinion after a few pages, and how it completely missed the fact that both 
the majority AND the dissent cite to the decision by Justice Taft for the 
same purpose, i.e., that an objective test applies in determining 
materiality.89  Thus, as held in Geer and agreed by the Geer dissent, but 
completely ignored by the Greene Court, under New York law: 
 
[M]ateriality is a matter of degree and a misrepresentation 
through concealment of a fact in regard to a condition of 
health or physicians consulted, is material where it appears 
that a reasonable insurer would be induced by the 
misrepresentation to take action which he might not have 
taken if the truth had been disclosed.90 
 
While the Green court ultimately found enough evidence that the insured’s 
misrepresentation was material and directed verdict in favor of the insurer, 
its reference to Geer for application of a subjective standard is entirely 
inexplicable.   
                                                                                                                 
88 Id. (citing Geer, 273 N.Y. at 269, 277) (emphasis in original; internal page 
citations omitted). 
89 Penn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Mechanics’ Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 72 Fed. Rep. 
413 (1896). 
90 Geer, 273 N.Y. at 272. 
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B. COMMENTATORS 
 
One group of commentators has suggested that New York lower 
courts are correct to assume that Section 149 overrules the legal effect of 
Geer in every capacity, including the use of a “prudent insurer” (or 
objective) test for determining materiality of misrepresentations.91  These 
commentators refer in a footnote, for example, to seven New York 
Appellate Division decisions which purportedly “disregard Geer” and 
incorporate a subjective test.92  In reaching their conclusion, the 
commentators also rely heavily on the Appellate Division’s decision in 
Giuliani v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 475 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1945), and the Historical Note to Section 149’s citation to Judge 
Finch’s dissent in Geer, which the commentators purport, read together, 
“makes clear” the legislature’s rejection of an objective test.93  The 
authorities they cite cannot bear the weight the authors place upon them. 
The Appellate Division cases cited by these commentators simply 
do not support the proposition for which they are cited.  In five of the seven 
footnoted cases, the issue was not whether the materiality test was 
objective or subjective from the perspective of the insurer, but rather 
whether the insurer had sustained its burden on a motion for summary 
judgment to establish materiality as a matter of law.  In each of those cases, 
the courts merely ruled that the insurer had not met its burden to establish 
materiality as matter of law and that the issue remained one for the trier of 
fact to decide.94  In the sixth case, the court actually cited with approval to 
                                                                                                                 
91 Richard Jacobs, QC, Lorelie S. Masters & Paul Stanley, LIABILITY 
INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: THE BERMUDA FORM 239-40 (Hart 
Publishing 2004).   
92 Id. at 243; see Patterson supra note 49. 
93 Id. at 239-40. 
94 See Zilkha v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 732 N.Y.S.2d 51, 52 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2001) (“Here, there are issues of fact as to whether . . . any such alleged 
misrepresentations were material.”); Carpinone v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 697 
N.Y.S.2d 381, 383 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (“The materiality of an applicant’s 
misrepresentation is ordinarily a factual question unless the insurer proffers clear 
and substantially uncontradicted evidence concerning materiality, in which event 
the matter is one of law for the court to determine.”); Campese v. Nat’l Grange 
Mut. Ins. Co., 689 N.Y.S.2d 313, 314 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999) (reinstating 
complaint where “the [trial] court erred . . . in determining that the 
misrepresentations were material as a matter of law”); Cutrone v. Am. Gen. Life 
Ins. Co., 606 N.Y.S.2d 491, 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (“Summary judgment was 
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Geer in support of its holding and confirmed the trial court’s entry of 
judgment against the insured on the jury’s finding that the insured’s 
misrepresentation was material.95  Finally, in the seventh case, the court’s 
decision does not even address whether the misrepresentation was material 
or not under any standard.96  
Moreover, this group of commentators highlight that the main 
point of Section 149 was to treat the materiality of a misrepresentation as a 
matter of fact for the jury’s consideration.  As previously discussed, Judge 
Finch’s dissent in Geer was based upon his disagreement with materiality 
being treated as a matter of law.97  With respect to the subjective-objective 
standard holding, Judge Finch was in absolute agreement with the majority 
that a “reasonable insurer” (or objective) standard applies, and he 
approvingly cited to cases (also cited by the majority) which applied an 
objective standard.98   
Finally, in Giuliani, also relied on by these commentators, the only 
issue on appeal was whether the trial court erred in treating materiality as 
an issue of fact, and the court did not consider explicitly whether an 
objective or subjective test should be used.99  The appellate court 
recognized that prior to the enactment of Section 149, “the tendency of the 
courts was to determine that every misrepresentation, except the most 
trivial ones, was material and thus voided the policy.”100  Relying on 
Section 149, the Giuliani court held that except in cases where 
“misrepresentations and the facts misrepresented were so serious that their 
very seriousness would establish their materiality as a matter of law,” the 
                                                                                                                 
properly denied, however, because defendant failed to meet its burden of 
establishing the materiality of the misrepresentations in the reinstatement 
application ‘sufficiently to warrant the court as a matter of law in directing 
judgment’ in its favor.”) (citations omitted); Sonkin Assoc., Inc. v. Columbian 
Mut. Life Ins. Co., 541 N.Y.S.2d 611, 612 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) (affirming denial 
of summary judgment where insurer had failed to establish “as a matter of law” 
that insured’s misrepresentation was material).   
95 Meagher v. Exec. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 607 N.Y.S.2d 361, 361-62 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1994) (citing Geer, 273 N.Y. at 269). 
96 Tennenbaum v. Ins. Corp. of Ir., Ltd., 579 N.Y.S.2d 351-52 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1992).   
97 See supra Part III. 
98 Id. 
99 Giuliani v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 56 N.Y.S.2d 475, 477 (N.Y. App. Div. 
1945). 
100 Id. at 479. 
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question of materiality should be a question of fact for the jury.101  Notably, 
however, while Giuliani did not expressly address the standard that should 
be used to determine materiality, it implied that an objective standard 
should be used, stating that “it cannot be said as a matter of law that a 
prudent insurer like the defendant would have or would not have rejected 
the application.”102  
The authorities cited by this group of commentators for the 
proposition that the courts have established a subjective standard in New 
York by openly disregarding Geer and embracing a subjective reading of 
Section 149, in fact stand for the proposition that courts have departed from 
Geer in only a single respect: that materiality should be treated as an issue 
of fact.  To argue that these authorities indicate Section 149 completely 
superseded Geer in every respect and thus marked the end of the objective 
“prudent insurer” standard is to extract more from these authorities than is 
warranted. 
Other commentators similarly have opined—although with less 
specific analysis—that under New York law, a subjective test must be 
applied in determining whether an insurer would have considered a 
misrepresentation to be material.103  However, the key case they most often 
cite, Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindenman, similarly does not support the 
conclusion reached by these commentators.  Rather, Lindenman addressed 
only the issue of what evidence is needed to determine materiality as a 
matter of law: 
 
Whether there has been a misrepresentation, and whether it 
is material are usually questions for the jury.  However, 
                                                                                                                 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (emphasis added).  
103 See Joseph K. Powers, Pulling the Plug on Fidelity, Crime and All Risk 
Coverage: The Availability of Rescission as a Remedy or Defense, 32 TORT & INS. 
L.J. 905, 915 n. 63 (Summer 1997) (“Materiality may be proven through evidence 
of the insurer’s practice concerning similar risks or the insurer’s manuals (where 
they exist), or testimony of qualified employees of the insurer, or where common 
sense dictates that the misrepresentation was significant to the underwriting 
process.”) (citing Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co. v. Lindenman, 911 F. Supp. 619, 624-
25 (E.D.N.Y. 1995)); see also Susan Koehler Sullivan & David A. Ring, Recurring 
Issues in Rescission Cases, 42 TORT & INS. L.J. 51, 56 n. 27 (Fall 2006) (citing 
Lindemnan for the proposition that “[m]ost states measure materiality from the 
subjective viewpoint of the insurer.”). See also Edwin W. Patterson, 
Misrepresentation by Insured Under the New York Insurance Law, 44 COLUM. L. 
REV. 24 (1944). 
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where the evidence is “clear and substantially 
uncontradicted,” the court may determine it. . . .  For the 
court to determine materiality as a matter of law, 
unequivocal evidence is required of the insurer’s practice 
concerning similar risks, or the insurer’s manuals, or 
“testimony of qualified employees of the insurer that the 
insurer would not have issued the particular contract it did 
if the facts had not been disclosed.”104 
 
The Lindenman court determined that there was sufficient evidence 
(including internal memoranda and uncontested underwriting guidelines of 
the insurer) to find materiality as a matter of law, and to grant summary 
judgment in favor of the insurer.105  The Lindemnman court never 
considered, discussed, analyzed, or in any way addressed the standard that 
would apply if the question of materiality was not decided as a matter of 
law, but rather became an issue of fact to be determined by the jury at trial.  
And, notably, as discussed above in Part IV, Section 149(3) only addresses 
what evidence “shall” be admissible at trial, and never excludes other 
evidence which “may” be admissible, such as practices of other 
underwriters, expert testimony, and general industry practice.106 
 
VII. THE BETTER READING: GEER REMAINS GOOD LAW AND 
AN OBJECTIVE STANDARD APPLIES 
 
The case law regarding the objective/subjective standard is far 
from consistent.  Although the majority of New York Appellate Division 
decisions since Geer appear to apply a subjective standard for materiality, 
others explicitly have stated that materiality should be determined 
objectively.107  For example, in Horton, the court quoted Geer at length in 
                                                                                                                 
104 Mut. Benefit Life Ins. Co., 911 F. Supp. at 624-25. 
105 Id. at 626. 
106 It also is interesting to note that at least one of these group of commentators 
may not even appreciate the difference between the two standards, stating both that 
Missouri applies a “subjective” standard, Sullivan, supra note 103, at 56 n. 27 
(citing Coots v. United Employers Fed’n, 865 F. Supp. 596, 603 (E.D. Mo. 1994)), 
while just sentences later stating that Missouri applies an “objective” standard.  Id. 
at 57 n.29 (citing Crewse v. Shelter Mut. Ins. Co., 706 S.W.2d 35, 39 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1985)). 
107 See Horton v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 363 N.Y.S.2d 130, 132 (N.Y. 
App. Div. 1975); see also, Giuliani, 56 N.Y.S.2d. at 479 (finding that “it cannot be 
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support of its decision to reverse the trial court’s denial of the defendant 
insurer’s motion to dismiss on the ground of a material misrepresentation.  
The court used an objective standard, stating that a misrepresentation is 
material when a “reasonable insurer would be induced by the 
misrepresentation to take action which he might not have taken if the truth 
had been disclosed.”108  
In addition, other jurisdictions and the federal judiciary have held 
that, under New York law, materiality is determined by an objective test.  
In Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. National Union Fire Insurance Co., 1990 
WL 96400 at *1 (Del. Super. July 6, 1990), the Superior Court of Delaware 
(citing Geer as relevant precedent) recognized that under New York law, 
“fraudulent concealment can serve as a bar to recovery under an insurance 
contract if the contract contains a representation made by the insured that is 
false and material and that was relied upon by insurer in issuing the 
policy.”109  The court provided a thorough analysis on misrepresentations 
under New York law, providing in part:  “Materiality is judged by an 
objective standard; that is, would industry practice consider the allegedly 
concealed information as material to an insurer’s decision to renew the 
policy.”110  Similarly, the Southern District of New York twice has held 
that the test for materiality under New York law is an objective one, and 
depends on whether industry practice would consider the undisclosed 
information material as to the insurer’s decision to participate in the 
insurance contract.111 
Despite the potential confusion created by the enactment of Section 
149 and the inconsistent holdings of lower New York courts, there has been 
one constant for applying an objective test:  the New York Court of 
Appeals.  When a statute is enacted, it becomes the responsibility of the 
                                                                                                                 
said as a matter of law that a prudent insurer like the defendant would have or 
would not have rejected the application.”) (emphasis added).   
108 Horton, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 132 (quoting Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
273 N.Y. 261, 272 (N.Y. 1937)).    
109 Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. Nat’l Union Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, No. 89C-SE-
35, 1994 WL 721653, at *2 (Del. Super. Ct. Mar. 31, 1994). 
110 Id. at *3.   
111 See John Jovino Co. v. Fireman’s Fund Ins. Co., No. 90 Civ. 7486, 1992 
WL 176956, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 14, 1992) (“The standard by which materiality is 
judged is an objective one.”); Am. Home Assurance Co. v. Fremont Indem. Co., 
745 F. Supp. 974, 977 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (“It remains to be seen whether under the 
standard by which materiality is judged, an objective one, industry practice would 
consider the [insured’s] loss projections as material to a reinsurer’s decision to 
participate . . .”). 
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courts to interpret the law.  If the legislature believes the courts have 
misinterpreted the law, the legislature can step in and make a correction.  
The legislature never has expressly abrogated Geer’s objective standard of 
materiality.  Moreover, other jurisdictions as well as New York federal 
courts and certain lower states courts in New York have concluded, 
correctly, that New York law applies an objective standard of materiality. 
Fundamentally, New York statutory law means what the New York 
Court of Appeals says it means, and the New York Court of Appeals says 
that a misrepresentation “is material where it appears that a reasonable 
insurer would be induced by the misrepresentation to take action which he 
might not have taken if the truth had been disclosed.”112  The Court of 
Appeals continues to treat Geer as good law, and Section 149 did not 
expressly abrogate, nor is it inconsistent with, this holding.  It is time for all 
courts and tribunals applying New York law to end the unnecessary 
confusion, give precedential effect to the ruling of the New York Court of 
Appeals, and consistently apply the objective standard set down by New 
York’s highest court.   
  
                                                                                                                 
112 Geer v. Union Mut. Life Ins. Co., 273 N.Y. 261, 272 (1937). 
THE COMPLEXITY OF THE MANDATORY MEDICARE 
SECTION 111 REPORTING RULES AND ITS PRACTICAL 
LEGAL AFFECTS – IS THERE A BREAK IN SIGHT? 
 
Crystal L. Fraser* 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Medicare is a health insurance program for people age 65 or older, 
people under 65 with certain disabilities, and people of all ages with end-
stage renal disease.1  Medicare was originally considered a primary payer 
system because “the private health insurance industry made its coverage 
secondary to [M]edicare’s.”2  As a result, at its inception, Medicare was 
considered “the ‘secondary’ payer only for medical services covered by 
workers’ compensation, and the ‘primary’ payer for all other eligible 
medical services provided to eligible participants.”3  In response to the 
increasing financial burdens on the Medicare system and in an attempt to 
shift the burden of costs to private sources, Congress enacted a series of 
amendments to the Medicare provisions of the Social Security Act in 2007 
which provided numerous circumstances under which Medicare was no 
longer a primary payer.4  “Medicare Secondary Payer” (hereinafter “MSP”)
                                                                                                                 
* Crystal L. Fraser, Esq. is a 2011 graduate of the University of Connecticut 
School of Law. She is currently employed as an associate at the West Hartford 
office of Seiger Gfeller Laurie LLP.  A special thank you to Partner Mark Seiger of 
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1 Michael A. de Freitas, Annotation,Validity, Constriction and Application of 
Medicare Secondary Payer Provisions of Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.A. § 
1395y(b)) and Regulations Promulgated Thereunder, 126 A.L.R. FED. 553 (1995). 
2 Id. 
3 Christopher S. Berdy & W. Steven Nichols, The Medicare, Medicaid & 
SCHIP Extension Act of 2007: A Practitioner’s Introduction to Resolving Personal 
Injury Liability. Claims by Medicare Beneficiaries, 76 DEF. COUNS. J., Oct. 2009, 
at 393, 394.  
4 See id. §5; de Freitas, supra note 1; See also Sonja P. Morgan-Marshall, 
Federal Medicare Secondary Payer Compliance and Now Mandatory Insurer 
Reporting – What’s Next?, TRIAL ADVOC. Q., Summer 2009, at 6 (“[M]edicare is 
not expected to pay for medical services as long as payment ‘has been made, or 
can reasonably be expected to be made, promptly, under a workmen’s 
compensation law or plan of the U.S. or under an automobile or liability insurance 
policy or plan (including self-insured plan) or under no-fault insurance”).   
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is the term commonly used to refer to situations where the Medicare 
program does not have primary payment responsibility.5 Today, Medicare 
is the “secondary” payer in two circumstances. First,  
 
Medicare is a secondary payer to [group health plans] for 
Medicare beneficiaries who are eligible Medicare 
beneficiaries . . . and who have [group health plan] 
coverage on the basis of their own or their spouse’s current 
employment with an employer that has [at] least twenty 
employees for beneficiaries aged sixty-five or older, or at 
least 100 employees for the disabled, or have end stage 
Renal disease and who have [group health plan] coverage 
on any basis.6  
 
Second, Medicare is a secondary payer where certain other forms of 
insurance are responsible for a Medicare-eligible individual’s health care 
expenses.7 In this context, Medicare is essentially secondary where an 
individual is treated for an injury or illness which is work-related, was 
caused by an accident, or where either a no-fault insurance or group health 
plan will cover such illness or injury.8   
On December 29, 2007, President George W. Bush signed into law 
the Medicare, Medicaid and SCHIP Extension Act of 2007 (hereinafter 
“MMSEA”).9 Section 111 of MMSEA imposes onerous new reporting 
requirements on liability (including self-insurers), no-fault and worker’s 
compensation insurers with respect to Medicare beneficiaries who have 
coverage under group health plan (hereinafter “GHP”) arrangements, as 
well as for Medicare beneficiaries who receive settlements, judgments, or 
other awards or payments from liability insurance (including self-
                                                                                                                 
5 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., MMSEA SECTION 111 
MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER MANDATORY REPORTING: LIABILITY INSURANCE 
(INCLUDING SELF-INSURANCE), NO-FAULT INSURANCE, AND WORKERS’ 
COMPENSATION USER GUIDE, at 12 (2d ed.2009).  
6 Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3. 
7 Id. at 394-95 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii) (2008); Memorandum 
from Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Introduction to Section 111 
Mandatory Medicare Secondary Payer Reporting. 1 (Feb. 23, 2009), available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Downloads/RevisedSection111022309.
pdf.). 
8 Morgan-Marshall, supra note 4. 
9 Roy A. Franco et al., Mission Impossible: Resolution of a Case with a 
Medicare Claimant?, FOR THE DEF., May 2009, at 8. 
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insurance), no-fault insurance, or worker’s compensation.10 The passage of 
this new legislation reinforces the notion that the federal government is 
intent on ensuring that Medicare is always treated as the payer of last resort 
in these situations and is intended to provide Medicare with new and 
additional tools to enforce this right. Under the MMSEA, parties 
designated as “Responsible Reporting Entities” (hereinafter “RREs”), are 
required to report certain information to the Centers for Medicare and 
Medicaid Services (hereinafter “CMS”).11 In response to the enactment of 
the Section 111 reporting requirements, it is imperative that RREs and 
those parties who represent RREs in any capacity take significant and 
proactive steps to reasonably consider the interests of Medicare when 
resolving insurance claims involving current or future Medicare 
beneficiaries; of utmost importance is developing a thorough understanding 
of the Section 111 statutory scheme and how to comply with its tedious 
reporting requirements.12   
The MMSEA is a complicated web which has just recently begun 
to be unraveled.13 CMS has been presented many questions which, 
although the act was passed in 2007, remain without clear answers. As a 
result, the implementation date for the reporting requirements has been 
pushed back numerous times. The implementation date has already been 
delayed two full years from the initial January 1, 2009 date; RREs are 
currently expected to begin testing the reporting system on January 1, 2010 
and to begin mandatory reporting in the first quarter of 2011.14 The purpose 
of this Article is to provide detailed instructions on complying with the 
Section 111 registration requirements and to analyze the new reporting 
requirements and the significant issues they present for insurers and their 
attorneys and to present a variety of solutions which, if acted upon by the 
appropriate party or entity, will help ensure compliance with the 
requirements and prevent the imposition of severe penalties.  
Section II discusses RREs in greater detail, particularly regarding 
who qualifies as an RRE. Additionally, it argues that one of the most 
onerous tasks faced by the insurance industry is determining if an 
                                                                                                                 
10 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395y(b)(7)-(8) (2008). 
11 Id. 
12 See Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3, at 393-405. 
13 It is important to note that this body of law is continuously changing and 
developing. Indeed, from this paper’s initial drafting through its publication CMS 
issued numerous updates and clarifications. As such, it is highly likely that after 
publication certain areas will be further developed. 
14 MMSEA 111 WHAT’S NEW, https://www.cms.gov/MandatoryInsRep/ 
04_Whats_New.asp#TopOfPage (last visited October 4, 2010). 
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organization is or is not considered an RRE for Section 111 reporting 
purposes. This section outlines the importance of making this 
determination.  
Section III briefly explains Medicare entitlement and eligibility and 
argues that RREs may have extreme difficulty in obtaining the information 
necessary to make a determination as to a claimant’s Medicare beneficiary 
status. It concludes that RREs should make mandatory reporting of a 
claimant’s social security number a prerequisite to receiving any settlement 
or other form of payment and/or that defense counsel should include 
requests for this information in interrogatories served on any plaintiff. 
However, this section also highlights the particular difficulties presented by 
“older” claims where some of the suggested solutions may be ineffective.  
Section IV outlines the reporting process for RREs including 
registering with CMS and detailing what information must be submitted to 
CMS and when the information must be submitted. It argues that the use of 
agents for reporting purposes by RREs may provide an additional point of 
liability for the RRE and therefore concludes that RREs should not use 
agents as a means of attempting to comply with the Section 111 reporting 
requirements. 
Section V discusses the penalties faced by RREs for non-
compliance with the Section 111 reporting requirements. It argues that 
imposing heavy monetary fines for non-compliance, particularly in the 
scenario where a claimant has failed to provide the RRE with requested 
information is a violation of the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause and is therefore unconstitutional.  As a result, this section concludes 
that any penalties which may be imposed on an RRE should instead be 
shifted to the claimant and/or the claimant’s attorney on a strong showing 
from the RRE that the claimant has failed to provide the information 
required by the RRE to ensure compliance with the Section 111 reporting 
requirements.  Section V further suggests a process which RREs should use 
to ensure they have any information necessary to challenge any fines for 
non-compliance with the Section 111 reporting requirements.   
Section VI presents a variety of solutions to the numerous 
problems presented by the Section 111 reporting requirements. In particular 
it discusses the development of errors and omissions policies to protect 
RREs from potential non-compliance; it suggests this solution as 
particularly useful to self-insureds. Second, it discusses and advocates the 
mandatory use of Medicare set aside arrangements, patterned after the 
current requirement for workers’ compensation, for liability (including self-
insurance) and no-fault insurers as an alternative method of protecting 
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Medicare’s financial interests and to the strict reporting requirements 
advocated in the MMSEA. 
 
II. RESPONSIBLE REPORTING ENTITIES 
 
 The first major issue posed by the MMSEA is determining who 
should be designated as an RRE. Section 111 requires only RREs to report 
information to CMS.  Medicare holds the RRE solely responsible for the 
accurate and timely filing and reporting of claims and it is therefore critical 
to identify the proper RRE.  
However, the process of identifying who qualifies as an RRE has 
proven difficult and confusing. For example, in the summer of 2009, ACE 
USA, a retail operating division of ACE Group, offering property, casualty, 
risk-management and accident and health insurance products through retail 
brokers, released information advising that its insureds would be the RRE 
for almost all policy types.15 In October 2009, ACE USA released the 
following statement: “While we believe there is merit to the position that 
our insured could be properly designated as the RRE for claims against 
deductible liability policies, we recognize the information received from 
CMS can be interpreted in several ways.”16 Therefore, in the October 2009 
release ACE USA assumed responsibility as the appropriate RRE.17 These 
two press releases clearly show the ambiguities in Section 111 and the 
complications in interpreting its requirements.  
 
A. GHP RRES 
 
GHP RREs are generally insurers or third party administrators 
(“TPAs”). A TPA is an entity that pays and/or adjudicates claims and may 
perform other administrative services on behalf of the GHP, the plan or the 
plan insurers.18 In instances where an insurer, an entity that, in return for 
the receipt of premium, assumes the obligation to pay claims described in 
the insurance contract and assumes the financial risk associated with such 
payments, does not process GHP claims itself, but contracts with a TPA to 
                                                                                                                 
15 Press Release, ACE USA, Update Information: ACE and the Medicare, 
Medicaid & SCHIP Extension Act (Summer 2009) (on file with author). 
16 Press Release, ACE USA, Updated Information: ACE and the Medicare, 
Medicaid & SCHIP Extension Act (October 5, 2009). 
17 Id. 
18 See § 42 U.S.C. 1395y(b)(7) (2008). 
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perform such services, the TPA has the responsibility of reporting.19  
Employers are Section 111 RREs for GHP purposes under only very 
limited circumstances. 
 
B. LIABILITY INSURANCE (INCLUDING SELF-INSURANCE) AND 
NO-FAULT INSURANCE 
 
For non-GHP purposes (liability insurance, self-insurance, no-fault 
insurance or workers’ compensation), the RRE is the “applicable plan.”20 
The term “applicable plan” means the “following laws, plans, or other 
arrangements, including the fiduciary or administrator for such law, plan, 
or arrangement: (i) [l]iability insurance (including self-insurance); (ii) [n]o 
fault insurance; (iii) [w]orkers’ compensation laws or plans.”21 The Health 
Care Financing Administration (hereinafter “HCFA”), which administers 
Medicare, defines an applicable plan as “any arrangement, oral or written, 
by one or more entities, to provide health benefits or medical care or 
assume legal liability for injury or illness.”22  
 A non-GHP [RRE] is an employer or defendant’s insurance carrier 
(i.e., workers’ compensation insurer, general liability insurer, or no-fault 
insurer). For example, if an employer is self-insured for workers’ 
compensation or liability insurance, the employer may be an RRE.”23 An 
insurance carrier may choose to handle claims processing on its own or to 
outsource these responsibilities to another entity. However, this distinction 
is irrelevant in relation to the determination of the RRE and an insurer is 
considered an RRE regardless of whether or not it handles its own claims 
processing.24  
 
1. Liability Insurance 
 
Liability insurance is defined in the regulations implementing the 
MMESA as 
                                                                                                                 
19 Id. 
20 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., INTRODUCTION TO SECTION 111 
MANDATORY MEDICARE SECONDARY PAYER REPORTING (2009). 
21 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8). 
22 42 C.F.R. § 411.21 (2006). 
23 Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3 at 399; OLLIS & CO., SECTION 111 OF THE 
MEDICARE, MEDICAID AND SCHIP EXTENSION ACT OF 2007 (MMSEA), available 
at http://ollisinsurance.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/section_111.pdf. 
24 RRE Overview, http://www.piattconsulting.com/index.php?option=com_co 
ntent&view=article&id=131&Itemid=91 (last visited Oct. 4, 2010). 
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Insurance (including a self-insured plan) that provides 
payment based on legal liability for injury or illness or 
damage to property. . . . Liability insurance payment 
means a payment by a liability insurer, or an out-of-pocket 
payment, including a payment to cover a deductible 
required by a liability insurance policy, by any individual 
or other entity that carries liability insurance or is covered 
by a self-insured plan.25 
 
Essentially, liability insurance (including self-insurance) “is coverage that 
indemnifies or pays on behalf of the policyholder or self-insured entity 
against claims for negligence, inappropriate action, or inaction which 
results in injury to an individual or damage to property.”26 Liability 
insurance includes the following: homeowners’ liability insurance, 
automobile liability insurance, product liability insurance, malpractice 
liability insurance, uninsured motorist liability insurance, underinsured 
motorist liability insurance, etc.27 
 
2. Self-Insureds 
 
In Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co.,28 the United States District Court 
interpreted “self-insured plan” as used in the Medicare as Secondary Payer 
(hereinafter “MSP”) statute as involving an “entity that has assumed 
posture similar to that of an insurance company.”29 The Code of Federal 
Regulations defines a self-insured plan as “a plan under which an 
individual, or private or governmental entity carries its own risk instead of 
taking out insurance with a carrier.”30 The Health Care Financing 
Administration has ruled that “the mere absence of insurance purchased 
from a carrier does not necessarily constitute a ‘plan’ of self-insurance.”31 
In determining the defendants’ status as possible “self-insured plans,” the 
court in Mason stated that “one requirement for an entity to be a self-
insured plan is ‘the provider must establish a fund with an independent 
fiduciary which is documented by a written agreement that includes legal 
                                                                                                                 
25 42 C.F.R. § 411.50 (2006).  
26 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5. 
27 Id. 
28 Mason v. Am. Tobacco Co., 212 F. Supp. 2d 88, 91 (E.D.N.Y. 2002). 
29 Id. 
30 42 C.F.R. § 411.50. 
31 Medicare as Secondary Payer and Medicare Recovery Against Third 
Parties, 54 Fed. Reg. 41716, 41727 (Oct. 11, 1989). 
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responsibilities and obligations required by State laws’ for payment of 
medical expenses of those injured by its products.”32 
In a May 2010 alert issued by CMS, CMS stated that it will 
consider payments by sponsors of clinical trials for any injuries or 
complications arising out of clinical trials to be self-insurance; as such, the 
sponsors are considered to be RREs and must report these payments to 
CMS.33 As early as 2004, CMS had maintained the position Medicare 
would not make payments in situations where the clinical trial sponsor 
agreed to cover payments not otherwise covered by another payer.34 
However, CMS, until May 2010, consistently failed to give clarification as 
to whether or not the sponsor’s agreement to make such payments 
constituted a liability insurance plan.35 As such, prior to that date, sponsors 
of clinical trials were unable to determine their status as RREs and begin 
the required registration process. In the event CMS had not further 
extended the initial reporting date, these sponsors would have faced severe 
penalties. This situation illustrates the ongoing difficulty in determining 
whether or not an entity has self-insurance and the problems that difficulty 
presents.  
 
3. No-fault insurance 
 
The regulations implementing MMSEA define no-fault insurance 
as 
 
Insurance that pays for medical expenses for injuries 
sustained on the property or premises of the insured, or in 
the use, occupancy, or operation of an automobile, 
regardless of who may have been responsible for causing 
                                                                                                                 
32 Mason, 212 F. Supp. 2d at 92 (quoting Mt. Diablo Med. Ctr. v. Blue Cross 
& Blue Shield Ass’n, Dec. No. 96-D40, 1996 WL 862610, at *6 (P.R.R.B. July 1, 
1996)). 
33 Memorandum from Ctrs. For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., ALERT: 
Clinical Trials & Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance), No-Fault 
Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation (May 6, 2010), available at 
http://www.cms.gov/MandatoryInsRep/Downloads/AlertClinicalTrailsNGHP.pdf. 
34 Janice Ziegler et al., CMS Issues Section 111 Alert in NGHP Context 
Regarding Clinical Trials, MONDAQ, June 17, 2010, http://www.mondaq 
.com/unitedstates/article.asp?article_id=103200.  
35 Id. 
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the accident. This insurance includes but is not limited to 
automobile, homeowner’s, and commercial plans.36 
 
No-fault insurance is essentially a plan of “insurance that pays for 
health care services resulting from injury to an individual or damage to 
property in an accident, regardless of who is at fault for causing the 
accident.”37  
 
III. MEDICARE ENTITLEMENT, ELIGIBILITY AND 
ENROLLMENT 
  
As mentioned above Medicare, is a federal health insurance 
program for people age 65 or older, people under 65 with certain 
disabilities, and people of all ages with end-stage renal disease.38 It is 
distinguishable from Medicaid, which consists of state run health insurance 
programs designed to provide health insurance to low income pregnant 
women, children under the age of 19, people 65 and older, people who are 
blind, people who are disabled and people who need nursing home care.39 It 
is possible to qualify for both Medicare and Medicaid; however, the 
Section 111 reporting requirements concern only Medicare beneficiaries.40  
Medicare is comprised of two “parts.” Medicare Part A, commonly 
referred to as “hospital insurance,” helps a qualifying individual pay for 
inpatient care received in a hospital, skilled nursing facility, or hospice, 
and, if certain conditions are satisfied, home health care.41 The second part, 
Medicare Part B, commonly referred to as “medical insurance” helps a 
qualifying individual pay for “medically-necessary doctors’ services and 
other outpatient care.”42 Medicare Part B also pays for certain preventative 
services and services that may prevent an illness from progressing.43   
 
                                                                                                                 
36 42 C.F.R. § 411.50 (2006). 
37 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 13. 
38 de Freitas, supra note 1, at § 2a.  
39 DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., WHAT IS MEDICARE?, available at 
http://www.medicare.gov/Publications/Pubs/pdf/11306.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 
2010). 
40 See id. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.; Medicare beneficiaries may also choose to enroll in Medicare Part D, 
which is Medicare’s prescription drug coverage plan or in Medicare Part C, which 
are commonly referred to as “Medicare Advantage Plans.” 
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A. DETERMINING A CLAIMANT’S MEDICARE BENEFICIARY 
STATUS 
 
Another issue for RREs involves determining the Medicare 
beneficiary status of claimants. There are a variety of ways by which an 
RRE may determine a claimant’s Medicare status. “An RRE can request 
that the claimant provide his or her Health Insurance Claim Number, which 
is the number on the claimant’s Medicare card. RREs may also obtain a 
benefits statement from the Social Security Administration by searching 
through the CMS-developed ‘Query System,’ or by using the claimant’s 
first and last names, Social Security Number, and Social Security Consent 
Form signed by the claimant.”44 In the alternative, rather than requesting a 
claimant provide the information necessary to perform a query check, an 
RRE may request the claimant provide information as to their Medicare 
beneficiary status.45  
Each method for determining a claimant’s Medicare beneficiary 
status poses serious problems and highlights significant obstacles for 
RREs. First, if the RRE requests the claimant provide it with information as 
to its Medicare beneficiary status or social security number (hereinafter 
“SSN”) and other information, the RRE may not always be able to rely on 
the truthfulness or completeness of the claimant’s response to the RRE’s 
request.46  For their part, claimants may decide to withhold that 
information. CMS has provided space on the forms to be used by RREs in 
requesting a claimant’s Health Insurance Claim Number (hereinafter 
“HICN”) and SSN for a claimant to “explain the reason(s) for refusal to 
provide requested information”; this indicates CMS’s awareness that 
claimants may choose not to provide crucial information to RREs.47 
Furthermore, an alert issued by CMS merely advises potential claimants 
that it is appropriate for an RRE to request their SSN and/or HICN; 
unfortunately for RREs, the alert does not advise or require compliance 
with any such requests.48 In order for the Coordination of Benefits 
                                                                                                                 
44 Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3, at 399. 
45 Kenneth R. Meyer & Genevieve M. Spires, Beware of Added Complications 
in Claims Involving Medicare Beneficiaries, NEW JERSEY L. J. Sept. 28, 2009 at 2.  
46 See id. 
47 Richard L. McConnel, et. al, No Port in a Storm? Crucial Safe Harbor Still 
in Doubt Under New Medicare Section 111 Reporting Requirements, INS. 
COVERAGE 4, Dec. 4, 2009, at 3, 5. 
48 Press Release, Collection of Medicare Health Insurance Claim Numbers 
(HICNs), Social Security Numbers (SSNs) and Employer Identification Numbers 
(EINs) (Tax Identification Numbers) – ALERT (April 6, 2010).  
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Contractor (hereinafter “COBC”) to make a determination as to a 
claimant’s Medicare beneficiary status it must be able to exactly match 
either a Health Insurance Claim Number or SSN exactly and match at least 
three of the four remaining criteria (first initial of the first name, first 6 
characters of the last name, date of birth and gender) exactly.49 A claimant 
who refuses to provide the requested information to an RRE therefore 
makes it impossible for both the RRE and the COBC to make a 
determination of the claimant’s Medicare beneficiary status.  As a result, a 
claimant who refuses to provide the requested information makes it 
impossible for an RRE to comply with the Section 111 reporting 
requirements.   
An alternative method to obtaining beneficiary status includes 
submitting “a query to CMS’ Coordination of Benefits Contractor to 
determine whether a claimant is a Medicare beneficiary.”50 An RRE should 
perform regular query checks through the “Query System” for every 
claimant in an attempt to determine Medicare beneficiary status; this 
includes performing a check at the inception of the claim and prior to any 
settlement or payment. It is particularly important to perform multiple 
query checks on claimants who were initially identified as not being 
eligible Medicare beneficiaries because such a claimant’s status may 
change over the course of processing the claim. The information required 
to complete such an inquiry include: the claimant’s date of birth, SSN and 
sex of the claimant.51 Therefore, completing an investigation into a 
claimant’s Medicare status will likely involve the need to obtain the 
claimant’s Social Security Number (hereinafter “SSN”).52  However, non-
health group plans cannot compel a claimant to provide such information 
and as noted above, in other instances the claimant may simply refuse to 
provide this information.53 Also, as noted above RREs cannot rely on 
claimant’s to receive honest or complete answers to requests for this 
information. In a town hall teleconference held on October 22, 2009 CMS 
advised insurers that a “claimant who is a Medicare beneficiary would have 
an obligation to provide their HICN or SSN to the insurer, but that a 
claimant who is not a Medicare beneficiary would not be obligated to 
                                                                                                                 
49 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 35. 
50 McConnel et al., supra note 47. 
51 Id. 
52 Joe Herbers, Medicare Data Requirements to Boost Workers Compensation 
Costs, PINNACLE NEWS, July 2009, at 1-2. 
53 Id.; Kevin Quinley, Baring its Teeth, CLAIMS MAGAZINE, Oct. 6, 2009. 
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respond,” though it is unclear what statutory or regulatory authority 
supports this assertion.54  
A solution to this problem is for claims handlers to include a 
condition to their settlements which requires “that the claimant (or 
claimant’s attorney) provide the Social Security number to enable the 
settling party to comply with MMSEA.”55  Where a claimant commences a 
lawsuit against an RRE to obtain payment, defense counsel should, in their 
interrogatories, request the claimant reveal whether or not he or she is a 
Medicare beneficiary or when he or she expects to begin receiving 
Medicare benefits.56 Defense counsel may also use interrogatories to “seek 
information about the plaintiff’s Medicare Identification Number, when 
Medicare entitlement began, and whether any claim for the plaintiff’s 
medical care related to the injuries alleged in the lawsuit have been paid by, 
or filed with, Medicare.”57 However, these methods may not be successful 
for an RRE’s existing claims and therefore a retrospective process should 
be developed to gather the necessary data on existing claims. Specifically, 
RREs must develop procedures to claims where settlements have been 
reached but the RRE maintains ongoing responsibility for medicals, after 
July 1, 2009 and for lawsuits in which discovery has closed.    
In response to these troubling issues some industry professional 
have advocated a “safe-harbor” provision that would apply to RREs that 
have attempted in good faith to obtain the necessary information from 
claimants but are unable to do so or are provided inaccurate information 
regarding whether a particular claimant is receiving Medicare.58 It appears 
that CMS has adopted a limited “safe-harbor” provision.59 In an alert 
                                                                                                                 
54 McConnel et al., supra note 47, at 5. 
55 Quinley, supra note 53. 
56 Sharon Caffrey et al, Medicare Secondary Payer Statute: New Reporting 
Requirements for Products Liability and Toxic Torts Clients, 198 N.J.L. J. 868 
(2009). 
57 Id.at 869. 
58 McConnel, et al., supra note 47, at 3-4 (A “safe-harbor” makes sense in the 
context of liability insurers and self-insured entities that have no contractual 
relationship with the claimant, do not control the claimant’s actions, and have no 
legally enforceable means for obtaining information from the claimant.); Franco, 
supra note 9, at 9. 
59 See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., CMS Alert: 
Compliance Guidance Regarding Obtaining Individual HICNs and/or SSNs for 
Non-Group Health Plan (NGHP) Reporting Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8) (Aug. 
24, 2009). However, a note to the Alert reads: “This process does not provide a 
‘safe-harbor’ to any reporting entity attempting to use it to avoid reporting MSP 
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published on its website, CMS advised that an RRE would be considered 
“compliant” if it has obtained a copy of the form used to request necessary 
information signed by the claimant.60  This limited “safe-harbor” provision 
fails to address the scenario where an insured or self-insured transmits the 
necessary forms for requesting the required information to the claimant but 
the claimant fails or refuses to return the form. It is likely that many 
claimants will simply disregard the insured’s or self-insured’s request for 
the form because “claimants have little or no incentive to provide the 
requested information to liability insurers or self-insured entities, and in 
some circumstances, they arguably have an incentive not to make the 
disclosure.”61 This will undoubtedly leave RREs liable for unreported 
information which cannot possibly be obtained. CMS has indicated it may 
shift its “safe-harbor” position by expanding the protections for insurers 
and self-insured entities.62 However, as CMS representatives have advised 
in their town hall teleconferences, the Liability Insurance (Including Self-
Insurance), No-Fault Insurance and Workers’ Compensation User Guide 
(hereinafter “User Guide”) and other written alerts produced by CMS are 
the official source of information where discrepancies exist and as of the 
drafting of this paper those sources contain no expanded “safe-harbor” 
provision.  
The safe-harbor provisions proposed by industry professionals pose 
a different problem, i.e., that such a provision undermines the intent of the 
Section 111 reporting requirements. The goal of Section 111 is to protect 
Medicare’s future financial interests by ensuring that Medicare is, where 
appropriate, the secondary payer.  A “safe-harbor” provision would allow 
certain claims to remain unchecked by the CMS system and therefore 
leaves open the possibility that Medicare will make unnecessary payments 
or will be ill-informed to collect reimbursements for past conditional 
payments. As discussed below a solution to this problem with the safe-
harbor provision is to transfer the penalties to the party responsible for non-
compliance.  
 
                                                                                                                 
data about an individual known to the reporting entity to be a Medicare 
beneficiary.” Id.  
60 Id. 
61 McConnel et al., supra note 47, at 4. 
62 Id. (In a town hall teleconference on September 30, 2009, CMS 
representatives appeared to depart from the written guidance contained in the alert 
and implied that the safe-harbor might extend more broadly if the insurer could 
prove it has a “process” in place to obtain information from claimants and that the 
request form was delivered to a specific claimant by certified mail or otherwise). 
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IV. REPORTING REQUIREMENTS 
  
During the investigation of a liability claim, if the claimant is a 
Medicare beneficiary, the RRE must place the CMS COBC on notice of the 
loss.63  “An RRE does not need approval from the Medicare beneficiary to 
make this notice.”64 “[T]he trigger to report involves whether there is an 
expectation of making a payment. If there is no liability and no expectation 
of making any type of payment, there is no duty to report.”65 Those 
required to report under MMSEA were required to commence collection of 
the data required for reporting prior to the testing of the reporting process 
which is scheduled to commence on January 1, 2011.66 
  
A. REGISTERING WITH CMS 
 
Any RRE who has an expectation of making payments to a 
claimant must register with CMS in order to comply with the Section 111 
reporting requirements. As noted above, “[e]ntities who are RREs for 
purposes of the Section 111 liability insurance (including self-insurance), 
no-fault insurance, or workers’ compensation are not required to register if 
they will have nothing to report.”67  CMS has an admittedly “hard” and 
“complicated” registration and reporting process for RRE’s.  Prior to 
commencing the registration process, RREs must determine how they will 
submit Section 111 files to the COBC and how many Section 111 
Responsible Reporting Entity Identification Numbers (hereinafter “RRE 
ID”) will be needed.68  An RRE who wishes to use different agents to 
                                                                                                                 
63 See 42 C.F.R. § 411.25(a) (2010). 
64 Id.; 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(A)-(B) (2006).  
65 Franco, supra note 9, at 10; Meyer & Spires, supra note 45. 
66 Alan Cooper, Will New Law Require Set-Asides for Medicare in P.I. 
Cases?, VA. LAW. WKLY, Nov. 23, 2009. 
67 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 23 (“For example, if 
an entity is self-insured solely for the deductible portion of a liability insurance 
policy but it always pays any such deductible to its insurer, who then pays the 
claim, it may not have another to report. However, those who do not register 
initially because they have no expectation of having claims to report, must register 
in time to allow a full quarter for testing if they have future situations where they 
have a reasonable expectation of having to report.”). 
68 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 33 (“Only one Claim 
Input File may be submitted on a quarterly basis for each RRE ID. Due to 
corporate organization, claim system structures, data processing systems, data 
centers and agents that may be used for file submission, RREs may want to submit 
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submit workers’ compensation claims and liability and no-fault claims 
must register twice to obtain two RRE IDs.69  An RRE who establishes 
multiple RRE IDs must submit a quarterly Claim Input File for every RRE 
ID formed, regardless of whether or not they have any reportable claims for 
the reporting period.70  
The registration process begins with the RRE entering the COB 
secure website and providing basic information about the RRE and its 
authorized representative.71 The authorized representative is “the person 
who’s able to essentially legally bind the RRE to [a contract and the terms 
and] requirements of the Section 111 reporting”; the authorized 
representative is generally a person at the executive level in the 
organization.72 The authorized representative is the person responsible for, 
among other things, reporting, signing off on any information provided by 
the RRE during registration and signing off on who an RRE appoints as its 
account manager.73  Essentially, the authorized representative has “ultimate 
accountability for the RRE’s compliance with Section 111 reporting 
requirements.”74 Once CMS has received this information, a letter is mailed 
US Post to the authorized representative; the letter will contain a personal 
identification number (hereinafter “PIN”).75 
Once the authorized representative has received the PIN, he or she 
will provide that information to the account manager.76 The account 
manager is the person who manages the day to day activities, including 
processing and account information.77 The account manager may be an 
employee of the RRE or, if the RRE chooses, may be an agent assigned the 
reporting tasks.78 The account manager must then return to the COB secure 
website to complete the account setup process. The account manager will 
be required to provide information about themselves, develop their own 
personal login ID and password, and set up the remainder of the RRE’s 
                                                                                                                 
more than one Claim Input File to the COBC on a quarterly basis and therefore 
will need more than one RRE ID in order to do so.”). 
69 Id. 
70 Id.  
71 Telephone interview with Bill Decker, Pat Ambrose, Barbara Wright, and 
Bill Zavoina (Jan. 22, 2009).   
72 Id. 
73 Id. 
74 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 31. 
75 Telephone interview with CMS (Jan. 22, 2009). 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 24. 
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account information, which includes information relating to the agent that 
will be used in the file transfer.79 
Once the account manager has completed the second step in the 
process, “the system will generate a profile report and issue that profile 
report to [the] authorized representative via email.”80 The authorized 
representative then reviews the information, signs the last page of the 
report and returns it to CMS.81 Further, after account managers have 
completed their step in the registration process they have the ability to 
invite an unlimited number of individuals, both employees of the RRE and 
outside agents, to become account designees.82 The account designees are 
individuals who assist the account manager with the reporting process they 
“are able to upload and transfer files, monitor file statistics and so on.”83 
RRE’s were required to register with CMS by September 30, 2009, 
however the complications in determining who is considered an RRE has 
led to flexibility in this registration deadline.84  The registration process for 
RREs will remain open indefinitely to allow for ongoing registration.85 
Practitioners recommend registering with CMS as soon possible because 
RREs are required to “test their abilit[ies] to upload files in early 2010” 86 
and to begin making quarterly reports of all payments to all Medicare 
beneficiaries in January 2011.  CMS advises allowing an entire quarter of 
testing prior to commencing mandatory reporting. Therefore, RREs who 
failed to register prior to January 1, 2010 are likely to face penalties for 
non-compliance. There is no exception to penalties for RREs who were 
required and able to register prior to that date, but simply failed to do so. 
RREs that are not prepared for the reporting process to begin face the 
possibility of being fined for unreported claims.87 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
79 Telephone interview with CMS (Jan. 22, 2009). 
80 Id. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Sharon Caffrey, et al., Have you Registered Under MMSEA? New Reporting 
Obligations & Penalties for Medicare Secondary Payers, MONDAQ (October 19, 
2009).  
85 CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 5, at 26. 
86 Caffrey, et al., supra note 84.  
87 Id. 
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1. Foreign RREs88 
 
As late as October 22, 2009, nearly a month after the initial 
September 30, 2009 registration deadline, CMS had no registration process 
available for foreign RREs and no guidelines as to what steps these entities 
should take to ensure compliance with the Section 111 reporting 
requirements.89  A foreign entity is “an entity that does not have a U.S. 
address and/or a U.S. Tax Identification Number (TIN) or Employer 
Identification Number (EIN).”90  CMS initially advised these RREs “what 
[they] should do is wait.”91 On December 29, 2009, CMS finally released 
registration guidance for RREs who are foreign entities. Foreign RREs are 
advised by CMS to obtain a United States EIN by completing the Internal 
Revenue Service SS-4 application.92  As a result of the late date at which 
CMS released this information foreign RREs were not required to register 
until April 1, 2010.93  However, it is important to note that this delay in 
registration does not change the reporting requirements of foreign RREs; 
foreign entities are required to follow the same registration and reporting 
procedures as domestic RREs once they have obtained a U.S. EIN.94  The 
delay was not anticipated to change the reporting date requirements 
associated with Ongoing Responsibility for Medicals or with ‘Total 
Payment Obligation to Claimant’ amounts.95 Therefore, foreign RREs were 
expected to register at a later date than domestic RREs yet were required to  
 
 
                                                                                                                 
88 An interesting and yet unresolved legal issue surrounding foreign RREs is 
whether or not CMS may assert extraterritorial jurisdiction on these RREs who 
make direct claims payments to U.S. residents. See Federation of Regulatory 
Counsel, Inc., Medicare Secondary Payer Reporting: Extraterritorial Applicability 
of Requirements to Foreign Insurers, 21 FORC J. 2 (2010).  
89 Telephone interview with CMS (Oct. 22, 2009). 
90 Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Office of Financial 
Management/Financial Services Group, ALERT: Registration Guidance for 
Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance), No-Fault Insurance, or Workers’ 
Compensation Responsible Reporting Entities (RREs) Who Are Foreign Entities 
(Dec. 29, 2009).  
91 Telephone interview with CMS (Oct. 22, 2009). 
92 See Press Release, Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 90.  
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
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gather and prepare their information for reporting to begin on the same date 
as domestic RREs. 
 
B. USE OF AGENTS FOR REPORTING PURPOSES  
 
According to the CMS MMSEA Section 111 Medicare Secondary 
Payer Mandatory Reporting: Liability Insurance (Including Self-Insurance), 
No-Fault Insurance, and Workers’ Compensation User Guide (hereinafter 
“MMSEA User Guide”), agents are not RREs “for purposes of the MSP 
reporting responsibilities.”96 However, an RRE may “contract with an 
entity to act as an agent for reporting purposes.”97 The RRE is responsible 
for registering, reporting and filing and will designate the agent who will be 
reporting during the registration process.98 It is important to note that an 
RRE may not shift its Section 111 reporting responsibility to its agent, 
whether the attempt to do so is by contract or otherwise. The RRE remains 
the party solely responsible and accountable for understanding of and 
compliance with the Section 111 requirements and for the accuracy of the 
data submitted.99   
While it is likely numerous companies and organizations will form 
with the purpose of taking on the reporting responsibilities of RREs, it is 
not advisable to procure an agent to satisfy reporting requirements. The use 
of agents in the reporting process raises potential liability for the RRE 
because the RRE lacks control over the reporting process engaged in by the 
hired agent yet is still held responsible through monetary fines for any non-
compliance with the reporting requirements. The RRE can ultimately be 
liable for any and all misdoings and errors made by the agent during the 
reporting process, a possibility that can be easily eliminated by an RRE 
retaining, rather than delegating the responsibility of reporting.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
96 Ctrs For Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 22 (“Agents may 
include, but are not limited to, data service companies, consulting companies or 
similar entities that can create and submit Section 111 files to the COBC on behalf 
of the RRE.”). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 Id. 
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C. CLAIM THAT TRIGGERS A REPORTING REQUIREMENT AND 
REPORTING THRESHOLDS 
 
Whether or not a claim triggers reporting requirements depends on 
the type of insurance in question. For liability lines of coverage, the 
reporting requirements are triggered by any kind of payment made on or 
after October 1, 2010 to a Medicare beneficiary for a claim or potential 
claim as a result of bodily or person injury, and/or ongoing responsibility 
for payment of medical services.100  For worker’s compensation and other 
Ongoing Responsibility for Medicals (ORM) payments, CMS requires a 
look back for ORMs paid from January 1, 2009, in which the file is closed 
by the insurer, but can be reopened if further medicals are submitted.101  
 Certain claims can be excluded from the mandatory Section 111 
reporting requirements because they do not meet the CMS-established 
reporting thresholds. For liability insurance (including self insurance) and 
workers’ compensation total payment obligation to the claimant 
(hereinafter “TPOC”) the established thresholds are: 
 
(a) For TPOCs dates of January 1, 2010 through 
December 31, 2010, TPOC amounts of $0.00 - 
$5,000.00 are exempt from reporting except as 
specified in (d) below. 
(b) For TPOCs dates of January 1, 2011 through 
December 31, 2011, TPOC amounts of $0.00 - 
$2,000.00 are exempt from reporting except as 
specified in (d) below. 
(c) For TPOCs dates of January 1, 2012 through 
December 31, 2012, TPOC amounts of $0.00 - 
$600.00 are exempt from reporting except as specified 
in (d) below.  
(d) Where there are multiple TPOCs reported by the same 
RRE on the same record, the combined TPOC 
amounts must be considered in determining whether 
the reporting exception threshold is met.102 
                                                                                                                 
100 Press Release, MARSH & Am. Soc. For Healthcare Risk Mgmt., MMSEA 
Section 111 Non-Grp. Health Plan Liab. Ins. (including Self Ins.), No-Fault 
Insurance, and Workers’ Comp. Frequently Asked Questions 2 (2009). 
101 Id.  
102 Id. at 5.  
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 There are further situations where a case-by-case analysis must be 
made to determine whether or not an entity is considered an RRE and 
whether it must submit information on certain claims.103 For example, in 
the context of reinsurance, stop loss insurance, excess insurance, umbrella 
insurance, guaranty funds and patient compensation funds which have 
some responsibility beyond a certain limit may be required to report claim 
in certain situations. “The key in determining whether or not reporting . . . 
is required for these situations is whether or not the payment is to the 
injured claimant/representative of the claimant vs. payment being made to 
the self-insured entity to reimburse the self-insured entity.”104  If the 
payment is made to the self-insured in the form of a reimbursement then 
the self-insured is the RRE. However, if the payment is made to the injured 
claimant or her representative then the insurer is the RRE for reporting 
purpose.105 It is therefore advisable in these situations to make payments to 
a party other than the injured claimant or their representative. Development 
of such a policy prevents those entities named above from becoming RREs.  
 
D. WHAT TO REPORT 
 
Initial reports made to CMS must include “information for all 
claims involving a settlement, judgment, award or other payment made to a 
Medicare beneficiary” after July 1, 2009 for ORM and January 1, 2010 for 
TPOC.106  “The Claim Input File is the data set transmitted from a MMSEA 
Section 111 RRE to the COBC that is used to report liability insurance 
(including self-insurance), no-fault insurance, and workers’ compensation 
claim information where the injured party is a Medicare beneficiary and 
medicals are claimed and/or released or the settlement, judgment, award, or 
other payment has the effect of releasing medicals.”107 When making that 
report to the COBC, an RRE is required to obtain and report approximately 
130 data points. These data fall into five distinct categories: 
                                                                                                                 
103 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 75-78 (For example, 
a payment made specifically as a one-time payment for defense evaluation does 
not trigger the reporting requirement if made directly to the provider or other 
physician; “[w]here there is a settlement, judgment, award or other payment with 
no establishment/acceptance of responsibility for ongoing medicals, the RRE is not 
requirement to report, etc.”). 
104 Id. at 75. 
105 Id. 
106 Meyer & Spires, supra note 45. 
107 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 34. 
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(1) The Injured Party/Medicare beneficiary Information: 
Includes identification information, date of injury, 
cause of injury, venue, injury information, product 
identification and insurance/self-insurance claim and 
contact information 
(2) Injured party attorney information []: includes detailed 
attorney contact information along with attorney/law 
firm TIN 
(3) Settlement, Judgment, Award or Other payment 
information []: includes amounts and dates for ongoing 
responsibility for medical and total payment 
obligations 
(4) Claimant information, if other than injured party []: 
includes contact information for estate or other 
claimant in survival or wrongful death actions. 
(5) Claimant (other than injured party) attorney []: 
includes attorney contact information along with TIN. 
108 
 
Once the data is transmitted in the form of a Claim Input File, 
COBC will use the file to determine whether or not a particular claimant is 
considered an eligible Medicare beneficiary by matching the information 
provided in the Claim Input File with already existing Medicare data.109  
Initially, uncertainty surrounding reporting requirements existed 
where an RRE had a claim in which it has an ongoing responsibility for 
future medical requests, as of the implementation date, even where the 
claim had been closed in the RRE’s records.  In a January 2009 
teleconference CMS indicated it was still looking at “how far back [it] will 
require [RREs] to go in terms of cases that are already closed” as of the 
implementation date.110  It now appears CMS will require RRE’s to report 
any claims where an ongoing responsibility exists as of July 1, 2009, 
regardless of when the RRE initially settled the claim.111  This will likely 
require a significant look-back period and cause an already onerous process 
to become more challenging. 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
108 Id. at 108-46.  
109 Id. 
110 Telephone interview with CMS (Jan. 22, 2009). 
111 Meyer & Spires, supra note 45.  
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E. WHEN TO REPORT 
 
Claims information must be reported after the RRE assumes 
ongoing responsibility for medicals or after a TPOC settlement has been 
reached, or a judgment, award or any other payment has occurred.112  Claim 
Input files must be submitted to COBC on a quarterly basis during an 
RRE’s assigned 7-day file submission time frame.113 There is a grace 
period when the settlement, judgment, award or other payment is made 
within 45 days prior to the start of the seven-day file submission time 
frame.114 
 
Quarterly Claim Input File Submission Timeframes115 
Dates 1st Month 2nd Month 3rd Month 
01 - 07 
08 - 14 
15 - 21 
22 - 28 
Group 1 
Group 2 
Group 3 
Group 4 
Group 5 
Group 6 
Group 7 
Group 8 
Group 9 
Group 10 
Group 11 
Group 12 
 
V. PENALTIES 
 
 Section 111 contains provisions which provide for serious 
consequences upon the failure of an RRE to comply with its terms.116  The 
statute states, “[a]n applicable plan that fails to comply with the 
requirements under subparagraph (A) with respect to any claimant shall be 
subject to a civil money penalty of $1,000 for each day of noncompliance 
with respect to each claimant. . . .”117 At the present time it appears as 
though insurers will be strictly liable under this section for failure to 
comply with the reporting requirements.  
In addition, CMS is entitled to recover penalties based on any other 
available remedy. For example, RREs may be required to reimburse 
                                                                                                                 
112 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 5, at 34. 
113 Id. at 33. (RREs receive their Claim Input File submission timeframe with 
the profile report sent after the COBC has processed their registration and account 
setup.). 
114 Press Release, MARSH & Am. Soc. For Healthcare Risk Mgmt., supra 
note 100.  
115 Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., supra note 4, at 33. 
116 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(8)(E)(2008). 
117 Id. 
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Medicare for any conditional payments made. Section 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii), 
states, in pertinent part, when Medicare makes a conditional payment for 
medical services received as a result of an injury caused by another party, 
the government has a right of recovery for the conditional payment amount 
against any entity responsible for making the primary payment.118 A 
conditional payment is: “A Medicare benefit payment made for any item or 
service to which the exclusion for third-party payers applies, [which] is 
conditioned on reimbursement to the appropriate Medicare Trust Fund 
when notice or other information is received regarding a beneficiary’s 
entitlement to payment under a primary plan.”119   
In a recent decision, United States v. Harris, the United States 
District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia was asked to 
examine the ability of CMS to recover monies owed by a beneficiary from 
such beneficiary’s attorney.120  The court noted that to recover payment, 
“the government may ‘bring an action against any or all entities that are or 
were required or responsible . . . to make payment with respect to the same 
item or service . . . under a primary plan.’”121 Primary plan is defined as a 
group health plan or large group health plan and a workmen's compensation 
law or plan, an automobile or liability insurance policy or plan (including a 
                                                                                                                 
118 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii). “In order to recover payment made under 
this subchapter for an item or service, the United States may bring an action 
against any or all entities that are or were required or responsible (directly, as an 
insurer or self-insurer, as a third-party administrator, as an employer that sponsors 
or contributes to a group health plan, or large group health plan, or otherwise) to 
make payment with respect to the same item or service (or any portion thereof) 
under a primary plan.” Id.; see also Cox v. Shalala, 112 F.3d 151, 154 (4th Cir. 
1997) (“When such a conditional payment is made for medical care, the 
government has a direct right of recovery for the entire amount conditionally paid 
from any entity responsible for making primary payment.”). 
119 70C AM. JUR. 2D Social Sec. & Medicare § 2473 (2009). 
120 U.S. v. Harris, No. 5:08CV102, 2009 WL 891931, at *1 (N.D. W. Va. 
March 26, 2009) (holding that Plaintiff’s attorney became liable to Medicare 
immediately when he made payment to his client, a Medicare beneficiary. Mr. 
Harris’ client in a personal injury case had received Medicare benefits in the 
amount of $22,549.67. Mr. Harris settled the personal injury action for $25,000. 
He then distributed the settlement proceeds without reimbursing Medicare for its 
conditional payments. Medicare reduced its claim to $10,253.59, taking into 
account Mr. Harris’ attorney’s fees, costs, and the amount of the settlement. 
Having already disbursed the settlement funds, Mr. Harris ignored Medicare’s 
rights. Thereafter, Medicare pursued Mr. Harris in court to recover its conditional 
payment).  
121 Id. at *3 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii)). 
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self-insured plan) or no fault insurance.122 The government may also 
“recover under this clause from any entity that has received payment from 
a primary plan or from the proceeds of a primary plan’s payment to any 
entity.”123 Such an entity is defined as “a beneficiary provider, supplier, 
physician, attorney, State agency, or private insurer that has received a 
primary payment.”124  Under Harris, an attorney may be held liable for 
monies due to CMS if her beneficiary client fails to make such payment. 
However, it appears as though this situation has rarely arisen. A Freedom 
of Information Act (hereinafter “FOIA”) request submitted to CMS 
revealed on three instances in which “CMS or its agents took action to 
recover conditional payments under the [MSP] Program.”125   
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y, liability for conditional payments made 
by Medicare can be further extended to the RRE.  There are a variety of 
methods by which an RRE may protect itself from lawsuits to recover 
conditional payments. First, an RRE may make a payment directly to 
Medicare for the conditional payments which have been made and then 
make any remaining payment to the claimant. Second, the RRE may name 
Medicare as an additional payee as a material term to the settlement 
agreement. Alternatively, the RRE may establish a policy of refusing 
liability payments to claimants who fail to provide the required 
information.  
  The case of Breitkopf v. Krieger126 illustrates how these methods 
may be used in practice. In Breitkopf, the parties entered into a settlement 
agreement under which they agreed Medicare’s rights had to be 
protected.127 However, a dispute between the parties arose as to whether 
Medicare or CMS could appear as a payee on the settlement draft.128 The 
claimant demanded a portion of settlement immediately, however, the 
insurer did not want to disburse the settlement proceeds for fear of the 
possibility that Medicare would pursue a claim against it if conditional 
payments were not repaid within 60 days.129 The judge ordered half the 
money be paid to the claimant and the other half be placed in an escrow 
                                                                                                                 
122 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A). 
123 Id. 
124 42 C.F.R. § 411.24(g)(2006). 
125 Hart v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs., 676 F. Supp. 2d 846, 852 (D. 
Ariz. 2009). 
126 No. 09-1890 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 2, 2009).   
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 Id.  
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account to be distributed to Medicare upon determination of the amount of 
conditional payments that had been made.130 
Under an agreement where Medicare is listed as an additional 
payee to the settlement agreement, the plaintiff’s or claimant’s attorney or 
the claimant would be required to obtain CMS’ endorsement on the check 
before distributing or depositing the funds. This would provide CMS with 
the opportunity to recoup any monies owed to it for conditional payments 
made. Defense counsel and insurance companies should ensure that the 
naming of Medicare as an additional payee is a material term to the 
settlement agreement and that the claimant and/or plaintiff is aware of this 
term.  In the recent decision in Tomlinson v. Landers,131 an insurer issued a 
settlement draft which included CMS as a payee after learning the Plaintiff 
was a Medicare beneficiary.  The court rejected a Defendant’s Motion to 
Enforce a Settlement on the ground that there was no “meeting of the 
minds” because the parties’ settlement agreement did not include naming 
CMS as a payee.132 Under Tomlinson, it is essential that insurers and their 
attorneys include such a term in the settlement agreement. 
 
A. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES 
  
A significant Eighth Amendment constitutional issue is raised by 
the imposition of heavy fines on RREs for non-compliance, particularly in 
situations where the RRE is unable to obtain the required information from 
claimants. The Eighth Amendment provides: “Excessive bail shall not be 
required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments 
inflicted.”133 The Excessive Fines Clause “limits the government’s power 
to extract payments, whether in cash or in kind ‘as punishment for some 
offense.’”134 “The touchstone of the constitutional inquiry under the 
Excessive Fines Clause is the principle of proportionality: The amount of 
the forfeiture must bear some relationship to the gravity of the offense that 
it is designed to punish.”135 In Bajakian the Court held a punitive forfeiture 
is violative of the Excessive Fines Clause if the forfeiture is “grossly 
                                                                                                                 
130 Id. 
131 No. 3:07-cv-1180-J-TEM, 2009 WL 1117399 (M.D. Fla. Apr. 24, 2009).   
132 Id. at *3-5. 
133 U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (emphasis added). 
134 Austin v. United States, 509 U.S. 602, 610 (1993). 
135 United States v. Bajakian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998) (Forfeiture of 
$357,144 in case, based on “solely a reporting offense” when defendant failed to 
declare that he was transporting more than $10,000 in currency out of the country, 
held constitutionally impermissible).  
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disproportional to the gravity of the defendant’s offense.”136  Imposing a 
fine of $1,000 per day is arguably disproportional to the offense when 
imposed on an insured or self-insured that is unable to obtain necessary 
information from the claimant.  Here again, shifting the burden of the 
penalties to the beneficiary would alleviate an issue created by the Section 
111 reporting requirements.  
  
B. PROCESS FOR AVOIDING PENALTIES IMPOSED BY CMS  
 
RREs must take care to develop intensive methods for providing 
claimants with any necessary forms and documenting all communications 
with the claimant. For example, the RRE should deliver any required forms 
to the claimant via certified mail; this method will allow the RRE to 
develop a record of communications with the claimant. If a response is not 
received on the initial attempt, the RRE should again attempt to deliver the 
form via the same method and should document each attempt to deliver the 
form. Instituting these types of comprehensive practices may allow the 
RRE to bring possible challenges to any fines imposed upon it in relation to 
those non-cooperative claimants.   
 
C. SITUATIONS WHERE PENALTIES SHOULD BE IMPOSED ON 
CLAIMANT  
 
As discussed above, there are likely to be situations where a 
claimant refuses to provide accurate and complete information relating to 
Medicare beneficiary status, including their HICN and SSN, to an RRE. An 
RRE should not be held responsible for its non-compliance with the 
Section 111 reporting requirements where the RRE has made multiple 
attempts, in good faith, to retrieve the necessary information from the 
claimant and can show the claimant is acting to hinder recovery of such 
information and to prevent a determination of the claimant’s Medicare 
beneficiary status.  The burden of proof should be placed on the RRE to 
establish its good faith attempts to collect the necessary information and 
that the claimant has hindered that collection.  
Where a RRE is able meet its burden it should be excused from 
monetary liability as to that particular claimant. However, Medicare should 
not be prevented from collecting monetary fines in this circumstance; 
instead, the penalties which are to be imposed on the RRE should be 
shifted to the claimant and/or their representative for their interference with 
                                                                                                                 
136 Id. 
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Medicare’s ability to recoup any conditional payments, to ensure its 
position as secondary payer for future payments and/or to achieve the 
overall goal of protecting Medicare’s future financial interests. Unlike the 
safe-harbor provisions which have been advocated by some industry 
professionals, which merely relieve all parties of liability, shifting the 
burden of financial penalties to the party responsible for non-compliance 
will serve the overarching goal of the Section 111 reporting requirements. 
Furthermore, shifting the burden to the claimant may provide an incentive 
for future claimants to comply with information requests sent by RREs. 
Therefore, shifting the financial burden will not only protect RREs from 
unreasonable penalties, but will result in a more effective process for CMS, 
RREs and claimants.   
 
VI. HELPFUL SOLUTIONS 
  
A. ERRORS & OMISSIONS INSURANCE POLICIES 
 
 The insurance industry has begun to offer new products in response 
to the reporting requirements. For example, American Empire Surplus 
Lines Insurance Company (hereinafter “American Empire”), a member of 
the Great American Insurance Group, has launched an errors and omissions 
(hereinafter “E&O”) liability insurance product specifically designed for 
Medicare statutory compliance.137 E&O insurance is “an agreement to 
indemnify for loss sustained because of a mistake or oversight by the 
insured.”138 Essentially, E&O coverage provides protection “in the event 
that an error or omission . . . has caused financial loss . . . .”139 In regards to 
American Empire’s new E&O product, Bob Nelson, American Empire’s 
President and Chief Operating Officer stated: 
 
Our new policy, which provides E&O coverage for 
Medicare Statutory Compliance, is designed to help all 
entities who choose to self-insure their workers’ 
compensation or third party liability exposures. The new 
Extension Act legislation has wide-ranging consequences 
                                                                                                                 
137 Press Release, Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins., Am. Empire Surplus Lines 
Ins. Co. Launches E&O Liab. Ins. For Medicare Statutory Compl. (Nov. 9, 2009). 
138 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).  
139 Glenda Wertz, The Ins and Outs of Errors and Omissions Insurance, INS. 
J., July 19, 2004 available at 
http://www.insurancejournal.com/magazines/west/2004/07/19/features/44745.htm.  
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to these employers, who may soon be confronted with 
demands from Medicare for reimbursement for claims they 
thought were settled.140 
 
The use of an errors and omissions policy will be particularly 
useful for self-insureds, particularly those that are small companies, where 
their new Section 111 reporting requirements will seem particularly 
onerous. An errors and omissions policy like the one discussed above will 
reduce the risk associated with self-insureds by ensuring coverage where 
any compliance mistakes are made by the self-insured which would 
otherwise result in the imposition of heavy fines.  
RREs should take into consideration numerous factors in 
determining whether or not to purchase an E&O policy to protect against 
non-compliance with the reporting requirements. For instance, in the event 
an RRE uses an agent as discussed above, it is important to discern whether 
the E&O policy will cover mistakes made by the agent.  Further, as with 
any type of insurance, RREs must consider what this type of E&O policy 
will cost.  
 
B. MEDICARE SET ASIDE ARRANGEMENTS  
 
The central goal behind the new reporting requirements enacted 
through MMSEA is to provide Medicare with additional tools by which to 
seek reimbursements for Medicare claims.  Completing CMS-approved set-
aside arrangements, commonly referred to as MSAs, will effectively serve 
this purpose. A Medicare set-aside is “an allocation for future payments 
under an insurance claims settlement designated exclusively to pay for 
medical services that would be covered by Medicare if the injury/illness is 
not covered by a private insurance program.”141 Medicare set-asides are 
currently required only in workers’ compensation settlements.142 The 
widespread use of Medicare set-asides in other settlement agreements will 
ensure that Medicare’s interests are being reasonably considered by the 
parties. The advantage of a Medicare set-aside arrangement is that when 
the set-aside amount has been completely exhausted, Medicare will become 
                                                                                                                 
140 Am. Empire Surplus Lines Ins., supra note 137.  
141 A Closer Look: Medicare Set-Aside Arrangements Become an Issue for 
Risk Managers, WORKPLACE STRATEGIES (MARSH, Global Offices) 2005, at 1.   
142 See id. 
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the primary payer and will be responsible for all future Medicare-covered 
expenses related to the injury.143 
Under the current Medicare set-aside scheme for workers’ 
compensation claims the following requirements must be met:  
 
(1) The claimant is currently a Medicare beneficiary and 
the total settlement amount is greater than $25,000; OR,  
(2) The claimant has a “reasonable expectation” of 
Medicare enrollment within thirty (30) months of the 
settlement date and the anticipated total settlement amount 
for future medical expenses and disability/lost wages over 
the life or duration of the settlement agreement is expected 
to be greater than $25,000.144 
 
The amount of a set-aside arrangement varies on a case-by-case basis and 
should be approved by CMS. The approval process would allow CMS to 
evaluate the extent to which its interests are being considered and advise 
the parties as to what adjustments, if any, must be made in their 
computations. In computing the amount to be “set-aside” the parties should 
consider: “all future medical expenses (including prescription drugs), 
repayment of any Medicare conditional payments, previously settled 
portions of a workers’ compensation claim, life expectancy, inflation, 
administrative fees, wages, and attorney fees.”145   
 There are no current requirements that MSAs be used in the 
context of non-workers’ compensation claims, including personal injury 
liability claims. However, using MSAs for these types of claims appears to 
be the most prudent way to protect Medicare’s interests for future expenses 
                                                                                                                 
143 Berdy & Nichols, supra note 3, at 397.  
144 Id. at 396 (citing Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Workers 
Compensation Medicare Set-aside Arrangement, available at 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/WorkersCompAgencyServices/04_wcsetaside.asp#TopOf
Page); see id. (A claimant may have a “reasonable expectation” of Medicare 
enrollment when the individual (1) has applied for Social Security Disability 
Benefits; (2) has been denied Social Security Disability Benefits but anticipates 
appealing that decision; (3) is in the process of appealing and/or refiling for Social 
Security Disability Benefits; (4) is 62 and six months old; or, (5) has an End Stage 
Renal Disease condition but does not yet qualify for Medicare.).  
145 Id. Conditional payments are those payments made by Medicare to a 
provider for health care services. “Medicare can and will seek reimbursements 
from GHPs and non-GHPs for conditional payments made if it determines those 
payments were the responsible of a primary payer.” Id. at 395. 
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and to protect RREs against future liability and fines. A system of MSA for 
personal injury liability claims could closely resemble the system currently 
in place for workers’ compensation claims. If any scenario listed above 
exists, a set-aside arrangement would be an appropriate option.146  
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
 In an attempt to “protect its future financial interests,” Medicare 
has imposed stringent new reporting requirements on liability (including 
self-insurance), no-fault and workers’ compensation insurers. These new 
reporting requirements present a variety of obstacles which make strict 
compliance difficult for these entities. Lack of strict compliance can lead to 
the imposition of stiff monetary penalties on these entities, as well as 
liability for any other remedies available to CMS. The simplest way to 
avoid liability is for the RRE to retain reporting duties within itself, not to 
outsource that responsibility to agents. That is because RREs may not 
transfer its duty to report, that is, it will always be liable for errors and non-
compliance, regardless if it actively participates in the actual reporting 
process.  
Affected entities need to take care to ensure they determine the 
proper RRE for reporting purposes and that the RRE makes any and all 
attempts to ensure compliance. Ensuring compliance with the reporting 
requirements will be particularly difficult because the RRE must rely 
heavily on the trustworthiness and cooperation of the claimant who for all 
intents and purposes has little incentive to honor any information requests 
from the RRE. For this reason, the burden of penalties should be shifted 
from the RRE who attempts in good faith to the uncooperative claimant 
who through his or her actions is essentially interfering with Medicare’s 
right to protect their interests.  
As CMS works through the implementation of the mandatory 
reporting requirements, more “alerts” and information are sure to come. 
Until then, the hurdles and obstacles faced by RREs and their attorneys will 
remain great. And until then, entities involved in the liability (including 
self-insurance), no-fault, and workers’ compensation insurance industry 
must be sure to determine their status as an RRE and comply with the 
current reporting requirements.  
 
                                                                                                                 
146 Id. at 401. 
DOWN THE ROAD TO PERDITION: HOW THE FLAWS OF 
BASEL II LED TO THE COLLAPSE OF BEAR STEARNS AND 
LEHMAN BROTHERS 
 
John F. Rosato* 
 
“For the last two decades, the Basel Committee keeps coming back to the 
same basic question: How much bank capital is enough?”1 
 
- FDIC Chairman, Sheila Bair 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
  
It is often said that a wise farmer should “never let a fox guard the 
henhouse.”  Echoing such sentiments, the U.S. FDIC Chairman, Sheila 
Bair, warned, “There are strong reasons for believing that banks left to their 
own devices would maintain less capital, not more, than would be prudent. 
. . . In short; regulators can't leave capital decisions totally to the banks. We 
wouldn't be doing our jobs or serving the public interest if we did.”2  
Chairman Bair made these comments in response to the proposed U.S. 
adoption of the 2004 Basel Accord (Basel II), which allows banks to 
develop statistical models for quantifying their individual capital 
requirements.3  Despite Chairman Bair’s cautionary words, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) became the first Federal 
agency to adopt the Basel II framework in late 2004.4 
Under heavy pressure from broker-dealers such as Lehman 
Brothers the SEC adopted the Basel II framework through its Consolidated 
Supervised Entity (CSE) program.5  At its inception, the CSE program had 
                                                                                                                                      
* J.D., University of Connecticut School of Law, 2011; M.B.A., University of 
Connecticut School of Business, 2011; B.A. in Political Science and History, 
University of Richmond, 2007.  I would like to thank Professor Patricia McCoy for 
her feedback and assistance.   
1 Sheila Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks at the 2007 Risk 
Management and Allocation Conference (June 25, 2007) (transcript available at 
Factiva) [hereinafter Sheila Bair, Remarks]. 
2 Id.  
3Id. (“When will the Americans finish the rule? . . . . We are working on it.  
We want a consensus on appropriate safeguards that will allow our banks to 
implement Basel II.”).    
4 See SEC Alternative Net Capital Requirements for Broker-Dealers, 17 
C.F.R. § 240 (2009) [hereinafter Alternative Net Capital Rule]. 
5 See Alternative Net Capital Rule, supra note 4; Letter from Joseph 
Polizzotto, Gen. Counsel, Lehman Brothers, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz, Sec’y, U.S. 
Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Mar. 8, 2004), available at http://edgar.sec.gov/rules/ 
proposed/s72103/lehmanbrothers03082004.htm. [hereinafter Lehman Brothers 
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seven participants: Bear Stearns, Goldman Sachs, Lehman Brothers, 
Merrill Lynch, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, and Citigroup.6  In particular, 
Lehman Brothers championed the CSE program as generally increasing 
competitiveness and aligning U.S. regulations with the European Union.7  
Fundamentally, these broker-dealers assured regulators that despite capital 
requirements being calculated internally, adequate risk-management 
policies and advanced statistical modeling would ensure that proper levels 
of capital would be maintained.  
Despite the promise of the CSE, by March of 2008 three of the five 
participating firms had at least $30 of debt to every $1 in assets.8  Such 
ratios are far in excess of the SEC’s standard limit of $15 in debt to every 
$1 in assets.9  Yet, even in the face of such alarming levels of leverage, the 
broker-dealers continued to assure the markets that they were in 
compliance with the CSE standards.  On March 11th, three days before the 
collapse of Bear Stearns, SEC Chairman, Christopher Cox, stated that he 
had “a good deal of comfort” about the capital cushions being maintained 
by CSE participants.10  Despite such assurances, by the end of September 
2008 all but two of the original CSE participants had dissolved or been 
acquired.11  More alarmingly, September 15th, 2008, the day Lehman 
                                                                                                                                      
Letter] (“Lehman Brothers applauds and supports the Commission in establishing a 
voluntary alternative method of computing net capital for certain broker-dealers. . . 
.”). 
6 U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., SEC’S OVERSIGHT 
OF BEAR STEARNS AND RELATED ENTITIES: THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED 
ENTITY PROGRAM iv, Report No. 446-A at iv (September, 2008) [hereinafter OIG 
Report].   
7 See Lehman Brothers Letter, supra note 5. 
8 Ben Protess, Flawed SEC Program Failed to Rein in Investment Banks, 
PROPUBLICA, Oct. 1, 2008, http://www.propublica.org/article/flawed-sec-program-
failed-to-rein-in-investment-banks-101.  
9 OIG Report, supra note 6, at ix. 
10 Boyd Erman, The Fed Rushes in as Wall Street Teeters, GLOBE AND MAIL 
(Toronto), Mar. 12, 2008, at B1. 
11 Robert Schroeder, Goldman, Morgan to Become Holding Companies: 
Companies get Access to Fed Lending in Exchange for Oversight, 
MARKETWATCH, Sept. 21, 2008, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/goldman-
sachs-morgan-stanley-to-become-bank-holding-companies. The remaining two 
firms, Goldman Sachs and Morgan Stanley applied to be bank holding companies, 
which effectively removed them from SEC oversight. Id.    
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Brothers filed for bankruptcy, surpassed 9/11 as the costliest day in Wall 
Street’s history.12   
Such events make Chairman Bair’s words seem prophetic.  The 
public is still left wondering what happened, and how regulators could have 
been so wrong?  In an attempt to answer these questions, this Note will 
investigate the flaws of Basel II’s capital requirements by examining the 
collapse of the investment banks Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers. 
Section II will discuss the relevant background and underlying 
principles of capital regulation.  This information will lay the foundation 
for understanding how the Basel Accords operate.  After establishing these 
basic principles, section III will outline the regulatory frameworks of the 
Basel I and Basel II accords.  Next, section IV will explore how the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) applied the Basel II standards 
to investment banks and how the SEC rule contributed to the collapse of 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.  Connected to the collapse of Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, section V will explore how the SEC failed to 
fulfill its regulatory obligations under the Basel II framework and how 
global regulators can avoid similar mistakes.  Finally, this Note will 
conclude by recommending that global financial regulators reconsider the 
adoption of the advanced approach in light of the recent financial crisis, 
and return to a simpler form of regulation.   
 
II. CONCEPTUAL FOUNDATIONS FOR THE REGULATION OF 
FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
A. WHY WE REGULATE INVESTMENT BANKS 
 
In their simplest form, investment banks are financial intermediaries 
that pool money raised from investors, and invest that money in securities 
ranging from corporate stocks and bonds to mortgage-backed securities.13  
However, unlike depositors in a commercial bank, investors in an 
investment bank are not guaranteed a specific return and can theoretically 
lose their entire investment in the company.14  In return for this additional 
risk, investment banks offer portfolios with a far broader range of 
investments and thus, rewards, than traditional commercial bank deposits.  
                                                                                                                                      
12 Niall Ferguson, The Descent of Finance, HARV. BUS. REV., Jul. 1, 2009, 
http://hbr.org/2009/07/the-descent-of-finance/ar/1.   
13 RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL ET AL., THE LAW OF BANKING AND FINANCIAL 
INSTITUTIONS 555 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 4th ed. 2009). 
14 Id.  
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Some argue that investment banking is nothing more than a for-profit 
business similar to any other commercial enterprise.15  As a result, the 
advocates of this position assert that investment banks should be subject to 
the same regulatory oversight as any other business.16  Such oversight is 
often relaxed or entirely nonexistent.  Nonetheless, every nation in the 
world subjects investment banks to some form of advanced regulatory 
supervision.17 What is the reason for such regulation?  
In 1911, Justice Rousseau Angelus Burch provided a clairvoyant 
answer when he described the economic role of banks as being 
“indispensible agencies through which the industry, trade and commerce of 
all civilized countries and communities are now carried on.”18 Though 
Justice Burch was specifically referring to commercial banks, his logic 
applies to investment banks as well.  At the beginning of 2008, investment 
banks held assets in excess of $13 trillion (23% of total U.S. household 
financial assets).19  Given investment banks’ prominent role in creating and 
maintaining wealth, it should be of little surprise that the proper 
functioning of the investment banking industry is in the interest of every 
nation.  Like the failure of a commercial bank, the failure of an investment 
bank carries greater significance than the failure of most other commercial 
enterprises.  Not only does an investment bank’s failure destroy the wealth 
of its investors, it erodes the public’s confidence in the financial system as 
a whole, which reduces the flow of credit and, thus, commerce.20  
Accordingly, in order to preserve the flow of commerce and protect the 
wealth of households, nations impose regulations that seek to minimize an 
investment bank’s exposure to a variety of risks.21  
Today, financial regulatory schemes are based on several primary 
principles.  First, regulators control entry into the banking industry through 
                                                                                                                                      
15 PETER WALLISON, WHY DO WE REGULATE BANKS? 2 (Am. Enter. Inst., 
August, 2005) available at http://www.aei.org/docLib/20050729_18781FSOAug 
05_g.pdf.  
16 Id. 
17 For list of nations, see INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REPORTS ON THE 
OBSERVANCE OF STANDARDS AND CODES, available at 
http://www.imf.org/external/np/rosc/rosc.asp?sort=topic#BankingSupervision (last 
visited May. 2, 2010) [hereinafter Observance Standards]. 
18 Schaake v. Dolley, 118 P. 80, 84 (Kan. 1911).  
19 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 14.  
20 Id. 
21 L. Jacobo Rodriguez, International Banking Regulation: Where’s the 
Market Discipline in Basel II?, POLICY ANALYSIS, Oct. 15, 2002, at 3, available at 
http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa455.pdf.       
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the issuance of licenses and impose penalties on institutions that fall out of 
compliance with the requirements of entry.22  Second, regulators generally 
impose capital requirements that force banks to hold minimum levels of 
money in reserve.23  Finally, regulators attempt to impose market discipline 
on the financial industry through the public disclosure of financial 
information, which permits investors and depositors to assess the risk 
associated with a particular bank.24 This Note is primarily concerned with 
the second principle, minimum capital requirements.   
   
B. THE DEFINITION OF CAPITAL 
 
When regulators refer to a bank’s capital they are referring to the 
“financial cushion that depository institutions maintain to shield themselves 
from unanticipated losses.”25  In its simplest terms, capital is the amount by 
which financial institution’s assets exceed the institution’s total liabilities.26  
Core capital primarily consists of retained earnings and shareholder’s 
equity.27  It is a generally accepted principle of financial regulation that the 
larger a financial institution’s capital, the more likely the institution will be 
able to repay its investors and avoid failure.28  In addition, forcing financial 
institutions to hold a minimum level of capital helps incentivize reasonable 
risk-taking on the part of the company’s shareholders.29   
                                                                                                                                      
22 RESERVE BANK OF INDIA DEPARTMENT OF BANKING SUPERVISION, CORE 
PRINCIPLES OF EFFECTIVE BANKING SUPERVISION, §§ 1-2 (1999) (Discussing the 
essential elements of an effective regulatory system and licensing as core 
principles of banking regulation), available at 
http://www.rbi.org.in/upload/publications/pdfs/10115.pdf.     
23 Id. at § 3 (discussing capital requirements as core principles of banking 
regulation). 
24 Id. at § 5 (discussing the disclosure of financial statements as a core 
principle of banking regulation). 
25 PATRICIA MCCOY, BANKING LAW MANUAL: FEDERAL PRUDENTIAL 
REGULATION OF BANKS AND THRIFTS § 6.03 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2009). 
26 Capital is the “net worth of a business; that is, the amount by which its 
assets exceed its liabilities.” InvestorWords.com, Capital, http://www.invest 
orwords.com/694/capital.html (last visited April 12, 2011). 
27 Equity Capital is “[i]nvested money that, in contrast to debt capital, is not 
repaid to the investors in the normal course of business.  It represents the risk 
capital staked by owners through purchase of the firm’s common stock.”  
Businessdictionary.com, Equity Capital, http://www.bis.org/press/p981027.htm  
(last visited Feb. 26, 2011). 
28 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 252. 
29 MCCOY, supra note 25.   
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The simplest form of capital regulation is called a “debt-to-capital 
ratio.” For investment banks, the debt-to-capital ratio represents the ratio of 
total debt to total equity capital.  A higher ratio indicates that the 
investment bank has more risk associated with its portfolio of 
investments.30  For instance, suppose that an investment bank has $310 in 
assets, $300 in debt, and $10 in equity capital ($310 in assets - $300 in 
debt).  By dividing total debt by total equity capital we arrive at a leverage 
ratio of 300/10 or 30-to-1.  However, this simple measure of an investment 
bank’s capital adequacy assumes that all assets are equally suited to 
providing an effective capital cushion.  This assumption fails to account for 
each asset’s level of risk and risk of default.  To solve this obvious flaw, 
financial regulators developed “risk-adjusted” capital standards.31   
 
C. RISK-ADJUSTED CAPITAL STANDARDS 
 
To adequately account for each individual asset’s unique risk 
profile, international financial regulators employ “risk-adjusted capital 
standards.”  This type of capital adequacy standard, pioneered in the 1988 
Basel Accord (Basel I), requires that banks hold a level of capital 
commensurate with an asset’s credit risk.32  For instance, would you rather 
place your money in a bank that maintains investments in U.S. Treasury 
bonds or commercial bonds?  Naturally, one favors the bank that invests in 
U.S. Treasury bonds because U.S. sovereign debt is backed by the full faith 
and credit of the American people.  Similarly, banking regulators need to 
make judgments about the stability and value of a bank’s assets when 
calculating the appropriate level of capital that should be held.  In the 
above scenario the bank investing in U.S. Treasury bonds would be 
required to hold no additional capital, while the bank investing in 
commercial bonds would be required to hold a more capital in reserve.   
This discrepancy results from the varying level of confidence that 
regulators have in the stability of the underlying asset.  Since the bank’s 
investment in Treasury bonds has few risks and a relatively stable value, 
regulators have a great deal of confidence that such an asset will act as an 
effective financial cushion to absorb a bank’s unanticipated losses.  
                                                                                                                                      
30 Id.  
31 See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING REGULATIONS AND 
SUPERVISORY PRACTICES, INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL 
MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL STANDARDS (1988), available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc111.pdf?noframes=1 [hereinafter BASEL I].  
32 Id. at 7-8. 
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However, the bank’s investment in commercial bonds is inherently more 
risky.  Commercial bonds are susceptible to interest rate fluctuations, the 
creditworthiness of the debtor company, and a host of other issues that 
threaten their stability and valuation.  As a result of this additional 
uncertainty, regulators have significantly less confidence in the commercial 
bonds acting as an effective financial cushion.  Accordingly, the primary 
result of employing risk-adjusted capital standards is to force banks with 
riskier portfolios of assets to hold larger amount of capital in reserve.33 
 
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING 
REGULATION 
 
A. BASEL I 
 
In 1988, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (Basel 
Committee) completed the Basel I accord, which establishes a framework 
for measuring capital adequacy for internationally active banks.34  Basel I, 
which has since been adopted by more than 100 countries, was developed 
in response to several financial crises during the 1980’s.35  The goal of 
Basel I is to stabilize the global banking system through uniform capital 
adequacy standards and to reduce regulatory competition by establishing 
common regulations for all banks.36  Basel I accomplishes these goals by 
utilizing a risk-adjusted capital framework, focusing on the measurement of 
a bank’s capital adequacy in relation to its credit risk.37  Basel I was later 
amended to also account for market risk.38  At the heart of Basel I is a 
three-step process: 1) determining total capital 2) determining risk-
weighted assets; and 3) determining the risk-adjusted capital ratio.39 
                                                                                                                                      
33 See MCCOY, supra note 26.  
34 BASEL I, supra note 31. 
35 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 21, at 7.  
36 BASEL I, supra note 31, at 1 (“[T]he new framework should serve to 
strengthen the soundness and stability of the international banking system; 
and…have a high degree of consistency in its application to banks in different 
countries with a view to diminishing an existing source of competitive inequality 
amount international banks.”). 
37 Id. at 8. 
38 W. Ronald Gard, Article, George Bailey in the Twenty-First Century: Are 
we Moving to the Postmodern Era in the International Financial Regulation with 
Basel II?, 8 TENN. J. BUS. L. 161, 183 (2006).   
39 CARNELL ET AL., supra note 13, at 259-65 (discussing three phase process 
for calculating a bank’s capital adequacy). 
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1. Total Capital: Tier 1 and Tier 2 
  
Since not all forms of capital provide an effective cushion against losses, 
Basel I divides a bank’s total capital into two tiers.40  Tier 1 (Core) capital 
is the preferred form of capital and consists of common equity shares, non-
cumulative preferred shares, and holdings in consolidated subsidiaries.41  
Because of its preferred status, regulators require that 50% of a bank’s 
capital requirements be satisfied with Tier 1 assets.42  Tier 2 
(Supplementary) capital accounts for all other non-preferred forms of 
capital.43  Tier 2 capital commonly includes hybrid capital instruments, 
subordinated debt, and general loan-loss reserves.44   
Using these tiers, Basel I establishes limits and restrictions on the 
composition of a bank’s total capital.  Most prominently, Basel I limits Tier 
2 capital to 100 percent of Tier 1 capital.45  In other words, if a bank has 
$500,000 in Tier 1 capital and $1 million in Tier 2 capital, the bank’s total 
capital can only be $1 million ($500,000 in Tier 1 capital and $500,000 in 
Tier 2 capital).  Additionally, Basel I limits subordinated debt to 50 percent 
of Tier 1 capital.46  For instance, if a bank has Tier 1 assets of $500,000 and 
subordinated debt of $1 million, the bank’s total capital cannot exceed 
$750,000 ($500,000 in Tier 1 capital and $250,000 in subordinated debt).  
After appropriately sorting a bank’s assets and applying the requisite 
restrictions, a bank’s total capital can be determined by simply adding Tier 
1 to Tier 2.47  
 
2. Risk-Adjusted Assets 
 
Next, Basel I values a bank’s “risk-adjusted assets” by dividing a 
bank’s total assets into four broad categories or “buckets.”48  Each bucket is 
assigned a specific conversion factor or “risk-weight” that is tied to the 
                                                                                                                                      
40 See BASEL I, supra note 31, at 3-7 (discussing the constituent elements of 
capital). 
41 Id. at 14-15. 
42 Id. at 3-4. 
43 Id. at 4-6. 
44 Id. at 14.  
45 BASEL I, supra note 31, at 14. 
46 Id.  
47 Id. 
48 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 21, at 8. 
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credit risk associated with the assets contained in each category.49  
Specifically, the four buckets and their associated risk-weights are: 1) cash 
and government securities-0 percent; 2) interbank claims-20 percent; 3) 
debt secured by real property-50 percent; and 4) all other obligations, 
including corporate debt-100 percent.50  Once a bank’s total assets have 
been appropriately sorted into the above categories, the dollar value of each 
category is multiplied by the conversion factor.51  The resulting dollar 
amounts represent the risk-weighted asset value for each category.  For 
instance, if a bank has $100,000 in mortgages (debt secured by real 
property), the risk-weighted value of those mortgages is $50,000 (100,000 
multiplied by the conversion factor of 50 percent).   
In addition, Basel I also provides mechanisms for drawing 
otherwise off-balance-sheet obligations, such as letters of credit, into total 
risk-adjusted assets for purposes of capital adequacy.52  Once again, off-
balance sheet obligations are grouped into the same four buckets, and 
multiplied the by the conversion factors: 0 percent, 20 percent, 50 percent, 
and 100 percent.53  By summing the risk-weighted value of categories 1-4 
we can calculate a bank’s total risk-weighted asset value.  
 
3. Risk-Adjusted Capital Ratio 
 
Finally, Basel I sets the ratio of minimum capital to risk-weighted 
assets at 8 percent,54 of which Tier 1 capital must be at least 4 percent.55  
For instance, if a bank has total risk-weighted assets of $100,000, the bank 
would be required to hold a minimum of $8,000 in capital ($100,000 x .08).  
At least $4,000 of the $8,000 capital charge would need to be Tier 1 capital 
($100,000 x .04).  However, Basel I assumes that national bank regulators 
will require banks to operate with capital levels in excess of the 8 percent 
                                                                                                                                      
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 8 tbl. 1. 
51 Id. at 8. 
52 BASEL I, supra note 31, at 19. 
53 Id. at 25 (“Once the bank has calculated the credit equivalent amounts, 
whether according to the current or the original exposure method, they are to be 
weighted according to the category of counterparty in the same way as the main 
framework…”). 
54 Id. at 13. 
55 Id. 
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minimum.56  Internationally active banks had until 1992 to bring their 
capital reserves into compliance with this ratio.57    
 
4. Criticisms of Basel I   
 
While Basel I represents an elegantly simple way of calculating a 
bank’s risk-adjusted capital, the accord has been plagued by problems.58  
First, the use of broad risk categories and risk-weights incorrectly assumes 
that all assets within a single category are equally risky.59  For instance, 
under Basel I the government bonds of Greece are assumed to be equally as 
risky as the government bonds of the United States.60  As the current 
sovereign-debt crisis in Greece demonstrates, it is not only imprudent, but 
incorrect to assume that the same level of risk is associated with each 
individual asset in a particular risk group.  Additionally, Basel I’s broad-
brush risk categories encourage banks to invest in riskier assets within a 
given risk category.61  For instance, since all mortgages have a .50 risk-
weight,62 banks have an incentive to hold riskier (higher paying) mortgages 
without holding a commensurate amount of additional capital.  These 
limitations were of great concern to global regulators who feared that the 
Basel I framework had not adequately accounted for the riskiness of a 
bank’s assets.63  As a result, the Basel Committee began work on a revised 
capital adequacy framework in 1999.64  
 
B. BASEL II  
 
In an effort to correct the pitfalls of Basel I, the Basel Committee 
released a revised capital adequacy framework known as Basel II in 2004.65  
                                                                                                                                      
56 Id. at 2. 
57 Gard, supra note 38, at 178.   
58 RODRIGUEZ, supra note 21, at 9.   
59 Id. 
60 Id.  
61 Id. at 10. 
62 Id. at 8 tbl. 1. 
63 Id. at 11. 
64 See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, A NEW 
CAPITAL ADEQUACY FRAMEWORK (June 1999) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs50.htm; see also MCCOY, supra note 26.   
65 See generally BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, 
INTERNATIONAL CONVERGENCE OF CAPITAL MEASUREMENT AND CAPITAL 
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The new accord is based on three pillars: I) minimum capital requirements 
for credit risk, market risk, and operation risk; II) Guidelines for effective 
supervisory review; and III) market discipline through enhanced public 
disclosures about capital adequacy.66  This Note will primarily focus on 
how Pillars I and II contributed to the collapse of Bear Stearns and Lehman 
Brothers.   
Though Basel II represents a significant departure from Basel I, 
key elements of Basel I were retained.67  For instance, Basel II still utilizes 
risk-adjusted capital standards, the 8 percent capital ratio, and the 
classification of capital into Tier 1 and Tier 2.68  However, Basel II does 
introduce significant changes to how the risk may be calculated under Pillar 
I.69  In an effort to correct the “one size fits all” approach of Basel I, Basel 
II sets up two approaches to calculating a bank’s minimum capital 
requirement, the “standardized approach” and the “advanced approach.”70   
 
1. Pillar I: The Standardized and Advanced Approaches 
 
The standardized approach is best understood as a modified version 
of the basic risk-adjusted capital requirements in Basel I.   The Basel 
Committee decided to leave this approach intact as an option for banks that 
may not be able to comply with the significantly more complex advanced 
approach.71  Under the standardized approach, the concept of sorting assets 
into risk categories or “buckets” remains, but the number of buckets is 
increased.72  Additionally, the standardized approach now forces banks to 
take a standard capital charge to account for market risk.73  Finally, the 
standardized approach ties the risk-weights assigned to each “bucket” to 
the external credit-rating of the borrower as issued by companies such as 
Standard & Poor’s.74  By tying the risk-weight to the market-based credit 
                                                                                                                                      
STANDARDS: A REVISED FRAMEWORK, COMPREHENSIVE VERSION (June 2004) 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs107.pdf?noframes=1 [hereinafter BASEL II].   
66 Id. at 2. 
67 MCCOY, supra note 25 at § 6.03[2].   
68 Id.  
69 Id. 
70 BASEL II, supra note 66, at 15, 48; MCCOY, supra note 26 at § 6.03[2].  
71 MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.03[2]a. 
72 BASEL II, supra note 66, at 15, 23 (discussing individual risk categories and 
associated risk-weights); MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.03[2]a. 
73 MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.03[2]a.  
74 BASEL II, supra note 65, at 19-27 (discussing the assessment of credit risk 
using the ratings from “external credit assessment institutions”). 
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ratings, it is hoped that banks will be less inclined to engage regulatory 
arbitrage.75   
By making these modifications, the Basel Committee hoped to 
correct the problems of Basel I and preserve the basic risk-adjusted capital 
framework for the banks that chose to utilize it.  However, for the largest 
internationally active banks the Basel Committee developed a far more 
complex form of capital adequacy standards aimed at providing banks with 
great flexibility.76     
The Basel Committee’s goal in developing the advanced approach 
was to give weight to the qualitative differences in banks’ [risk 
management] choices.77  The advanced approach permits the largest 
internationally active banks to estimate their own levels of risk or “risk-
weights” by utilizing their own internal value at risk (VaR) statistical 
models.78  The advanced approach is based on the assumptions that banks 
are better informed about their own risk profiles than regulators, and that 
banks have a natural incentive to avoid undue losses.79  It was hoped that 
the additional flexibility provided by the advanced approach would help 
banks realize more consistent profits through improved capital 
deployment.80    
 
i. Understanding the Value at Risk Statistical Model 
 
Value at risk models (VaR) “measure the risk of a portfolio of 
assets by estimating the probability that a given loss might occur.”81  Put 
differently, VaR models tell us that there is an X percent probability that a 
portfolio will lose more than X dollars over a certain period of time.82  
Under Basel II, banks using the advanced approach are required to develop 
                                                                                                                                      
75 MCCOY, supra note 25, at § 6.02[2]a.   
76 THE FEDERAL RESERVE, CAPITAL STANDARDS FOR BANKS: THE EVOLVING 
BASEL ACCORD 398 (Sept. 2003) http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/bulletin 
/2003/0903lead.pdf [hereinafter FRB Capital Standards]. 
77 Gard, supra note 38, at 189.   
78 See BASEL II, supra note 65, at 48-112 (discussing the mechanics and 
requirements of the “internal ratings-based approach”).  
79 MCCOY, supra note 26, at  § 6.03[2]b.   
80 Gard, supra note 38, at 189-90.   
81 The Risks of Financial Modeling, VaR and the Economic Meltdown: 
Hearing before the Subcomm. on Investigations & Oversight, 111th Cong. 59 
(Sept. 2009) (Statement of Richard Bookstaber, Risk Manager, Bridgewater 
Associates) [hereinafter Risks of Financial Modeling]. 
82 Id. 
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VaR models that have a confidence levels of 99 percent, meaning that the 
model is incorrect only 1 percent of the time.83 To construct a basic VaR 
model a risk-manager would take the following steps: 1) identify all the 
assets held in a portfolio; 2) obtain the daily returns for each individual 
asset for the past 250 trading days (one year); 3) aggregate the returns for 
each individual asset to obtain the return for the entire portfolio over the 
past 250 trading days; 4) order the daily portfolio returns from highest to 
lowest to develop an estimate of the daily value at risk at the 99 percent 
confidence level, and 5) smooth the results by fitting the returns to the 
Normal distribution function and incorporating additional risk variables.84     
However, like all mathematical equations, VaR models have 
limitations.  For instance, a properly constructed VaR model needs to 
include variables that account for the probability of inherent risks, such as 
the risk of default.85  A failure to input such variables or to input correct 
probabilities can result in an ineffective model that permits a financial 
institution to make imprudent investment choices.  Additionally, VaR 
models are dependent upon the assumption that the past trading history for 
an asset is a reasonable representation of how the asset will trade in the 
future.86  For instance, if the 250 trading day sample only includes a 
positive trading cycle, a very low probability of decline will be included in 
the model’s predictions.  Additionally, since VaR models operate at the 
99% confidence level there is still a 1% chance that the model is 
completely incorrect.87  A huge limitation of the VaR model is that it does 
not tell you whether the 1% represents a catastrophic or minor market 
event.88 Thus, one should not be lulled into a false sense of security by the 
fact that VaR models employ advanced statistics.  The quality and accuracy 
of VaR models will inevitably vary based on the quality of the inputs and 
those constructing it. 
 
2. Pillar 2: Supervisory Review 
 
Pillar 2 of the Basel II accord outlines four supervisory principles 
to guide regulators in participating countries.89  The guidelines are meant to 
                                                                                                                                      
83 See BASEL II, supra note 65, at 73. 
84 Risks of Financial Modeling, supra note 81. 
85 Id. at 59-60. 
86 Id. at 60. 
87 Joe Nocera, Risk Mismanagement, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2009, at MM24. 
88 Id. 
89 See BASEL II, supra note 65, at 158-72 (Discussing the supervisory review 
process). 
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ensure that all regulators require that, “banks have adequate capital to 
support all the risks in their business… [and] to encourage banks to 
develop and use better risk management techniques in monitoring and 
managing their risks.”90   
The four principles are that: 1) banks should have a process for 
assessing their overall capital in relation to their risk profile and strategy 
for maintaining their capital levels; 2) regulators should review and 
evaluate banks’ internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies as well 
as their ability to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory 
capital ratios.  Regulators should take appropriate action if they are not 
satisfied with the results of this process; 3) regulators should expect banks 
to operate above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the 
ability to require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum; and 4) 
regulators should seek to intervene at an early stage to prevent capital from 
falling below the minimum levels required to support the risk 
characteristics of the particular bank.91 
The principles on supervisory review are an important aspect of 
achieving the uniform implementation of the accord.  Such guidelines are 
necessary, because Basel II gives each member nation latitude in 
determining how to implement the framework.92  In addition, the added 
regulatory complexity of Basel II requires adequate supervision in order to 
compensate for the added flexibility given to banks.93  As the recent 
financial crisis has shown us, without proper regulatory oversight, risk-
models can be approved without proper inspection and banks may be 
allowed to dip below minimum capital requirements before enforcement 
action is taken. 
 
C. THE CONSOLIDATED SUPERVISED ENTITY PROGRAM 
 
In 2003, the European Union (EU) issued the Financial 
Conglomerates Directive, which required that financial conglomerates 
operating with the EU be supervised by either EU financial regulations or 
                                                                                                                                      
90 Id. at 158. 
91 Id. at 159-65 (discussing the “four key principles of supervisory review”); 
Rodriguez, supra note 21, at 14.  
92 Id. at 2 (“[T]he framework also allows for a limited degree of national 
discretion in the way in which each of these options may be applied, to adapt the 
standards to different conditions of national markets.”). 
93 Erik F. Gerding, Code, Crash, and Open Source: The Outsourcing of 
Financial Regulation to Risk Models and the Global Financial Crisis, 84 WASH. L. 
REV. 127, 188 (2009). 
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by a set of substantially equivalent rules.94  Given the comprehensive 
nature of the EU financial regulations, the major U.S. investment banks 
preferred to be regulated by the SEC.95  Unfortunately, the Gramm-Leach-
Bliley Act of 1999 created a regulatory void in the U.S. for systemically-
important investment bank holding companies.96  Nevertheless, major 
investment banks pressured the SEC to fill the regulatory void in order to 
avoid the exacting EU regulations.97  In response to this pressure, the SEC 
created a voluntary supervision option for broker-dealers known as the 
consolidated supervised entity (CSE) program.98  The CSE program 
incorporated the three pillars of Basel II, and allowed the SEC to supervise 
broker-dealers on a consolidated basis, including their holding companies 
and affiliates.99  The goal of the program was to permit the SEC to monitor 
the systemic risks to U.S. regulated investment banks posed by their 
unregulated affiliates.100   
As part of the CSE program, an investment bank could apply to the 
SEC for an exemption from the Commission’s standard net capital rule.101  
After obtaining such an exemption and agreeing to consolidated 
supervision, the investment bank was permitted to compute its required 
capital using an “alternative method” that complied with the Basel II 
capital standards.102  However, unlike Basel II, participating financial 
institutions would be required to maintain an overall Basel capital ratio of 
                                                                                                                                      
94 Report of Examiner Anton R. Vukas, at 1484, In re Lehman Brothers 
Holdings, 433 B.R. 133 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) (No. 08-13555) available at 
http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/VOLUME%204.pdf [hereinafter Examiner’s 
Report].  
95 Id.  
96 Id.  
97 See Lehman Brothers Letter, supra note 5. 
98 See Examiner’s Report, supra note 94, at 1484-85. 
99 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
100 Id. at viii (“The regime is intended to allow the Commission to monitor for, 
and act quickly in response to, financial or operational weakness in a CSE holding 
company or its unregulated affiliates that might place regulated entities, including 
US and foreign-registered banks and broker-dealers, or the broader financial 
system at risk.”). 
101 Id. at 2. Under the standard net capital rule it must meet certain ratios and 
maintain minimum net capital levels based on the type of securities activities they 
conduct.   
102 Id. at 2-3.   
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not less than the Federal Reserve’s 10 percent well capitalized standard.103  
Based on the specific risk qualities of its assets, a firm’s internal risk 
modeling could require it to maintain a capital ratio well above the 10 
percent minimum.104     
Investment banks such as Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
favored the adoption of the CSE program, because they believed that their 
superior risk-management systems would result in lower capital 
requirements.105  However, Alan Greenspan aptly pointed out in 2002 that 
“all risk-management strategies rest on uncertain forecasts and the models 
underlying the frontier approaches . . . depend on key assumptions that rest 
on fragmentary or indirect evidence . . . To be sure, even the most 
sophisticated risk models will never be a complete substitute for 
experienced judgment.”106  Unfortunately, Mr. Greenspan’s concerns were 
validated on March 14th, 2008, the day Bear Stearns declared bankruptcy.         
 
IV. THE COLLAPSE OF BEAR STEARNS AND LEHMAN 
BROTHERS 
 
On March 14th, 2008, J.P. Morgan acquired Bear Stearns in a 
federally orchestrated and assisted effort to save the financial markets from 
imminent peril.107  At the time of its acquisition, Bear Stearns had a debt-
to-equity ratio of 33 to 1.108  Similarly, prior to its collapse on September 
15th, Lehman Brothers’ debt-to-equity ratio reached a high of 32 to 1.109  
Such ratios are in stark contrast to the SEC’s standard net-capital rule, 
which only permits a debt-to-equity ratio of 15 to 1.110  Yet, despite these 
                                                                                                                                      
103 Id. at 3 (“The CSEs are required to maintain an overall Basel capital ratio 
of not less than the Federal Reserve’s 10 percent ‘well capitalized’ standard for 
bank holding companies.”). 
104 BASEL II, supra note 66, at 211.   
105 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 4. 
106 Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Federal Reserve, Remarks at the Conference 
on Bank Structure and Competition, Chicago, IL. (May 10, 2002) 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speexhes/2002/20020510/default.htm.  
107 See David Ellis & Tami Luhby, Bear Stearns Bailout Keeps Firm Afloat, 
CNNMONEY.COM, March 14, 2008, http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/14/news/co 
mpanies/jpm_bsc/index.htm?section=money_topstories.    
108 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 19.   
109 Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., Quarterly Report (Form 10-Q), 89 (May 
31, 2008), available at http://www.rns-pdf.londonstockexchange.com/rns/8436Z_ 
1-2008-7-24.pdf. 
110 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 19. 
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alarmingly high rates of leverage, Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers 
reportedly never fell below the 10 percent capital minimum of the CSE 
program.111  How could these firms have been allowed to reach such high 
rates of leverage and how could the SEC have maintained confidence in the 
capital adequacy of these firms?  The section below will demonstrate how 
flaws in VaR modeling, non-compliance with Basel II principles, and 
failures in SEC oversight helped diminish each firm’s capital adequacy and 
contributed to their collapse.   
 
A. FAILURE OF VAR MODELING (PILLAR I) 
 
As previously discussed, the central innovation of Basel II is the 
advanced approach for calculating capital adequacy.  Essential to the 
operation of the advanced approach is the VaR statistical model, which 
allows banks to calculate the risk associated with a particular portfolio of 
assets.  However, as mentioned above, VaR models contain several 
assumptions that, if not recognized, will result in a distortion of the model’s 
results.  Specifically, the models will yield imprecise risk measures, which 
will adversely affect the level of capital held by the financial institution.  It 
was precisely a lack of attention to the VaR model’s assumptions and thus, 
its limitations, that helped drive Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to the 
brink.  
One of the basic assumptions underlying any statistical model is 
that all of the variables are properly included.  In a risk model such as VaR, 
this means that all of the known assets in a portfolio and their associated 
risk assumption are included.112  For instance, if a bank were to construct a 
risk model for a portfolio of mortgage-backed securities, it would be 
essential that variables such as home prices, interest rate fluctuations, and 
delinquency rates were included.  Such variables represent only the most 
basic forms of risk associated with mortgage-backed securities and are 
essential to producing models that yield accurate results.  Yet, Bear 
Stearns’ VaR models for mortgage-backed securities failed to adequately 
account for both the natural fluctuation in home prices and delinquency 
rates.113  As a result, in the months leading-up to its collapse, Bear Stearns’ 
                                                                                                                                      
111 Id. at viii-ix.   
112 Risks of Financial Modeling, supra note 81, at 3.  
113 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 23. 
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risk-modeling floundered.114  Because of these inconsistencies, internal 
memos suggest that the trading-desks began to ignore the advice of risk-
managers.115  Internal confidence in risk-modeling was further eroded when 
Bear Stearns abruptly replaced an experienced risk-manager, which 
resulted in the further disruption of the company’s risk-management 
structure.116 
Additionally, and potentially most critically, VaR models need to 
have sufficient historical trading and valuation data in order to accurately 
project future results.117  For instance, if a financial institution’s VaR model 
only contained data during a stable or positive market trend, the model may 
not accurately forecast potential downswings in valuation.  Unfortunately, 
VaR models at most financial firms included historical trading data that did 
not adequately capture the volatility of the assets.118  As a result, though the 
VaR models were operating correctly, they were not accurately projecting 
the risk of future downturns in asset valuations.   
Because of the above and other limitations of VaR models, it is 
essential that they are adequately “stress-tested.”119  Since the VaR models 
operate at the 99% confidence level, there is still a 1% chance that the 
model is completely incorrect.120  However, a huge limitation of the VaR 
model is that it doesn’t tell you what can happen during the 1% of the time 
when it is wrong.121  Thus, to assess whether the 1% represents a 
catastrophic failure or a small blip, stress testing puts the model through a 
series of hypothetical stresses to see how it will react.  For instance, for a 
portfolio of corporate bonds a bank might place the VaR model through a 
test involving a dramatic change in interest rates.  Though both Bear 
                                                                                                                                      
114 Mark Pittman, Cox’s SEC Censors Report on Bear Stearns Collapse, 
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 7, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=2107 
0001&sid=a6iXuZJG1L44. 
115 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 22-23. 
116 Id. 
117 Risks of Financial Modeling, supra note 81, at 3-4. 
118 Nocera, supra note 87 (“The whole intellectual edifice, however, collapsed 
in the summer of last year because the data input into the risk-management models 
generally covered only the past two decades, a period of euphoria.  Had instead the 
models been fitted more appropriately to historic periods of stress, capital 
requirements would have been much higher and the financial would be in far better 
shape today.”).    
119 Romain Berry, Stress Testing Value-at-Risk, J.P.MORGAN, http://www.jpm 
organ.com/tss/General/Stress_Testing_Value-at-Risk/1159389400084.  
120 Id. 
121 Id. 
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Stearns and Lehman brothers did test their VaR models under certain 
historical scenarios, (including the 1987 stock market crash in the case of 
Lehman)122 there is evidence that the models were not properly designed.  
For instance, at Bear Stearns the VaR model for mortgage-backed 
securities was never tested for a potential collapse in home prices.123  As 
recent events have shown, such a test would have been critical to highlight 
potential flaws in how the model was constructed.  Similarly, at Lehman 
Brothers management deliberately excluded risks to its real estate 
investments from firm wide stress tests.124  Thus, Lehman’s VaR models 
were never tested for economic shifts in the real estate market.  These 
examples help demonstrate why adequate stress-testing is needed and why, 
if not conducted, firms cannot adequately prepare for the catastrophic 1%. 
 Murphy’s Law tells us that “anything that can go wrong will go 
wrong.”  Unfortunately, the above represents a perfect example of this 
concept.  The limitations of VaR modeling have been well documented 
since it was first created by J.P. Morgan in the early 1990’s.125  Yet, both 
Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers failed to take notice of these limitations, 
choosing instead to be lulled into complacency by the sirens song of 
mathematics.    Not only did these firms ignore the flaws contained in VaR 
modeling, they also failed to take the necessary steps to help mitigate those 
risks.  Thus, as critics of the Basel II advanced approach warned,126 Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers touted the superiority of their risk 
management systems, while in reality they were woefully unprepared.  
These inadequacies not only led Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers to 
collapse, but led the global financial system down the road to perdition.   
 
B. LACK OF COMPLIANCE WITH BASEL II CAPITAL ADEQUACY 
STANDARDS (PILLAR I) 
 
Beyond the proper management of VaR models, Bear Stearns and 
Lehman Brothers demonstrated a troubling record of compliance with CSE 
and Basel II standards for calculating capital adequacy.  The CSE program 
requires that a participating financial institution “calculate capital adequacy 
consistent with the international standards adopted by the Basel Committee 
                                                                                                                                      
122 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 24; Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 30.    
123 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 24. 
124 Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 181-82. 
125 Nocera, supra note 87.   
126 Sheila Bair Remarks, supra note 1.   
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on Banking Supervision.”127  While both Bear Stearns and Lehman brothers 
complied with these standards on paper, serious lapses in compliance with 
the requirements resulted in questionable levels of capital being 
maintained.   
In particular, Bear Stearns exhibited a troublesome pattern where 
each division of the company maintained separate VaR numbers for each 
portfolio of assets.128  For instance, while the trading desk might have one 
set of VaR numbers, another division might be working with a completely 
different set of numbers for the same exact portfolio.129  The inconsistency 
in VaR numbers between divisions undoubtedly diminished the 
effectiveness of the risk management infrastructure and prevented adequate 
“enterprise wide” risk assessments from being made.  Such a state of affairs 
is of particular note, because it violated Basel II standards, and would have 
allowed Bear Stearns to choose the most favorable VaR numbers for 
calculating its capital charges.130  Thus, though one division might have 
VaR numbers to suggest that the asset presented significant risks, requiring 
a higher capital charge, the company could chose to disclose a set of VaR 
numbers that painted a completely different picture.  Such behavior is not 
only risky; it is fraudulent and inconsistent with the spirit of the CSE and 
Basel II. 
Additionally, Bear Stearns failed to comply with Basel II by failing 
to markdown stressed assets in order to forestall the resulting capital 
charges.131  For instance, when the market value of an asset declines, banks 
are required to “markdown” or reduce the value of the asset as it is 
recorded on their books.  Bear Stearns attempted to avoid the 
corresponding capital charges by delaying such markdowns.  This behavior 
is particularly incentivized during periods of market turmoil, because the 
cost of raising new capital can be expensive and can send a negative signal 
to the market.132  Additionally, if a firm were to sell the asset, it might also 
incur additional capital charges as the value of its assets declined in relation 
to its debts.  Thus, under Basel II, firms have a “perverse incentive to delay 
markdowns” to avoid additional and potentially costly capital charges.133 
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Finally, at Lehman Brothers a series of “Repo 105” transactions 
resulted in questionable capital charges being made.134  A Repo 105 
transaction is an accounting maneuver that allows short-term loans to be 
temporarily classified as a sale.135  The cash obtained through these "sales" 
are then used to pay down debt, allowing the company to appear to reduce 
its debt-to-equity ratio by temporarily paying down liabilities.136 In order to 
artificially reduce its capital charges and improve its debt-to-equity ratio in 
late 2007 and early 2008, Lehman Brothers use Repo 105 transactions to 
temporarily remove debt from its balance sheets.137   Prior to its collapse, 
Lehman Brothers undertook “$38.6 billion, $49.1 billion, and $50.38 
billion of Repo 105 transactions at the ends of fourth quarter 2007, first 
quarter 2008, and second quarter 2008 respectively.”138  Such behavior is in 
direct contravention of Basel II and the CSE program, since it allowed 
Lehman Brothers to illegitimately reduce its debt-to-equity ratio and 
corresponding capital charges. 
The above series of events only corroborates Chairman Bair’s 
predictions that banks have a natural tendency to hold less capital rather 
than more.  Instead of choosing to comply with Basel II and CSE standards, 
Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers used loopholes and outright tricks to 
delay the inevitable.  Such behavior resulted in the systematic manipulation 
of capital ratios, and shows a complete disregard for the stability of the 
financial system.  Yet, the above problems with VaR calculations and the 
deliberate manipulation of capital charges also demonstrate why Basel II 
and the CSE program contain guidelines for adequate regulatory 
supervision.  
 
V. FAILURE OF SEC OVERSIGHT (PILLAR II) 
 
  Basel II requires that regulators “review and evaluate banks’ 
internal capital adequacy assessments and strategies as well as their ability 
to monitor and ensure their compliance with regulatory capital ratios.”139   
Additionally, Basel II requires that regulators “expect banks to operate 
above the minimum regulatory capital ratios and should have the ability to 
                                                                                                                                      
134 See Examiner’s Report, supra note 96, at 732-34. 
135 Id. at 732. 
136 Id. at 733-34. 
137 Id. 
138 Id. at 733 n. 2852. 
139 BASEL II, supra note 67, at 209. 
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require banks to hold capital in excess of the minimum.”140  In fact, the 
CSE program required that participants submit to regular inspections of the 
internal risk management control systems and gives the SEC the power to 
require a participant to maintain a capital adequacy ratio of at least 10 
percent.141  Yet, despite being aware of many deficiencies in CSE 
compliance, several documented incidents demonstrate how the SEC failed 
to use the powers at its disposal to enforce compliance.142 
  So what happened?  Was the SEC asleep at the switch?  Were the 
powers given to the agency inadequate?  Sadly, the answer seems to be 
twofold.  First, the agency seems to have fallen victim to the same market 
euphoria and sense of infallibility that plagued the very firms it regulated.  
Second, the SEC severely understaffed the CSE program, limiting its 
ability to effectively police participating financial institutions.  
  One of the major components of Basel II and the CSE is that firms 
utilizing the advanced approach submit their VaR models to regulators for 
approval.143  Such a review process allows the regulating agency to assess 
the adequacy of the risk models before approving a firm’s use of the 
advanced approach.144  Yet, on several occasions, the SEC approved 
applications to become part of the CSE program prior to the firm’s VaR 
models being reviewed.145  In fact, in the case of Bear Stearns the SEC 
never issued a formal approval of the firm’s VaR modeling.146  To make 
matters worse, internal memoranda reviewed by the inspector general of 
the SEC suggest that the SEC was aware of the inadequacy of Bear 
Stearns’ risk management systems, but blindly accepted executives’ 
assurances that the systems would be updated and corrected.147  It is unclear 
what might have been motivating the SEC to not properly review VaR 
models, but one thing is certain, the failure to do so set the CSE program 
down an ominous path from the beginning.  
                                                                                                                                      
140 Id. at 211. 
141 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 3. 
142 See generally OIG Report, supra note 6; Examiner’s Report, supra note 94. 
143 OIG Report, supra note 6, at 40. 
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  In another documented occurrence, the SEC became aware of 
inconsistencies in the VaR numbers being submitted to the agency by Bear 
Stearns.148  As discussed above, Bear Stearns was maintaining multiple sets 
of VaR calculations for the same portfolios of assets and using the most 
favorable of these numbers to calculate its capital charges.  Bear Stearns 
officials were unable to account for the inconsistencies, but appear to have 
assured the inspectors that they were taking corrective action.149  Nothing 
in the OIG’s report suggests that the SEC pursued these inconsistencies 
further. 
 Even after the collapse of Bear Stearns the SEC failed to take prompt 
corrective action against Lehman Brothers.  For instance, in 2008 the SEC 
became aware that Lehman Brothers had characterized a multi-billion 
dollar deposit with Citigroup (made as a precondition to continued banking 
relations) as a liquid cash deposit.150  Given that the deposit could not be 
withdrawn without adverse effects upon Lehman’s day-to-day business 
operations, the SEC disagreed with Lehman’s characterization.151  
However, instead of forcing Lehman Brothers to properly classify the 
deposit, the SEC took no enforcement action.152  Instead, the SEC 
discounted the risk posed by the deposit’s mischaracterization and 
characterized it as an “illiquid asset” for internal calculations only.153 As a 
result, Lehman Brothers was effectively permitted to manipulate its debt-
to-equity ratio and corresponding capital charges.  Such behavior not only 
misled the investing public as to Lehman Brothers’ financial health, it was 
a patent violation of the CSE program and Basel II standards.      
  Finally, in the months leading up to the collapse of Bear Stearns 
and Lehman Brothers, the SEC seemingly took little notice of the rapidly 
shrinking capital adequacy ratios and rapidly rising leverage ratios at each 
firm.154  In fact, the SEC took no action between 2006 and 2008 as Bear 
Stearns’ capital adequacy ratio fell from 21.4 percent to just 11.1 percent 
by March 2008.155  While the CSE program and Basel II require that the 
agency take prompt corrective action to ensure that a firm operates with 
levels of capital above the minimum requirements, the SEC allowed Bear 
Stearns to come dangerously close to the 10 percent capital adequacy 
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minimum without so much as a written warning. It was not until two weeks 
before the March 14th collapse of Bear Stearns that the SEC sent a letter 
recommending that the firm raise additional capital.156  How could the SEC 
have been so blind? 
  The answer to the above question is twofold.  First, the SEC was 
simply caught up in the pro-market that plagued the very firms they 
regulated.  Despite being aware of numerous violations, the SEC simply 
failed to act.  In fact, one commentator described the SEC as succumbing 
“to the anti-regulation climate of recent years.  Too many of its members 
just did not believe in regulation.”157  Such comments, in combination with 
the SEC’s relaxed pursuit of known violations suggest a culture of 
complacency that bred inaction.   
  Moreover, an inspector general’s report notes that since its 
inception, the CSE program had a “small number of staff.”158  In fact, even 
in 2008, the CSE program only employed seven inspectors, two in 
Washington, D.C., and five in the New York regional office.159  
Considering that these inspectors were charged with reviewing dozens, if 
not hundreds of VaR models per firm, it is hard to believe that adequate 
inspections occurred.  Such a conclusion is buttressed by the fact that in 
September 2008 the CSE program had not conducted any inspections in 18 
months.160  Even six months after the collapse of Bear Stearns, only three 
inspections were in progress to “assess the adequacy of the implementation 
of firms’ internal risk management policies and procedures.”161  
The SEC’s failure to adequately comply with Pillar II of the 2004 
Basel Accord should be a warning to global regulators.  A failure to 
adequately police the use of the advanced approach will inevitably lead to 
inadequate levels of capital being maintained.  However, adequate 
supervision requires not only promulgated regulations, but adequate 
staffing with the necessary expertise to evaluate the complicated VaR 
models.  Most importantly, regulators need to remain skeptical of executive 
assurances that compliance will be forthcoming.  As Basel II requires, 
agencies need to act swiftly to correct violations of regulations.   
                                                                                                                                      
156 Id.; J. Robert Brown, Reforming the SEC: Dodging a Legislative Bullet, 
THERACETOTHEBOTTOM.ORG, Sept. 29, 2009, http://www.theracetothebottom.o 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The above arguments point in favor of scrapping Basel II’s 
advanced approach, which allows financial institutions to set their capital 
requirements according to their internal risk modeling.  The spectacular 
failure of the VaR models to predict or adequately protect against the 
current financial crisis makes entrusting capital regulation to proprietary 
risk-modeling seem hopelessly misguided.  In particular, the dismal record 
of the SEC’s CSE program provides a warning to international regulators to 
reverse their recent adoption of the Basel II framework.  Instead, 
international regulators should renounce the advanced approach and adopt 
the intermediate approach proposed by U.S. regulators in 2005 (Basel 
IA).162    
Although the Basel Committee could revise the advanced approach 
to provide further guidance to international regulators (which the 
committee has already done),163 the fundamental limitations and flaws of 
the advanced approach cannot be overcome.  More detailed audit standards 
would simply increase the cost of both compliance and regulation.  
Additionally, as recent history has shown us, any updated guidance would 
require constant revision as the financial sector continued to evolve and 
develop new products.  Moreover, more specific rules would only increase 
the burden on regulators who are already understaffed, overworked, and 
inexperienced.  Basel II already requires regulators to review numerous risk 
models for a single institution, not to mention back-testing and stress-
testing the very same models.  Again, as the SEC experiment has shown, 
regulators whose resources are stretched have an incentive to be less 
rigorous.  
  Yet, even armed with sufficient resources, the advanced approach 
contains the worst elements of both rules and standards.  Basel II gives 
international regulators a wide measure of discretion in deciding which 
banks may use the advanced approach and whether the firm’s risk 
management systems satisfy the standards of Basel II.  Such opaque and 
flexible standards make it difficult to compare the compliance of regulators 
in one nation versus another.  This lack of transparency provides an 
incentive for regulators to forgo regulatory action so as to provide the 
                                                                                                                                      
162 See Revised Risk-Based Capital Guidelines, 12 C.F.R. Part 325 (2006) 
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163 See, e.g. BASEL COMMITTEE ON BANKING SUPERVISION, REVISIONS TO THE 
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banks of their own country a competitive advantage.  Though regulators 
attempted to forgo regulatory action under Basel I, their actions were easily 
discovered due to the simplicity of the regulatory framework. 
  Alternatively, Basel IA represents an intermediate approach to 
financial regulation that combines the best elements of Basel I and Basel II. 
Fundamentally, Basel IA provides meaningful improvements to the risk 
sensitivity of Basel I, while imposing minimal increases in regulatory 
burdens.  To increase the risk sensitivity of Basel I, Basel IA significantly 
increases the number of risk-weight categories.164  The addition of more 
risk-weight categories solves Basel I’s greatest flaw (the “one-size-fits all” 
approach) by permitting financial institutions to adjust their capital ratios 
based on the institution’s specific risk profile.  Yet, by abandoning Basel 
II’s advanced approach in favor of a standardized method for calculating 
capital adequacy, Basel IA also reduces the burdens placed on global 
financial regulators.  No longer would regulators be forced to police dozens 
of firm-specific statistical models that are often complicated and beyond 
the comprehension of the average regulator.  Instead, under Basel IA 
regulators would be free to calculate capital adequacy using a standardized 
formula that naturally adjusted to the risk-profile of each financial 
institution.  Because of their simplicity, the regulations included in Basel 
IA are easier to understand and thus, facilitate compliance by financial 
institutions and adequate auditing by regulators.  Further, the Basel IA 
standards are also more transparent; it would not only be easier for 
regulators to audit a financial institution, but would be easier for 
competitors and regulators in other countries to check whether there is 
adequate compliance.  Finally, Basel IA’s simpler rules allow regulators 
and interested parties to more adequately assess the credit and market risks 
posed by individual institutions.  By adopting the Basel IA framework, 
global regulators will help to establish a sustainable path to global financial 
stability.   
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